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Abstract 
This thesis brings together work I have published in the last 
five years in academic journals and edited book collections. All 
the material presented in the thesis, much of it substantially re- 
written, will appear in the trilogy I have been working on since 
my last published book, Radio, Television and Modern Life 
(Blackwell 1996). The organising structure of the thesis and its 
substantive concerns corresponds with that of the three books 
that will come out of it. The form and content of the thesis, and 
its relation to the books, is discussed in some detail in its 
introduction. Its fundamental concern is with human time 
which I have explored in all my writings since I began research 
thirty years ago, with my late friend and colleague David 
Cardiff, into the early history of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation. The medium of radio is time. Historiography deals 
with past time. The academic work of writing history on the 
other, and the temporality of radio and television on the one 
hand, are the first two themes of this thesis which shows that 
the orders of time in which they work are divergent rather than 
convergent. The third section of the thesis attempts their 
reconciliation through the recovery of meaningful time. 
Broadcasting and Time 
Introduction 
All the chapters of this thesis have been published in the last five years in academic journals or 
edited book collections and all will appear-some substantially re-written-in the trilogy on which I 
have been working since the publication in 1996 of my last book, Radio, Television and Modern 
Life. The thesis is organised into three parts each corresponding to one of the three books, while the 
order in which they are presented corresponds with the order of publication for the books that will 
follow from them. Since the structure and unity of the already published material in the thesis is 
derived from the as yet unpublished three books I will begin with a thumbnail sketch of each book 
before turning, in this introduction to a more detailed discussion of the three parts of the thesis, the 
focal concerns of each and what connects them to each other. 
The first book, due out in early 2007, is called Media and Communication. it is an historical review 
and critique of academic developments in the study of media and communication in the 20thcentury. 
It consists of nine chapters each of which offers an account of a key moment in the history of 
academic studies of media and communication with a final chapter that offers an historical review 
and critique, like the conclusion of Culture and Society which I took as a model. I have completed 
eight of the nine chapters with one still only half finished. I have yet to write the last chapter and, in 
fact, the first section of this introduction (The historiography of 'media studies') is the first draft of 
that review and critique. 
The first two chapters of the thesis deal with two key moments in the history of academic 
engagements with the media in the last century. The first recounts the debate in the 1930s between 
Theodor Adomo and Walter Benjamin about the relationship between art, politics and the newly 
emerging 'culture industries'. The second reviews the engagement with study of television at the 
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham in the 1970s. In my introductory 
discussion I treat them as part of two key moments in the historical formation of 'media studies'. 
The first is the development of mass communication research by Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates 
at Columbia in the 1930s and, distinct from but intimately connected with this, the critique of the 
entertainment industries developed by the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in exile in America 
and affiliated to Columbia for a while. The second is the 'moment' of Cultural Studies in Britain 
from which 'media studies' developed. I have completely re-written the two chapters of the thesis 
for the book whose table of contents is shown in Appendix A. Reference to it should clarify how the 
broad historical critique developed in the first section of this introduction is grounded in the book as 
a whole and how the two rather discrete and fragmentary chapters of the thesis are in fact key parts 
of its overall historical structure and narrative. 
The second book is called Television and the Meaning of 'Liveand follows on directly from Radio, 
Television and Modern Life (1996). When I wrote that book I had not fully thought through the 
issues raised by Dayan and Katz's then recently published study of media events. The four chapters 
that make up the second part of the thesis all explore the significance of their book's sub-title, 'The 
live broadcasting of history'. Likewise, although my last book is sub-titled 'A phenomenological 
approach' most of it was written before I had read Heidegger's Being and Time. I was then too 
much under its influence and had no critical distance from it. In the years that have passed I have 
achieved (I hope) a more balanced view of Heidegger's thinking, which remains essential to me, 
particularly in the second part of the thesis. The table of contents of Television and the Meaning of 
'Live'is shown in Appendix B. Like the second part of this thesis, it is made up of case studies of 
particular broadcast programmes. In its introduction I will review historically the academic literature 
on media events before and after Dayan and Katz's ground-breaking work. The conclusion will 
explore the meaning of 'live' broadcasting along the lines explored in the second part of this 
introduction. 
The last book in the trilogy is provisionally called Love and Communication. Its title comes from a 
recent review essay I wrote (Scannell 2005) on Speaking Into the Air by John Durham Peters, 
another work that has deeply influenced my recent thinking. The three chapters in the final part of 
the thesis are meditations on some key issues of substance and method raised by chapters that 
precede them and all will be included in the final volume of the trilogy which stands in a similar 
relation to the two books that precede it. In the introductory commentary on the last part of the 
thesis I pursue a rather more personal line of thought, and try to connect what I think and how I 
think to my own experience of life as it was formed in my early childhood and education. And so 
the final discovery, in this introduction to the thesis, is the link between life and work. But before I 
get to that I must first trace something of that work and account for its historical development and 
what it is about and why. 
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The historiography of 'media studies' 
Chapters one and two of the thesis were written for publication in Canonical Texts (Katz et al 2003) 
a collection which to some extent anticipates my concerns in Media and Communication. The 
selected canonical texts were grouped into four 'schools' (Columbia, Frankfurt, Chicago and 
Toronto in that order) plus a final section called 'British Cultural Studies'. It was a sketch map of 
the key countries and universities in which the study of the media began to be established in the 
course of the last century, but the emphasis was much more on the impact and significance of key 
individual works than on the institutional contexts in which they were produced. As I wrote my 
contributions to Canonical Texts I knew that I would include revised versions of them in my own 
book because both were about the two defining moments in the study of the media: the first being 
the development of the sociology of mass communication at Columbia in the USA in the 1930s and 
the second being the emergence of what came to be called Cultural Studies at Birmingham, UK, in 
the 1970s. 
I had wanted to write a student-friendly guide to the study of media and communication for quite a 
while, but it took me a long time to see clearly what form it should take. I have taught courses on 
'Theories of Communication' for over twenty five years, at undergraduate and graduate levels. In 
recent years most of the graduate students I have taught have been from overseas, with little 
knowledge either of the academic study of media and communication in Europe and North America 
or of their wider economic, political and social contexts. Thus, in class I found myself increasingly 
taking time to spell out the historical contexts in which these academic developments took place and 
so, eventually, I came to the idea of a historical review and critique of the formation of the 
intellectual fields of the study of media and communication in the 20th century. As I got seriously 
stuck into this task I became increasingly fascinated by the problems of historiography that it posed. 
Naturally one tends to start with the concrete and the particular: how Paul Lazarsfeld ended up at 
Columbia and pioneered a social scientific approach to the study of the effects of new media on 
individuals; how the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt also ended up at Columbia, its 
somewhat fraught relationship with Lazarsfeld and its own distinctive 'critical' take on mass 
entertainment; how Stuart Hall theorised the pioneering study of contemporary British culture that 
Richard Hoggart had initiated at Birmingham. Such developments have been quite well covered. 
There are plenty of accounts of Lazarsfeld by those who worked with him and two excellent 
histories of the 'Frankfurt School' (Jay 1974, Wiggershaus 1994) as well as the personal memoirs of 
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key personnel. When we get to Birmingham in the 1970s I have personal recollections to draw on as 
well those who studied there and useful interviews with Hall and others. The accounts that emerge 
of such developments have a familiar narrative structure: there is a host institution, there are 
founding fathers, an emerging agenda, key texts, turf wars perhaps within the founding institution 
(the Media Group versus the Language Group at Birmingham) or against others that arise to 
challenge it (CCCS Theory v Screen Theory). All this is the usual stuff of historical accounts of 
developing academic fields. But what they do not account for are the historical circumstances that 
summoned them into existence in the first place and that seems to me to be the crucial question that 
the historiography of intellectual fields must grapple with. 
It is never simply a question of why things happened as and when and where they did. These are 
partly a matter of chance. The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies was established at 
Birmingham because that happened to be the place where Hoggart got a chair in Literature in the 
early 1960s. But the emergence of intellectual fields of enquiry themselves is never a matter of 
chance. They are a determinate effect of the historical process; responses to the pathologies (the 
disorders) of modernity. They show up, in particular times and places, as one response to 
contemporary anxieties about the world. The form that such responses take is an effect of history in 
the first place, not of the founding institutions and their founding fathers. Thus, if the two key 
moments in the academic study of the media in the 20th century are Columbia in the 30s and 40s and 
Birmingham in the 60s and 70s then what must be accounted for, in the first place, is why each 
moment took the forrn that it did: why did it appear as a social question in 30s America and as a 
cultural question in 70s Britain and why in that order (i. e. why does the social question appear, 
historically, before the cultural)? An immanent account of developments cannot answer the question 
in either case. Thus there are two quite distinct and separate historiographies to the formation of 
intellectual fields: the endogenous histories of particular developments (sociology at Chicago, say) 
and the exogenous history to which they are a response. The former is a plurality, the latter a 
singularity: histories and History. 
If there is one book that clarified my thinking on this matter, it is The Lonely Crowd by David 
Riesman, written in the late 1940s and published in 1950. Riesman argued that a structural 
transformation of the American soul was taking place at that very moment; a transition from the 
inner directed to the other directed individual (Riesman 1950). This restructuring of the self was not 
an endogenous reorganisation of the American psyche but was brought about by exogenous 
historical forces working through contemporary American society, most fundamentally and 
pervasively the transformation of the economy from the production of primary heavy industrial 
goods to the manufacture of secondary, light domestic products. It was the then accelerating 
transition from an economy of scarcity to an economy of abundance that forged a new kind of 
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individual in its own image and likeness. The life-circumstances of individuals were changing from 
work defined patterns of existence to new leisure defined ways of living. The coercive time of work 
and the work-place no longer dominated individual life and experience which were now oriented 
towards free time. The pendulum was swinging from production to consumption. It was a decisive 
change of gear in the long, still continuing world-historical process of societal modernization in 
which subsistence economies and the forms of life developed in adjustment to them gave way to 
unprecedented surplus economies of abundance and new forms of life defined, for the first time, by 
economic choice and freedom. 
One has only to compare Britain and the USA in the 1930s and the 1950s to see the general force of 
this argument. It is a striking contrast. In both countries poverty defined the decade before the 2nd 
World War (lest we forget, it was known as 'the hungry thirties'), whereas increasing prosperity for 
the majority of the population defined the decade that followed it: the Conservatives won an election 
in 1959 with the campaign slogan 'You've never had it so good! ' The 2 nd World war is the historical 
hinge of the last century. It is a bitter historical irony that a war in which 50 million people perished 
resolved the politics of poverty that had precipitated it. In both countries the outbreak of war 
brought about full employment within months and the working population experienced a real rise in 
its general standard of living which continued through the next decade and has been sustained ever 
since. The world we inhabit today is the product of the last world war whose lineaments began to 
appear in the 1950s. It was, as we now can see, a victory for capitalism and democracy, neither of 
which had, up to that moment, seemed particularly compelling, necessary or even desirable in most 
if not all European countries (Dunn 2005). Now it seems 'there is no alternative' to either. Coming 
out of the 1940s the politics of poverty gave way to the politics of plenty and it is this that shows up 
as the fundamental difference between the first and second moment of academic engagement with 
the question of 'the media'. 
The politics of poverty was concerned, unavoidably, with the problem of the masses or what 
Hannah Arendt called 'The social question' (Arendt 1963/1990: 59-114). The politics of plenty 
presupposed the resolution of that problem (ie the dissolution of the masses) before its problematic 
could emerge, as it did, in the 1950s; namely leisure and consumption and the politicisation of 
everyday life. The end of the masses was proclaimed at exactly the same time in the USA and 
Britain in two key academic texts: Personal Influence by Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, and 
Culture and Society by Raymond Williams. There are no masses. There are only ways of seeing 
other people as masses, the latter famously proclaimed, while Katz and Lazarsfeld celebrated 'the 
discovery of "people"' who they had found to be leading active social sociable lives, embedded in 
family and friendship networks at home and work in the various neighbourhoods of Decatur. The 
question of 'culture' comes to the fore as the social question retreats. It presupposes a society no 
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longer ravaged by the evils of primary poverty. Its anxieties are of a different order to that posed by 
poverty and the threat of revolution from 'below'. 'The media' as we know them today bespeak the 
new historical phase of world modernisation that was decisively and irreversibly established in the 
1950s and whose consequences we are living and working through today. Developments in 
communication in the last fifty years are both products of the economics of abundance and a crucial 
means through which its politics has been made visible and problematic and discussable. 
Thus, I want to argue, the two moments of 'media studies' are responses to two different worlds. In 
the 1930s the study of mass communication in America was driven not so much by fear of the 
revolutionary potential of the masses as anxiety about their well-being. What was the effect of 
powerful new communication technologies on the ordinary man? Was he not vulnerable to 
manipulation because he was ill-informed through lack of education and psychologically suggestible 
through economic insecurity? Such were the underlying assumptions of the first important case- 
study of the impact of the first great, and then very new technology of broadcast communication, 
radio. Hadley Cantril's study of The Invasionfrom Mars was subtitled 'A study in the psychology of 
panic'. The fact that large numbers of people were so frightened by a spoof scary play for 
Halloween-an adaptation of The War of the Worlds by H. G. Wells-that they fled their homes and 
took to the road seemed to confirm the power of radio and the vulnerability of 'the common man'. 
It was the task of intellectuals 'to spread knowledge and scepticism more widely among common 
men' so that they might be 'less harassed by the emotional insecurities which stem from 
underprivileged environments' (Cantril et al 1940: 205). That important task was addressed in Paul 
Lazarsfeld's key study of Radio and the Printed Page, published in the same year, whose aim was 
to answer the question 'uppermost in the minds of many citizens: what will radio do to society? ' and 
to provide those concerned with mass education with an analysis of the conditions in which the 
"masses") would or would not expose themselves to education by radio (Lazarsfeld 1940: 133). The 
theme of Mass Persuasion was addressed at exactly this time, in Robert Merton's elegant study of 
audience responses to Kate Smith's marathon radio broadcast to promote the purchase of 
government war bonds. 
All these studies of the impact of radio in the late 30s and early forties presupposed its direct and 
powerful impact on the lonely crowd; the powerless, susceptible, under-educated urban masses. 
Underpinning these concerns were further assumptions about the character and experience of social 
life at that time. In his study of Mass Persuasion Merton interpreted contemporary social life as 
essentially false, characterised by pseudo-Gemeinschaft, anomie and cynicism. These were not the 
effects of the media in the first place but of anxieties and uncertainties generated by chronic 
personal financial insecurity and the harsh, competitive pressures of a society driven by money in 
which everyone aspired to be a winner and the losers had no-one to turn to and no-one to blame but 
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themselves (Merton 2004). At the same time, and in sharp contrast to this, the appeal of Kate Smith 
(and what prompted so many to buy war bonds in responses to her broadcast) lay in her apparent 
ordinariness, genuineness and sincerity. Merton's classic study of the impact of radio on the masses 
served to problematise the social morality of contemporary America on the cusp of its structural 
transformation so presciently diagnosed by David Riesman. 
The 1950s was the pivotal decade in which this transformation was decisively established and began 
to be worked through on the newly discovered terrain of 'everyday life'. I am not suggesting, of 
course, that something called everyday life did not exist before the 1950s-that would be absurd- 
but rather that it achieved an entirely novel salience and importance at this time. The simple fact that 
it now begins to appear as an object of academic thought and enquiry is remarkable enough for 
hitherto it had been deemed unworthy of the attentions of history and literature, below the radar of 
sociology and an impossible object for philosophy. It first appears from the rubble of war-tom 
France in Henri Lefebvre's quite remarkable Critique ofEveryday Life (1947/1992). In America it 
achieves definitive recognition in Erving Goffman's Presentation ofSeýf in Everyday Life (1959) 
which takes for granted that the self in question is indeed the new 'other-directed' type identified by 
Riesman. In Britain along with the work of Hoggart and Williams who redeem the ordinary and the 
everyday from the condescensions of Literary Studies, I want to emphasize the quite different, but 
no less important work of J. L. Austin and H. P. Grice who pioneered the philosophy of ordinary 
language on the stony soil of Oxford philosophy in the 1950s. Their work was fundamental to 
establishing ordinary language and its everyday (non academic) usage as a valid object of academic 
enquiry, thereby making possible the beginnings of an adequate understanding of human 
communication. Finally at the end of the decade Jurgen Habermas published in Germany The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere a key work which argued for the political opinions 
of ordinary people and the ways in which these were arrived at as the historical and normative basis 
of modem democracy. 
These academic developments are one indicator of the quite new importance of everyday life in 
post-war North America and Europe. But it shows up in all sorts of ways. It is there in the theatre, 
novels and films of the decade but nowhere more than television, which now becomes the definitive 
new medium of everyday life. And most significantly of all it begins to show up as a new kind of 
politics, as the politics of the masses gives way to the politics of everyday life. The first stirrings of 
the new politics show up in the United States: the civil rights movement, the women's movement 
and, a little later, the student movement. This was not a politics produced or led by established 
organisations and their representatives. It came from ordinary people and what they wanted was 
something other than what traditional politics offered. Foucault has distinguished between three 
forms of oppression: exploitation, domination and subjection. The first is economic and concerns 
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the struggle for subsistence; the second is ideological and concerns the struggles over imposed 
political and religious authority, and the third is social and cultural and concerns the struggle to be 
allowed to be oneself in public (Foucault 1982). The new social movements, as they began to 
articulate their own self-understanding, were concerned with this third claim. The politics of 
recognition, as it was aptly called by Charles Taylor (1994), has grown in global significance in the 
last half century. In many ways its defining moment was the refusal of Rosa Parks to give up her 
seat to a white passenger on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama on December 10 1955: an act which in 
itself perfectly encapsulates the then new politics of everyday life. 
This politics is no longer concerned with distributive justice (the politics of poverty) and its demand 
for freedom from want. The riddle of post-modemity and the politics of plenty concerns what comes 
after that. As the corrosive fear of poverty fades and as most people find they have some control 
over their life choices and circumstances the question of freedom ceases to be about freedomfrom 
something (from the five giants of want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness, for instance, that 
the Beveridge Report of 1942 was designed to overcome) and poses a new, quite different 
question-freedomfor something... but what? Amartya Sen has posed this issue most forcefully. 
The greatest of the evils of poverty is its denial of the right of individuals to discover and develop 
their human capabilities; their entitlement to a full, fulfilled existence (Sen 2000). That is the new 
condition of existence established in the advanced economies in the last sixty years. Working 
through what it means has been, and remains a core concern in post-modem democracies. It is the 
essence of the politics of culture and it hailed into existence a new academic field of enquiry to try 
and get to grips with it: Cultural Studies. 
Cultural Studies takes the ordinary and the everyday as its object of enquiry. It began, in orthodox 
fashion, with the everyday life and culture of the English working class in the 1950s and developed 
in response to the new cultural politics of the 1960s. Its task was to identify and account for the 
significance of these developments, initially in terms of their impact on working class life. I have 
tried, in my account of the moment of 'media studies' at Birmingham in the 1970s, to do justice to 
the real difficulties and complexities of this task. It is notable how the initial 'settled' task of 
CCCS-the heritage of Hoggart-was unsettled by the impact of the new social movements, not 
only race and feminism but the student revolution of the late 1960s as well, which all combined to 
produce a peculiarly febrile working environment in that fractious decade. 
The crux of the matter was clearly identified in Stuart Hall's cogent analysis of the two paradigms in 
Cultural Studies: the culturalist and the structuralist (Hall 1980). The first generation had privileged 
'lived experience' as the authenticating, validating category of everyday existence. The new 
structuralisms undermined that claim. Lived experience could not be claimed as validating anything 
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since what determined it was quite simply beyond its grasp. Lived experience was an effect of 
ideological forces that reconciled individuals to their immediate circumstances and thereby to the 
economic and political forces which deten-nined those circumstances. Hall's ideology critique, 
which I find problematic in many ways, nevertheless clearly and accurately identified the 
fundamental 'problematic' of the politics of the everyday; the status of human experience and the 
enigmatic character of ordinary daily life. That enigma, in the 1970s, showed up most clearly in the 
dominant communicative medium of everyday life, television, whose seeming immediacy and 
transparency appeared precisely to validate the facticity of ordinary lived experience while 
mystifying the hidden forces of economic and political domination that produced it as such. The 
key text produced by the Media Studies group was a study of how everyday television did precisely 
that. Everyday Television: 'Nationwideby Charlotte Brunsdon and David Morley (1978) is today 
quite unjustly ignored in preference for the subsequent study of the programme's audience that 
Morley (1980) produced. But the earlier work is far more substantial than its successor whose aim 
was to check out the validity of its analysis of the ideological work performed by the programme, 
the ways in which it interpelleted its audience as a nation of families with a shared set of 
unexamined commonsense values and assumptions about Englishness and the English way of life. It 
served to demonstrate the force of Halls's ideology critique of lived experience, its evasions and 
concealments. 
If we now compare the two moments of 'media studies' we can see in what ways they were like 
and unlike each other. Both presume the power of the media and both are concerned with its social 
and cultural effects on those on their receiving end. James Curran has argued that the revived 
concern with audiences studies in the 1980s was, in effect, a revival of the agenda of American 
effects studies thirty or more years earlier (Curran 1996). There is more truth in this than the 
defenders of new reception and ethnographic studies will allow, yet the differences are striking. In 
the 1930s the question of media effects was a pre-conception for the new social science of mass 
communication and, as such, was treated as empirically provable or disprovable. The discovery of 
the two-step flow of media influence challenged and revised the initial working hypothesis which 
fell into abeyance for a time after the publication in 1955 of Personal Influence. The question of 
media power needed to be re-thought and the theory of ideology revived it. This time though the 
assumed power of television was not an open question. That was foreclosed from the start, for its 
ideological effect was not an assumption to be tested but a theoretical a priori. The concrete task of 
ideology critique was to show how it worked and with what effects for media audiences. it too 
faded as the discovery of 'active audiences' begin to show (yet again) that individuals were not 
merely the bearers of ideological effects but used the media as aspects of their life-styles and self- 
definitions. Different premises in each case, I suggest, but with similar outcomes in the turn to 
audiences and reception studies. But crucially, as I have tried to show, the politics of these two 
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moments are different. The politics of poverty and the question of the masses which defined the 
thirties have a different basis to the politics of plenty and the question of everyday life which 
defined the 50s and since. Each was a response to the state of the world in its own time. The 
difference between them is an effect of the slow structural transformation of global capitalism in 
transition from an economy of scarcity to one of abundance. The world of post-modem consumer- 
oriented capitalism is very different from that of early modem producer-oriented capitalism. 
I would like to suggest, by way of tentative conclusion, that the crucial difference between these two 
politics can be thought of in moral and ethical terms; more exactly that the politics of poverty is a 
moral question, whereas the politics of plenty raises ethical questions. Morality is concerned with 
the conditions of social existence; with how we live with each other. It is the normative social 
question. It is about the basis of a just and fair society. Poverty is an affront to any such notion and 
modem theories of justice (Rawls (1971/1999) and Sen (2000) are about social fairness. Ethics is a 
refinement of basic moral questions. It concerns the good life and only becomes salient, as the 
question of how to live, for individuals and societies that have risen above the realm of necessity. 
That poverty is a basic social injustice to be remedied by political action is a distinctively modem 
concept (Flieschacker 2005), and its elimination from the lives of the majority of its citizens is a real 
achievement of advanced capitalist democracies since the end of World War 2. What these societies 
now face are a whole series of ethical questions that have arisen only as the earlier pandernic disease 
of poverty has faded. Fat is indeed a political and ethical issue today. It was not in the hungry 
thirties. The characteristic dilemmas of post-modernity arise from our difficulties in finding 
common ground about what a good and meaningful life might consist of in unprecedented 
conditions of economic abundance. 
If we ask what the politics of plenty is about we might agree with John Dunn's analysis of the story 
of democracy as the triumph of the party of egotism over the party of equality. We have settled for 
security and comfort, ease and amusement. That, in Dunn's view, is what contemporary 
democracies deliver for the ma ority of its citizens (Dunn 2005). Is the good life no more than this- 
shopping, eating out, holidays abroad and the continuing banquet dished up daily and weekly by the 
contemporary entertainment industries? Should we not take seriously those who warn that we are 
amusing ourselves to death? Such questions indicate something of the ethical dilemmas we face 
today. They also point to our difficulties in knowing how to begin to answer them if it is the case, as 
Alisdair MacIntyre has so vigorously argued, that we no longer know the meaning of the virtues 
(MacIntyre 1985). The critics of modernity had a clear moral basis from which to denounce the evils 
of poverty. We have no clear perspective on the goods and evils that prosperity has brought us. This, 
our post-modem dilemma, shows up in post-modem thinking which lacks any normative basis and 
is simply uncomfortable with moral categories (Bauman 1993). 
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The original sociology of mass communication, as I read it, had a clear normative basis in both its 
key academic articulations; Lazarsfeld and Merton just as much as Adorno and Horkheimer. Merton 
in particular was concerned with the condition of the masses in a society characterised by cynicism 
and anomie. Critical Theory's devastating critique of Enlightem-nent was intended somehow to 
salvage its original emancipatory promise, but how that might happen was beyond the reach of 
Horkheimer and Adomo's thinking in the early 1940s. For them the 2 nd World War was indeed the 
end of reason. There is a similar clear moral basis to the thought of the first generation of cultural 
criticism in Britain. Both Williams and Thompson write in the name of social justice and on behalf 
of the underprivileged. But when we get to the 1970s, the study of culture and the media has lost 
any normative grounding. There is no moral basis that I can see in ideology critique. One can see 
what is being criticised (power) but why it is being criticised and in the name of what remains quite 
opaque. This lack of moral clarity is not, of course, the fault of Stuart Hall or anyone else in those 
years. It is rather an effect of the exogenous world historical process in play at that time. One of the 
most striking features of Birmingham in the 1970s as I have described it was the frantic pursuit of 
Theory in order to get some compass bearings on what the world was about and where it was 
heading. That pursuit led to the cultural relativism of the 1980s and the loss of confidence in the 
possibility of normative critique and judgement, for any such attempt was immediately torpedoed by 
the charge of Western phallogocentrism. The moral confusions of post-modernity are the effects of 
an economy of abundance which has brought about an increasingly diverse and pluralized world 
celebrated as such in multicultural identity politics. This world, our world, has no recognizable 
moral basis to it and no shared ethical concerns. And it is precisely this that presses on us with 
increasing urgency at the start of this century. 
In the very last part of Media and Communication I try to salvage communication itself as a 
fundamental moral, rational, human process. My critique of the two moments in which the academic 
study of the media was formed in the last century focuses in the end on the significant absence, in 
each case, of any coherent account of the meaning (the significance) of communication or how it 
worked. There was, of course a model of communication put forward in the 1930s and in the 1970s: 
a transmission model of transmitter > message > receiver, and the well-known encoding/decoding 
model advanced by Hall which drew on, but significantly revised the earlier direct transmission 
model. Neither of these began to address the question of communication as I understood it but then, 
as my historical account shows, in neither case was communication a focal matter of concern. In the 
late 1970s a group of colleagues at the Polytechnic of Central London decided to establish a new 
journal for the new field of Media Studies. We called it Media, Culture & Society. There was no big 
debate about the name. It simply served to acknowledge the core concerns of the study of the media 
in terms of their social and cultural impact. The journal's name confin-ns the historical thesis 
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outlined above: that what started as a social critique of mass communication in the 1930s changed, 
for reasons suggested, into a cultural critique at the time of the journal's foundation. In each case the 
media were examined in terms of the operation of exogenous historical processes at play in and 
through them. It is, of course, interesting to examine the play of contemporary social and cultural 
processes in new institutions and technologies, but they can equally well be examined (and were, 
with similar results) in other institutions, notably education. Althusser's shopping list of ISAs 
included education, religion and the family as well as the media. My key criticism of both moments 
is that neither engages with what I take to be the defining immanent characteristic of media as new 
technologies of communication. 
So the title Media and Communication has, for me at least, more than a hint of irony. When you pair 
words in this way you suggest that they have some natural affinity to each other, like 'love' and 
6 marriage' or 'culture' and 'society'. No such natural affinity between media and communication 
has yet been established in Media Studies. The key developments in the understanding of 
communication and how it works took place elsewhere: in the historical work of Innis, the sociology 
of interaction (Goffman and Garfinkel), ordinary language philosophy (Austin and Grice), the 
emergence of pragmatics (Brown and Levinson) and the analysis of conversation (Sacks and his 
successors) and finally in the theory of communicative rationality developed by Habermas. These 
are mapped in Media and Communication as all contributing to the discovery and analysis of talk as 
the universal expressive, communicative medium of everyday life and the beginnings of its 
empirical observation and analysis. The Ross Priory Group has explored the study of talk, in its 
many forms, as the communicative medium of radio and television since the start of the 1990s. My 
continuing participation in the work of this group from its inception forms the basis of the next 
section of this thesis. The material under discussion in chapters three to six was first presented and 
discussed at the seminar in Broadcast Talk held each year in the incomparable setting of Ross Priory 
on the shores of Loch Lomond. 
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The care structures of live broadcasting 
I have never thought of communication as an abstraction requiring theoretical models to account for 
it (McQuail 2005). 1 encountered it as a practical dilemma that confronted broadcasters as they went 
about their business of discovering how to 'do' their business in the early years of the BBC. In this 
respect David Cardiff s brilliant reconstruction of the work of the Talks Department from its 
foundation in 1927 through to the outbreak of war came as a revelation to me. It showed the cardinal 
significance of talk as the communicative medium of radio and the many problems that it presented 
for Talks producers. Well before our social history was finished I had begun to search for ways of 
getting some purchase on how radio talk worked as a communicative practice between institution 
and audiences. Serniotics, as an extension of Saussurian linguistics, was then the preferred tool for 
the analysis of media 'language' but it had nothing to say about talk or how it worked, for structural 
linguistics rejected from the start the very possibility of analysing linguistic utterances. Langue was 
privileged overparole. Martin Montgomery, a socio-linguist, was a friend from the early 1980s and 
I keenly supported his exploratory work in analysing radio DJ talk. At the same time I somehow got 
in touch with John Heritage at Warwick who, with his PhD student, David Greatbatch, was 
pioneering the analysis of the broadcast political interview. Their work, and that of Ian Hutchby on 
radio phone-ins, introduced me to Garfinkel and Sacks, ethnomethodology and Conversation 
Analysis. I brought all this together in a special issue of Media Culture & Society (October 1986) 
on Broadcast Talk and pursued the issues first raised there in the follow-on collection of the same 
name published by Sage in 199 1. Martin founded the Ross Priory annual meeting in the same year 
as a way for all of us to continue sharing and discussing our on-going study of talk on radio and 
television. 
Since then there have been three key books that have profoundly affected my work on broadcast 
communication: Media Events by Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz (Scannell 1995), Being and Time by 
Martin Heidegger (which I first read about ten years ago) and, most recently, Speaking into the Air 
by John Durham Peters (Scannell 2005). The impact of all three shows up in Chapter 3 in which I 
discuss a famous wartime programme, The Brains Trust. I had done research on this programme at 
the end of the 1970s when David Cardiff and I were commissioned by the Open University to write 
a unit about radio and World War 2 for a new cross-disciplinary course (U203) on Popular Culture. 
13 
I knew then that it deserved more detailed attention than we could give it, but it was only about five 
years ago that I finally saw what was so fascinating about it. Three things came together for the first 
time in my thinking about The Brains Trust: what was at stake in the management of live-to-air talk, 
the invisibility of the production process in radio and television and its transcendent impersonal 
character. The first point owes much to Dayan and Katz, the second to Heidegger, and the third to 
Peters. All three are subsumed in and by the central concept of the care-structure, one of 
Heidegger's most profound insights. 
The Brains Trust is a key programme in the history of programme-making and, as I show, it could 
only have happened in the unprecedented context of a total war and the BBC's new-found 
commitment to making programmes with wide popular appeal. What that means, as far as radio is 
concerned, is making programmes to which people would want to tune in and stay with. The switch 
to unscripted talk is of course the basis of its historical significance as well as its instant popular 
appeal at the time. But it was the management of a particular kind of unscripted talk that Howard 
Thomas pioneered. The programme seems to have invented public discussion (not just for 
broadcasting) and is the parent of the still-running Any Questions on Radio 4 and Question Time on 
BBC I, hosted by the Dimbleby brothers. In my account I attend to the particularities of the 
management of live-to-air studio discussion as these were observed and attended to by the 
programme's producer, Howard Thomas. And this leads to the fundamental issue of the invisibility 
of the labour process in radio and television and why it should be so. 
Back in the 1970s this was regarded with deep suspicion. My readers will doubtless recall the great 
debate in the pages of Screen concerning the reactionary character of television 'naturalism', the 
progressive character of Brechtian techniques for film and television and the problematic character 
of 'bourgeois' television drama and documentary. We were all caught up in it. I taught courses for 
years that included screenings of Days ofHope and The Cheviot, the Stag and the Black, Black Oil. 
The whole debate was served up again in Popular Television and Film, one of the three course 
books produced to support U203. There is no need for me to re-heat it here. The crucial point is the 
deep suspicion at the time of the concealment by television (and cinema) of its own 'mode of 
production'. The ineffable Colin MacCabe's critique of 'the classic realist text' was highly 
influential. In his notes on some Brechtian theses he developed an argument that the realist novel of 
the I 9th century and later realist film narrative both conceal the materiality of the processes that 
constitute them as a written or filmic text (in Bennett et al 1981: 216-235). The reader or viewer is 
stitched (sutured) unawares into the text by practices of writing and film-making which render 
themselves invisible and conceal the material apparatuses on which they depend (the publishing and 
film industries and their material products). The effect of this is to place the reader/viewer in an 
illusory position of dominance (mastery) in relation to the text. The reader experiences the 
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novel/film as if it offered transparent access to a fictional real world. Or rather, it is the fictionality 
of this world that is elided by the formal operations of the text. The na*fve reader does not (because 
s/he cannot) see that in either case, the novel or film is in fact a construction that produces an 
illusion (effect) of reality. For McCabe (following Eco and Barthes who had made the same point 
earlier), the revolutionary text is that which reveals its own constructed character by insisting on 
making visible the materiality of its production, just as Brechtian theatre insisted on making explicit 
the theatricality of what was happening on stage. 
I remember teaching all this with a slightly queasy feeling at the time, but I could not put my finger 
on what was wrong with it and I certainly had no available position from which to develop a 
counter-argument. What I did know, from my own work on radio, was that any programme that 
went on air was the result of a great deal of hidden thought, effort and care but it was not until I read 
Being and Time in the mid 90s that I at last saw another way of accounting for how this was 
embedded in the production process. Part One of Being and Time is a journey that leads to the 
discovery of care as the truth of Dasein (humanity). Care is not some floating metaphysical essence. 
It is certainly not it a 'value' or norm. Rather it is immanent in every humanly made thing and in the 
environment (the umwelt) in all its parts and as a whole. It is the summational character of the 
human world understood by Heidegger as 'a relational totality of involvements'. The key question 
is 'how do we encounter the world? ' This is not a theoretical, academic question. It asks rather how 
we deal with it; how it is that we each can go about our daily business in the world in ways that are 
essentially unproblematic. That we know and understand how to deal with the environment is 
obvious. What is not obvious at all is precisely how it is that the things which make up the 
environment (the life world) 'give' themselves in such ways as to be available for use by us, 
practically, immediately and essentially unproblematically. What are the conditions of the 
intelligibility of things? Or, more exactly, how do we know what to do with them? What and who 
are theyfor? 
These matters are discussed in the celebrated chapter on 'the worldliness of the world' and 
particularly in relation to hammers (Heidegger 1962: 91-148). We show our understanding of what a 
hammer is by putting it to appropriate use. We are able to figure what that usage is from the design 
of the thing which discloses what it is for. The shaft is to-be-grasped. The head is for-striking- 
things. Its usage is implicated in its design which discloses what it is for and how it is to be used. 
This is the meaning of things: their meant and intended usage, their point and purpose. Things, 
understood in this way, never exist in isolation from other things. Every particular thing is itself part 
of an activity-whole which it bespeaks. The hammer presupposes nails and things that can be nailed 
(wood) and things that are to be nailed (the floorboard) and so on. The car presupposes roads, planes 
airports and so on. Things are pragmata. They are meant and intended for use. As such they enable 
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us to do the things that we do in every situation we encounter every day of our lives. The everyday 
world is action-oriented in all its parts and as a whole. We encounter the environment, wherever we 
are, as an all ways all ready fore-given relation totality of things which separately and together 
'give' the possibility of what we are doing there. Things have their whereabouts. I do not keep pots 
and pans in the bedroom. The kitchen is an environment (what Heidegger calls 'a region') in which 
the preparation of food is possible only by virtue of the totality of available appropriate things and 
the totality of their arrangements for that activity. And all this presupposes care. Care is implicit in 
every aspect of every thing. It is the relational totality of every thing in any and every region. And, 
Heidegger goes on, it reveals our human essence, the truth of what we are, as being-in-concern. Mea 
res agitur (Heidegger 1992: 8E). I am my concerns: an action oriented definition of being-in-the- 
world. But the possibility of my concerns is given by the world-of-concern that is always already 
there in advance of me and which shapes the terms and conditions of the things that concern me. 
This, when I first read it (and to this day) struck me as quite wonderful and I am wholly persuaded 
by it. It yields a powerful pragmatics of meaning: it begins to reveal the meaning-full-ness of 
humanly made things and practices. They are meaningful because they are care-full: care is the 
meaning of meaning. Still the analysis begs a number of questions. It's notable that Heidegger's 
hammer is a pretty primitive tool that elicits a pretty primitive practice. What of something complex 
like radio or television? In short what is not accounted for by Heidegger is how the hammer gets to 
be the thing-for-use that it is. The study of the production process in radio and television can 
(should) be thought of, following Heidegger, as a care structure, a particular relational totality of 
practices that come together to deliver the programme-as-broadcast. What are programmesfor? 
They are to be listened to or watched. Those conditions (of listenability and watchability) don't just 
happen. They are the result of real thought, effort, experiment, mistakes and adjustments in the prior 
work of production. The study of production shows how the final thing (the programme-as- 
broadcast) gets to be what it is in the ways that it is. The care-structure of a thing is the achieved 
realisation and articulation of all the prior concern (care) that it elicited from the moment of its 
conception. But why is all this labour hidden. Why does it not disclose itself as the critics of 
television drama in the 1970s demanded? 
To answer that question I needed John Peters' analysis of Christ's parable of The Sower which gives 
us a wonderfully counter-intuitive interpretation of broadcasting (Peters 1999). The prevalent 
academic view of radio and television was that they were if not distorted at least deficient forms of 
communication. Broadcasting is a one-way form of communication (as proposed in the transmission 
model). A powerful transmitting source delivers messages to powerless individual receivers: active 
transmission > passive reception. There is no feedback in this system, no way in which those who 
receive the message can respond to or interact with it. True communication is dialogue between two 
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people in each others presence. Peters takes Socrates as the great exponent of this form of 
communication. He interprets both (Socrates and Jesus) as teachers of two different kinds of love, 
eros and agape. Eros is the incarnate love of human beings for each other, and is normatively that 
which is between two people: the Phaedrus, which Peters discusses, is the paradigmatic text that 
pre-supposes love as dialogue. The parable of The Sower is the paradigm of Christ's own discourse 
and method that shows how he himself spreads the Word; how he teaches the indiscriminate love of 
God for all human beings. Broadcasting is like the love of God precisely because it is one-way, 
non-reciprocal and indiscriminate. This is not its limitation but its blessing: it is a gift that makes no 
demands, that gives without expecting acknowledgement or thanks, in which the giver conceals (as 
Christ counselled) the act of giving from those who receive it. Eros is a wonderful thing; but it is 
binding and coercive. It demands reciprocity. It requires mutual commitment. It is a conditional 
bargain. It is entered into by both parties with good faith and in the shared hope of mutually 
supportive happiness, but if it fails there will be recriminations, accusations of bad faith and much 
unhappiness. Agape imposes no conditions and makes no demands. It gives in good faith and in the 
hope that it may be received in good faith, but if it is not it makes no complaint. Rejection is allowed 
for and accepted in principle from the start. The indiscriminate scatter of broadcasting is intended 
for each and all to use as they see fit. Or not. The difference between the two, eros and agape, points 
up the gap between non-transcendent and transcendent love, the love that is between human beings 
and the love of the world. 
Can one argue for agape or non-reciprocal love, in strictly non-theological terms, as immanent in 
worldly things and practices? It seems to me to be a necessary argument if we are to redeem things 
and practices from the hermeneutics of suspicion and the destructiveness of scepticism. In so doing 
what is restored is trust; not trust in God (long since eroded) but trust in the world. These things- 
trust and suspicion-stand in a dialectical relationship to each other and the question of which is 
prevalent is, as always, a matter of history. The first phase of world modernization (from the French 
Revolution to the end of World War 2) was characterised by suspicion. Contemporary accounts 
from the I 9th century testify to life as the war of all against all. In both the natural and the human 
world life was a struggle to the death and only the fittest survived. The rest perished. 'Do other men, 
for they would do you', the grim philosophy of Jonas Chuzzlewit, sums up how to survive in a 
threatening, hostile, dangerous environment. Suspicion was the necessary default position in a world 
that was, really and truly, malevolent. 
The post-war transformation that I have outlined above has tipped the balance in favour of a 
renewed trust-in-the-world. Henri Lefebvre saw this emerging in a France still reeling from the 
horrors of the war: 
17 
In the course of our study we will attempt wherever possible to demonstrate the new marvels 
which are being born at the very heart of mediocrity. They are simple, human marvels. Let us 
name one of them without further ado: trust. 
It is as old a social life itself-, very close to naivety, to foolishness; always abused from 
childhood on (trust in one's parents, in masters and bosses, priests and gods, faith and destiny, 
love); always changed into a distrust which is almost as unexpressed as the initial naivety- 
today trust in life is taking root in life and becoming a need. In the contradictory dualism 'trust- 
distrust'-contradictory in an embryonic, suppressed way, more ambiguous than antagonistic- 
trust is slowly getting the upper hand. In spite of the most dreadful trials, the most awful 
illusions, it is getting stronger. Today trust is bursting forth, today trust is growing. We will see 
how it is at work deep in the heart of the everyday, and how it works through its opposite, 
doubt-the restless need for material security. [Lefebvre 1992 (1947): 51] 
What an astonishing perception this is, when one considers the bitter recriminations in France at the 
time of writing. But it points to an emerging truth about the post-war world. Trust is neither blind 
faith, nor a pious wager. It presupposes the reliability of things and persons. The post-modem world 
we now inhabit demands trust in both as the condition of its continuing existence. Two examples 
must suffice by way of illustration: trust in people and trust in things. 
Erving Goffman is the post-modem sociologist. One of his most brilliant perceptions is the 
phenomenon of 'civil inattention'. The possibility of being in public with others, who we do not 
know, without anxiety or fear-a central theme of Behaviour in Public Places (1963)-is a long, 
historical and still incomplete process. It is foundational for the kind of world which we, in fact, 
inhabit, since our world, of necessity, throws all of us into contact with strangers on a daily basis. If 
we are to accomplish the myriad small tasks and interactions of daily life we must be able to be in 
the presence of strangers, to deal with them, to interact with them without it being an issue, a 
problem, a source of anxiety, fear or hostility. This is what Goffman draws our attention to as 'the 
courtesy' of civil inattention: 
In performing this courtesy the eyes of the looker may pass over the eyes of the other, but no 
"recognition" is typically allowed. Where the courtesy is performed between two persons 
passing on the street, civil inattention may take the special form of eyeing the other up to 
approximately eight feet, during which sides of the street are apportioned by gesture, and then 
casting the eyes down as the other passes-a kind of dimming of lights. In any case, we have 
here what is perhaps the slightest of interpersonal rituals, yet one that constantly regulates the 
social intercourse of persons in our society. 
By according civil inattention, the individual implies that he has no reason to suspect the 
intentions of the others present and no reason to fear the others, to be hostile to them, or wish to 
avoid them. (At the same time, in extending this courtesy he automatically opens himself up to 
like treatment from others present. ) This demonstrates that he has nothing to fear or avoid in 
being seen and being seen seeing, and that he is not ashamed of himself or of the place and 
company in which he finds himself. (Goffman 1963: 84) 
Civil inattention contributes to freeing up the very possibility of a civil society in which being in the 
presence of others in open public spaces without fear or threat is generally and mutually allowed. It 
presupposes a general equality of being insofar as anyone may expect to be treated with civil 
inattention by anyone else. As such it is a recent historical phenomenon and an important indication 
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of the democratization of civil society and everyday life. Marshall Berman has written a brilliant 
account of being in public on the streets of St Petersburg in the 19thcentury: on Nevsky Prospect it 
appears that high ranking individuals expected inferiors to step aside as they approached. They 
walked as if not seeing them, as if they were invisible (Berman 1983: 173-286, especially 219-228). 
Nor was civil inattention a universal experience in America of the 1950s. Goffman points to the 
"hate stare" that Southern whites gratuitously gave to Negroes walking past them (Goffmann 1959: 
151-3). The civil rights movement in the USA was triggered precisely by the demand for the right to 
civil inattention (on the buses for instance) and thereby to be treated as an ordinary person 'like 
anyone else'. Civil inattention gives the possibility of being-with-others in public in ways that are 
essentially non-problematic. Without it the ontology of the social (being with others) is threatened, 
for the world is, first and last, a public matter and it matters that it is, as such, freely and publicly 
available to all and in the same way. 
Trust in things is equally historically determined. It is evident from the literature of the first half of 
the 20'hcentury that there were enormous anxieties about the seemingly machine dominated world 
of that time. 'The question concerning technology' preoccupied Leavis in Britain just as much as 
Heidegger in Germany and it was of course a theme of popular culture: Chaplin's Modern Times, 
with its defining image of Charlie as the little man literally caught up as a cog in the machine 
illustrates common sense perceptions about technological domination in the pre-war era. If these 
anxieties have faded, as I think they have, it is because technology (in its most general sense) has 
become a great deal safer and more reliable than it was in early modemity. The technologies of the 
I 9th century depended on water and steam power and fossil fuels. Machinery was large, noisy, dirty 
and dangerous to life and limb. In the last sixty years we have experienced an unprecedented rate of 
technological innovation. Life conditions today are the effect of the harnessing and application of 
newer energy sources (oil, electricity and atomic power) and extraordinary developments in 
increasingly miniaturised micro- and nano-technologies. The modem home, wired for electricity, 
wanned by central heating, is stuffed with electrical gadgets and equipment most of which did not 
exist before the 1950s (a PEP report of 1947 predicted that the electric washing machine would not 
catch on). 
Today we expect to buy things that are safe, easy to use, reliable and durable. Caveat emptor no 
longer applies. Things come today with warranties and guarantees. Nor is this happenstance. it is the 
realised, achieved and accomplished, practical outcome, through the years, of continuing thought 
and effort, trial and error, research, development and innovation in the making of things. And this is 
not an endogenous development in the histories of technologies. It is as much the result of 
continuing exogenous political pressures that have demanded that things be made safe and reliable: 
consumer activism, official enquiries and reports, legislation, setting of standards, regulation, 
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monitoring and supervision. All of this is built into today's everyday appliances but invisible. It is 
the hidden care-structure of today's technologies. It is what 'gives' us things as 'user-friendly' so 
that anyone and everyone (a child) can use them. It is what makes the world safe. Cars, trains and 
planes are intrinsically dangerous, life-threatening technologies. Who on earth would risk their life 
in a plane unless this utterly implausible form of human transport was safe to all practical intents 
and purposes? The use of planes as an instrument of destruction on September II th 2001 serves to 
show, by its hideous incongruity, the taken for granted trust in the everyday world that is its 
underpinning and which was so grievously violated on that day. 
It is time to pull together these reflections and draw them back to what prompted them. If we mostly 
take things for granted it is because that is what they grant us. Things 'give' themselves in ways that 
enable us to use them for our own purposes. That is their gift to us. This is as true of a television 
programme as a television set. Neither tells us how it was made. If we applied the 1970s critique of 
television more widely we would demand that the technology should not conceal itself. We should 
have television sets without their casings. That too would remind us that television is an apparatus, a 
construction. What was the point of those objections to bourgeois television drama and 
documentary? At bottom I think they indicated deep anxieties and fears of technology and 
mediation. Until very recently the world was experienced by individuals as fraught, dangerous and 
untrustworthy in respect of other people and other things. If it was so experienced it is because in 
many ways it was so. The world has become safer and more reliable. Trust has grown, as Lefebvre 
anticipated. It has taken root, as he foresaw, 'deep in the heart of the everyday'. This is what I saw 
in my work on the production process in radio and television and in the nature of the communicative 
relationship between broadcasters and audiences. 
The social relations of production (producers-products-consumers) in broadcasting as much as in 
commodity manufacturing is split. The moment of encoding is indeed distinct from the moment of 
decoding. It is very difficult to hold these two moments together; to see over both sides of the wall 
at the same time, so to speak. On the whole the study of media has focused on one or other side of 
the wall: production or consumption and mostly the latter. There is less work on the production side. 
In reception and audience studies the whole invisible labour of production is simply taken as given. 
I was profoundly impressed by the real moral seriousness, at every level, of the production process 
in the BBC (then and now). Having given an account of it in the Social History, I wished 
subsequently to accountfor it. The chapter on the Brains Trust begins to make articulate what for 
many years was largely inexpressible for me. Here I have tried to elaborate a little on its basic 
themes and will return to some of them (especially the transcendent, impersonal character of care) in 
the third and last section of this commentary. For the moment I must turn to the other key themes of 
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the second section of the thesis, as contained in chapter seven and the catastrophic events of 
September II th 2001. 
I was invited by Daniel Dayan to contribute to a special issue about the media and 9/11 that he was 
putting together in its aftermath for Dossiers de LAudio-Visuelle. One of my undergraduate 
students, Paul Pheasey, who had taken my course on Media Events, had just produced a wonderful 
dissertation on CNN's live coverage on the day, from the moment its cameras focused on the World 
Trade Center minutes after it appeared to have exploded. Paul produced from tapes he obtained of 
CNN coverage, a shot by shot, word for word transcription of the first hour of its coverage. I used 
this as the basis of my contribution. In reading and thinking about the transcript of this 
extraordinary moment and how it was handled by the broadcasters a number of things became clear 
to me about the essence of broadcasting: the meaning of 'live', the nature of 'the event', the 
ftinction of 'news'. Further, what comes together in these things, what they disclose, is the politics 
of the present and, in this, how history is 'made'. What I learnt from television coverage of the 
attack on the World Trade Center was the meaning and significance of the subtitle to Dayan and 
Katz's Media Events-'The live broadcasting of history'. 
In my essay on the death of Diana, Princess of Wales (chapter four), I had broadened Dayan and 
Katz's definition of media events. They took the term to relate to ceremonial occasions (the French 
title of the book, translated by Dayan, is La Tilevision Uremonielle), but this had the effect of 
eliminating that very large class of 'disaster' events which have always been major 'news' stories 
since the beginnings of recorded history. I therefore proposed a simplest taxonomy of events based 
on the distinction between the things that happen to us, and the things we make to happen. The 
former I called happenings; the latter, occasions. My account of what happened in the immediate 
aftermath of the death of the princess tried to show the structural differences between these two 
kinds of event as I reconstructed how a meaningless happening (an accidental car crash) was 
transformed into a meaningful occasion (the state funeral). Happenings are strictly meaningless 
because they are not meant to happen, while occasions are meaningful precisely because they are 
meant and intended. The work of meaning is different in each case: it is 'to be found' on the one 
hand, and 'to be made' on the other. In respect of disasters (whether natural or human) the task of 
finding their meaning is necessarily retrospective, whereas the work of bringing the occasion to its 
realisation is necessarily prospective. Thus the two classes of event have essentially different 
temporalities; one which works on the axis of present-past (happenings) and one which works on the 
axis of present-future (occasions). 
These different temporalities generated, I argued, different kinds of narrative: disaster narratives are 
retrospective, occasions have prospective narratives. The events on the day of September 112001 
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stood that argument on its head for it was a disaster of apocalyptic magnitude that 'happened' live- 
to-air and in real time on television around the world. In its very first moment on screen it appeared 
as an inexplicable happening about which the broadcasters in the CNN studio knew no more than 
their viewers. Nevertheless they immediately understood their task to be that offinding the story: 
that is to say, they immediately took it to be the case (they knew) that however inexplicable this 
thing was, it must mean something and that in finding its story they would find its meaning. The 
eventful thing is a storyable thing. It has a beginning, middle and end. Events have the same 
structure as stories and both derive their structure from 'life', the existential template of event-story- 
narrative. The work of finding the story becomes the task of narrating it. The story is 'in' the event: 
its discovery and narration comes afterwards. And this is the usual understanding of history. History 
is that which has always already happened. It is necessarily treated in this way by professional 
(academic) historians who produce retrospective narratives in their own present times about past 
events. But the history-making process (historicality) is in the present and is oriented to the future. 
The future is made (is brought into existence) by forward-looking actions in the present. Thus we 
'make' our own individual life histories and thus the history of the world goes on. 
Historicality (the making of history) and historiography (the narration of history) exist on the two 
different temporal axes of present-future and present-past. They are diverging from rather than 
converging on each other. What is so rare and extraordinary about 9/11 is that on this day event, story 
and narrative all co-existed in the unfolding 'now', the immediate forward-moving present of the 
event. It showed not simply the gripping power of live broadcasting, but the capacity of live news 
coverage to cope with, to manage and make meaningful even the utterly unexpected, unbelievable, 
terrifying, terrible event. It can do this because all the structures of news organisations are geared to 
coping with 'breaking news' and all the routines of journalists are geared to finding and telling the- 
story-in-the-news-event. But only broadcast journalism, by virtue of its live immediacy, can narrate 
the event as it unfolds, moment by moment. It is in this very particular sense that journalists are the 
historians of the present and future as well as the past. News coverage on the day, even in the direst 
moments, hung on to the task of figuring out what was going on in the certainty that it must make 
sense: it must mean something, By the end of the day, as my discussion of the BBC's end-of-day 
broadcast shows, 'news' had not only accounted for what had happened. It had found reasons for it, 
anticipated who had done it and predicted the likely future political consequences. So far those 
interpretations and analyses have proved to be almost wholly correct. 
The attack on the world trade centre was an extraordinary, world historical event and the immediate 
responses to it reveal something of what Boltanski calls the politics of the present. He introduces 
this term only in the last two pages of his lengthy, complex analysis of suffering and the modem 
politics of pity to which it gives rise (Boltanski 1999: 191-2). What he means by it is not elaborated, 
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but crucially it concerns the necessity of immediate action in the face of suffering, the work the 
humanitarian movement and especially, in the French context, the pioneering work of Bernard 
Kouchner, founder of Mýdecins sansfrontieres. The rise of the voluntary sector (more advanced, 
Boltanski notes, in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in France) is again a feature of the last sixty 
years and the politics of everyday life generated by economies of abundance. It is a further instance 
of the deepening democratisation of everyday life. NGOs, lobby and pressure groups, voluntary 
work of all kinds became increasingly important and globalized as the world shrank in the late 20th 
century and the politics of poverty re-emerged on television screens around the world (the BBC 
news reports on Biafra in the early 1980s was a key moment in this country). These developments 
were criticised in France, by the Left, on the grounds that they responded only to immediate 
suffering, that they offered no analysis of its causes and no remedies to rooting out those causes. 
Moreover, in blundering into crisis situations which they did not understand, voluntary aid might 
make things worse, rather than better (Rwanda was an extreme case in point). 
In response to all such criticisms Boltanski asks simply, 'Should nothing be done? ' And if 
something is to be done, it must surely be done immediately. By the time the correct 
political/theoretical analysis of the causes of the crisis has been worked out it will be too late: too 
late that is for those who5 in extremis, cry out for immediate relief from their suffering. In other 
words the politics of the present confronts us with the fundamental question of human action: the 
necessity of action without guarantees. We must act now, in the immediate present. We must do as 
best we can without any certainty that it will prove to be the best we could do. The politics of the 
present concerns the unavoidable necessity of action in the present without the luxury of pausing to 
consider all possible options or think through all possible consequences. And this is in the nature of 
our human situation. Life is not a matter of contemplation in the first or last instance. It is not a 
theoretical thing. It is, in all its vivid, given immensity, a practical, matter-of -fact affair which 
summons us to action and to act. The politics of the present concerns the necessity of action without 
any assurance of success. The humanitarian movement is moved to act by good intentions. The 
sceptic will rightly point out that good intentions do not guarantee good results. True. But nothing 
will come of nothing. To act in good faith is no guarantee of a good outcome but, at the very least, it 
gives that possibility. Neither private nor public actors can hope for more from their actions. The 
courage of action lies in the always very real possibility of failure. The glory of action comes when 
it triumphs over all those possibilities. No-one has argued this more forcefully than Hannah Arendt 
in her justification of 'the great and glorious public realm' (Arendt 1958: 52) as the space of speech 
and action,, of brave words and great deeds. 
For Arendt the separation of thought and action is one of the oldest and deepest flaws engrained in 
the Western intellectual tradition going back to the Greeks. Thinking has long since turned in on 
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itself and taken itself as its object. The Cartesian cogito is the source of all subsequent philosophies 
of consciousness and the subject. It is the classic default position of scepticism. The thinker 
rigorously refuses to take anything as given except that which is most immediately apparent to him, 
namely that he can think. Everything else, all that is external to consciousness, is suspect. Might it 
not be, Descartes pondered within himself, that the room in which I sit and think is no more than a 
dream, a spell cast by a malin genie, an evil spirit. For Kant the scandal of philosophy was that 
thought could ftimish no certain proof of the existence of anything outside itself. It could never be 
sure of the existence of an 'external world'. For Heidegger the scandal of philosophy was precisely 
the attempt to furnish such proofs over and over again. 
The small academic parish of media studies is split down the middle by the divorce between Theory 
and Practice. The undergraduate degree that I and others started thirty years ago at the Polytechnic 
was predicated on this divide. Our initial aim was to unite them both: we wanted to teach theories of 
the media that might be used by the students in their practical work in print j oumalism, radio and 
television production. I fear that this amounted to no more, initially, than our advocacy of Brechtian 
alienation techniques to disturb the complacency of bourgeois BBC practices as taught by our radio 
and television colleagues who came to us from the Corporation. The effort soon lapsed-the 
students mostly could make neither head nor tail of it, and our practice colleagues were 
understandably irritated by it. Today Practice and Theory remain quite separate and staff are split 
down this divide. We seldom talk to each other. Our teaching is quite separate and unrelated. We, on 
the theory side, sometimes speak of our practice colleagues as 'the woodwork teachers'. We are 
quite sure of the superiority of what we do to what they do, just as Plato was quite sure of the 
superiority of philosophers over craftsmen in his ideal republic. Our students know otherwise. 
For my part I have never accepted that the task of thinking should mean the task of theorising. I 
began to think in the mid 1970s, kick-started by a year of attending Stuart Hall's famous Monday 
theory seminars at Birmingham, and I remain truly grateful for that experience. But I was never 
persuaded by the theoretical turn that the study of culture took under Stuart's direction. It always 
seemed to claim a privileged position in relation to 'the real' (always placed in scare quotes at the 
time) which became something to be 'explained' by the correct theory. And if reality somehow did 
not fit the theory, that was its fault not theory's. Reality became something to be stretched or lopped 
into shape on the Procrustean bed of theory. This is doubtless too crude a caricature of those times 
and I don't mean to belittle the work of the Centre in the seventies. But I didn't like its theory and I 
didn't like its politics and the two were intertwined in ways I could not unravel still less counter 
with any coherent alternative interpretations. 
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My first book, like the first part of this thesis, is about academic theories of the media. The secondý 
like the second part of this thesis, is about the practices of broadcasting-Theory and Practice; 
thought and action. To study broadcasting is to engage with it as a practice and thereby as an 
essentially worldly activity which serves, indeed, to give and sustain our sense of the world today. 
What I want then to revalue, in Television and the Meaning of 'Live' is indicated I hope in the 
chapters included in this thesis and explained a little further in this commentary on them. I have 
tried to restore the unity of thought and action in the study of the management of live radio and 
television broadcasting. The central category of care expresses this unity. It serves to indicate the 
forethought and foresight that is integral to any human practice and any human artefact. Another 
word for foresight is providence. In the final section of this commentary I turn to that question: 
providence and history, history as providence. This will be the central theme of Love and 
Communication, the third book in the trilogy whose first, rough outline is presented in this thesis 
and its accompanying commentary. 
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III 
Time and television 
For many years, as I have indicated, I was unclear about my own position. I knew what I liked and 
disliked; what I thought interesting and uninteresting, what I thought worth studying, researching 
and teaching and what not. Mea res agitur. I am my concerns. But I could neither account for nor 
justify them. That has only begun to become clear to me in the last dozen or so years and 
undoubtedly goes back to the experience of reading Being and Time in the early 1990s. By then I 
had written most of what went into Radio Television and Modern Life which was published at the 
end of 1995.1 gave it the subtitle, 'A phenomenological approach', but only one or two chapters 
(the last, particularly) was written under the influence of Heidegger (as 'under the influence of 
drinV), and if you had asked me then what I meant by 'phenomenology' I would simply have said 
that it was a code word for Heidegger. I am no longer under the influence, as I was then, of that 
extraordinary, magnificent book and have come to a more inclusive understanding of 
phenomenology as the study of the ordinary world free of academic preoccupations. I have taken 
this way of putting it from Stanley Cavell who described J. L. Austin's ordinary language 
philosophy as 'a view of words free of philosophical preoccupation' (Cavell 1976: 238). For Austin 
language and world are inextricably entwined and presuppose each other. The world and what it is 
to speak of it in language is the abiding concern of all the authors who have helped me in coming to 
understand what broadcasting is about: from sociology Goffman, Garfinkel and Sacks and from 
philosophy not only Heidegger but Arendt and Gadamer (his two most brilliant students) and, in 
another comer of the same field, Austin, Grice and Cavell . 
All these writers treat the world-the actual, factual, matter-of-fact of fact world: the world as it is 
and as they find it, not as they think or would like it to be-with the proper respect and seriousness 
that it deserves. Nor is this something easily accomplished for the enigma of the everyday world lies 
precisely in the ways that it resists serious attention. There is a long tradition of intellectual thinking 
in the West (from Plato to Stuart Hall) that interprets the ordinary world as unreal and inauthentic 
and those who dwell in it (ordinary people) as somehow deceived into taking it as real and authentic 
when it is not. Plato's story of the cave, whose shackled dwellers live in a world of shadows, and 
Hall's critique of lived experience both share this perception and both conceive of the intellectual 
as the one who (having seen the light) aspires to free ordinary mortals from the darkness of the 
cave. Truth is to be found in the ideal forms for Plato and in a totalising theory of society for the 
New Left in the 1970s. Such thinking is always other-worldly, always in search of an ideal world 
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that transcends the limits of the actual ordinary, everyday world of experience. I am no idealist and I 
dislike utopias. I have always taken the actual, factual world on trust, at face value. What I have 
come to understand as 'phenomenology' gave me a way of articulating a non-sceptical hermeneutics 
of trust. Phenomenology wholly accepts and is only concerned with the apparent world, the world of 
appearances. It does not start from the premise that appearances are deceptive and that one must 
look beneath the surface of things to find their true and hidden meaning. It is not interested in 
motives, still less in any underlying 'depth' theory of the real. It holds that the truth is immanent in 
worldly things and in ordinary language (talk) in ways that are apparent to and understood by 
everyone. What is not apparent is how ordinary things and ordinary language are so. The enigma of 
the everyday world is not a malicious deception but a gift; the gift of care that is immanent in it but 
concealed. This concealment is not a trick but an act of generosity; a generosity that gives the 
possibility of action, that allows for our concerns whatever they may be. Is not this its agape, the 
mark of the world's disinterested, non-reciprocal, impersonal, transcendent love, in short, its care 
for those who dwell in it, the living? 
If we are to act in the world it must be possible for us to act and that leads straight to the 
consideration of the world in which we act as that which allows us to act. The question of action and 
the conditions of its possibility is a primary consideration of all the writers I have just mentioned 
and is inseparable from thinking about the world not simply as the locus of action but as that which 
gives action its possibilities. Thefreedom of action is not an effect of will, mind or any mental- 
cognitive metaphysics or theory but of a world that frees us for our own potential to act and thereby 
to realise our human capabilities. Hannah Arendt distinguishes action from labour (toil) and work 
(craft) in order to emphasise that only action belongs to the world of freedom, the latter two being 
the necessary effects of the world of necessity (Arendt 1958). Freedom only emerges as and when 
we escape necessity. Early modernity, driven by necessity, thought of unnecessary things as idle 
luxuries. Art fell into this category. But all these things (idleness, luxury, art) are precious freedoms 
that presuppose the overcoming of necessity. That is what it means to speak of the free world and it 
is part of my overall historical thesis about the last century that, in its course, the world has become 
freer for more and more people who now face real choices about what to do with their lives. Do I 
have to work? How much time do I want for myself, my family and all my interests and concerns 
that lie outside the necessity of work? The modem world was largely driven by necessity. Today we 
confront the freedoms of the post-modem world as existential choices, as what to do with our lives 
now that we, no longer driven by necessity, are free to do something with them. 
The final section of this thesis consists of essays in self-clarification; efforts at figuring out the basis 
of my thinking. The book that will come out of this section stands in a subordinate, supplementary 
relation to the two books and the two sections of the thesis that precede it. I intend it as a collection 
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of glosses and commentaries on the thinking embedded in the studies of academic approaches to the 
media on the one hand, and the actual worldly practices of radio and television on the other. It is the 
'methodology' part of this thesis. It is an interesting experience, 'doing' a PhD after years of 
providing supervisory guidance and support for others as they struggled to roll their particular stone 
uphill. Most students, in my experience, get pretty anxious about their methodology and the chapter 
they must write about it. My advice is not to worry about; at least, not initially. The key thing 
usually, is to figure out what the PhD is about and that usually means identifying the story. What is 
it about? How do you find out? How do you tell it? And what is its point? Reason and justification: 
the point of doing it and how it is done. The normal format of the PhD places that first. You begin 
with what you are going to do and why and how. The literature review, the dreaded methodology 
chapter have to precede the really interesting bit; the accounts of the actual topic and the work that 
went into it. I have preferred to reverse this structure and to put the methodological considerations 
after the presentation of the substantive concerns of the thesis as set out in the first two sections. I 
prefer to move to the general from the particular; inductive rather than deductive reasoning. 
The key chapter in the final part of this thesis, and the one that was written first, is the essay on for- 
anyone-as-someone structures, written as an exercise in coming to terms with Being and Time and 
getting a critical perspective on it. I think it reads, more than any other part of the thesis, as a 
conversation with myself rather than the reader and it is still too much 'under the influence' of the 
author of BT. But it served to clarify what I took from Heidegger's fundamental ontology. It was 
also an exercise in working out its pervasive relevance to my thinking on broadcasting. It had not 
escaped my notice that Being and Time was published in 1927, the year that the British 
Broadcasting Company became, by royal charter and license, the British Broadcasting Corporation 
and thereby assumed its settled, historical role as a public service in the national interest. David 
Cardiff and I had already argued that this transition created a new kind of listening public; the 
general public whose general interests the broadcasters must serve (Cardiff and Scannell 1986). 
Thus the audience addressed by the BBC in its new National Programme was anyone and everyone. 
Yet work on the Talks Department and its search for appropriate forms of address to this listening 
public showed how they came to speak to each listener as an individual, as someone in particular. 
How could these two apparently contradictory discursive formations-the audience as anyone in 
general and yet as someone in particular-be resolved? The clunky term I came up with-'for- 
anyone-as- someone structures'-has a decidedly Heideggerian ring to it. I took this concept as 
indicating a particular communicative structure that mediated between the other two that are 
implicated in it; for-anyone and for-someone structures. I pushed on to consider these three 
structures as aspects of the self and finally as aspects of time. In the end it is always a matter of 
time. The common theme, the core concern of the last three chapters in this thesis, the question of 
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history and the role of broadcasting all come down to this. It is the last great theme of Being and 
Time. 
All things are in time. First and last the existence of any thing (its being-there) is disclosed by and 
as its being in time, what Heidegger calls its 'within-time-ness'. The question of time is the question 
of existence and it is focused for us, the living, in the question of the meaning of live. Liveness, 
being alive, is the condition of our existence. What is it, to be alive? How do we encounter it? I 
have tried to raise that question in relation to the experience of listening to and watching live radio 
and television and to link it to the wider question of the world-historical significance of 
broadcasting, first raised by Dayan and Katz. The different temporalities (the different orders of 
time) involved in the now of watching television and listening to radio are extraordinarily complex. I 
have indicated that the broadcast now is a spatially spanned moment in which the here of the 
viewer's situation is connected to the there of the programme's situation to create a here-and-there. 
It is also a temporally gathered moment in which the time of the viewer the time of television and 
the time of the world all come together in the phenomenal hic et nunc, the here-and-now of the 
televised event and the here-and-now of watching it. One way of considering these orders of time 
(there are many more) is in terms of whether or not they are transcendent ternporalities. This will 
serve as the final question I wish to consider as implicated in all aspects of this thesis and most 
clearly in this final section. By transcendence I mean, simply, what endures, what lives on in time. 
Death is the mark of the difference between things that endure and the things that do not. The world 
in which we live is, in relation to our mortal being, immortal; not eternal (for everlasting things are 
neither alive nor dead) but immortal, transcending death, existing in different, transcendent orders of 
time. These are matters that are proper to phenomenological enquiry. Pragmatics deals with social 
life. Phenomenology deals with the larger and more inclusive question of life as such. 
Life, world and television-these are the three related matters raised in the last two chapters on 
television and history and the future of broadcast television. What clouds our understanding of 
television as an everyday worldly thing is that we think of and deal with it as if it was non- 
transcendent, like us. In other words, we deal with things and the world as part of our lives and our 
concerns. We treat them both as if they were there for us. We take them for granted. This is right 
and proper, of course. How else would we deal with things? And yet, in a fundamental way, in so 
doing we do not (we cannot) see the world as anything other than immediately obvious and as such 
beneath our notice. This is the enigma of 'ordinary life' upon which our lives depend and whose 
extraordinariness is necessarily concealed so that we can get on with our ordinary lives in the 
politics of the present. At the heart of this enigma, I think, is our lost sense of transcendent time and 
thus of transcendent phenomena that exist in different orders of time to our life-time. Immortal 
things are not eternal. They do not last for ever. They are immortal in that they transcend and 
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surpass what Arendt calls the ruin of our mortality. Empires endure for centuries but they 
eventually crumble and fall-thus I do not invoke absolute transcendence (which belongs to the 
universe and all universal things), but historical transcendence (which belongs to the world and all 
worldly things). The time of the world (the human world) is the time of the being in the world of 
humanity; that is the most transcendent order of historical time. Within the historical time of human 
beings there are many different institutional orders of time: the times of languages, of religions, of 
empires, of nation states. In 'Television and History' (chapter eight) I focused on the problems 
involved in the historiographies of different orders of time: the time of individuals (their life time), 
the time of institutions (such as broadcasting) and the time of the world. In each case I ask 'Who can 
write this history? What narrative problems does it pose? ' 
The last chapter in this thesis is my most recently published essay. I have written about the meaning 
of broadcasting since the 1980s. My first major effort at thinking about this was an essay called 
'Public service broadcasting and modem public life' (Scannell 1989) and I followed it up with 
subsequent essays that updated its concerns in the following decade (Scannell 1991,1996). 
'Broadcasting in the digital era' has a different emphasis. In the mid 1980s, at the time of the 
Peacock Report, it looked as though PSB in Britain would not last much longer. It was disliked by 
Margaret Thatcher and threatened (fatally it was assumed) by the new era of multi-channel 
television just around the comer. Two decades later the BBC remains one of the biggest beasts in 
the British media jungle. It has survived the threat of commercial terrestrial radio and television, and 
the hundreds of channels available on BSkyB. It has been quite remarkably successful since the 
1980s and in unforeseen ways. The challenge to the BBC today is not in terms of public service 
versus the market, but in terms of the future of broadcasting as a way of delivering radio and 
television services in the face of the radical implications of new digital technologies whose 
applications provide a quite different delivery system. BSkyB's concept of personalised television 
on demand and the brilliant technologies that deliver it are promoted quite explicitly as the end of 
scheduled television. And that means the end of broadcast television whose raison d'etre is the 
provision of a programme service at different times of day, for those times and through the day. 
This most recent essay contains all the major themes of my writing in the last five years or so and, in 
a nutshell, of this thesis. It is about the relationship between time and the media. Taking a clue from 
Sylviane Agacinski (2003) 1 argue that the time of the masses has given way to what she calls the 
time of the media, and I interpret this in terms of the key historical argument set out in the first part 
of this thesis, namely the transition from an economy of scarcity to one of abundance and from the 
politics of poverty and the masses to a politics of plenty and everyday life. I go on to consider what 
'the time of the media' could mean. I argue that it finds its fullest realisation in live-to-air 
broadcasting whose liveness is held in place day by day and every day by the schedules. The 
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schedules hold in place the publicness of public service broadcasting. They are the unique means 
whereby on any day at any time, I or anyone am linked to the ongoing life and times of the world. 
The BSkyB alternative-customised individual on-demand television-in destroying the schedules 
thereby destroys television's public, worldly essence by removing it from public, worldly time. The 
BSkyB experience of television reduces it to an aspect of 'my time', the private life and times of 
individuals. I argue finally that it is not a question of either-or: either broadcast or on-demand 
services. But it is a question of priorities with underlying ethical implications. 
If as I have argued our post-modem world is characterised by moral incoherence and ethical 
uncertainty it is because we have privileged the private over the public, the individual over the 
social and the personal over the impersonal. And all this amounts to privileging eros (private, 
individual and personal forms of life) over agape (public, social and impersonal forms of life). The 
difference between these two forms of love should finally be understood in terms of the temporal 
transcendence of agape and the non-transcendent temporality of eros. Today we have lost sight of 
the transcendent meaning and power of love (care) as agape and can only understand it as the non- 
transcendent power of eros. This is a profound loss for it means essentially that we can no longer 
understand the world, nor recognise the care-structures of everyday worldly things and institutions 
which give the very possibilities of our own concerns and cares. It further means that we are no 
longer capable of facing, of owning up to, our own radically non-transcendent finite essence. The 
fear of death (so natural in the pre-modem world) has been driven back by the extraordinary 
advances in the management of life which is one of the greatest achievements of modernity and 
shows up today in the extraordinary extension of life-expectancy in the advanced capitalist 
democracies of the last sixty years. But the consequence of this has been a refusal to face death, to 
deal with it and manage it with dignity and compassion (with care and love). The loneliness of the 
dying-their hygienic isolation from the living in hospitals and nursing homes-is an indication of 
the extent to which we have lost a sense of the meaningfulness of life before it finally departs from 
us (Elias 1985). The benefits of world modernization are quite extraordinary and hopefully 
irreversible. These are the results of the immense gains in knowledge brought about the scientific 
revolution that underpinned and continues to underpin world modernization from its beginnings to 
the present and beyond. But this has come at a price; the loss of understanding of the meaning of our 
own lives and of the world into which we are born and from which we must in the end depart. The 
disenchantment of the world was not a by-product but the precondition of its modernization. What 
we have gained in knowledge of the world has been accompanied by a loss in understanding of it. 
This loss shows up finally as a loss of understanding of history. That too is an effect of post- 
modernity which has proclaimed the end of history and its incredulity towards grand narratives. My 
own sense of history, I have at last understood, comes from the world I was born into and my Irish 
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Catholic upbringing, but fortunately in England rather than my parents' mother country. Irish 
Catholicism in the 40s and 50s was a practical, devotional religion. It was quite untouched by the 
Reformation and the Vatican Council had not yet begun its work of bringing the Church into the 20th 
century. It was thus, in all essential respects, unchanged from the late 15'hcentury church on the 
cusp of the religious and political revolutions that were shortly to come (MacCulloch 2003). The 
essential characteristics of this religious upbringing I now see as shaping the fundamental ways in 
which I experience and think of things. Most crucially, and what makes it utterly distinct from what 
was to come, it was a practice defined by the performance of the Mass as a public, participatory 
event. To be a Catholic was not so much about believing things as doing things. Catholicism was not 
a silent religion of the book. Still less was it an inward looking private spiritual relationship between 
the individual and God. Catholics defined themselves not in terms of their beliefs but their practices. 
I can still hear, from my earliest childhood, grown-up conversations about so and so who was 'a 
good, practising Catholic' and so and so who was not. A 'lapsed Catholic' was not someone who no 
longer believed, but someone who no longer went to Mass. Thus my marked preference for practice 
over theory, action over thought, public over private, my taste for the celebratory Event and for the 
theatricality of public life-all of which shows up in this thesis and this account of it-all makes 
sense to me now in terms of my upbringing in the life of the Church. 
The life of the Church is rooted in the Church's year: its everyday pieties, its daily devotions and 
commemorations of the saints, the apostles and the Virgin Mary: its re-enactment of Christ's birth, 
life, death and resurrection which define the seasons--Christmas, Easter and Pentecost. My deep 
sense of the meaningfulness of day to day life and of lived experience (and hence my preference for 
the Cultural Studies of Williams, Thompson and the old New Left over that of Hall and the new 
New Left) is embedded in the ways that first in my family and later and especially at school I lived 
(and loved) the slow unfolding, day by day and through the year, of meaningful time. That sense of 
meaningful time is most fully embodied and expressed not so much in the grand narrative of 
salvation and redemption that the Church taught, but rather in the institutional life and practices of 
the Church itself in which the orders of sacred time have been maintained, in unbroken apostolic 
succession, since the death of Christ. Sacred time is the unity of the living and the dead et vitam 
venturi saeculi-and the life of the world to come, the very last words of the Latin Creed which I 
still remember from my schooldays. Past, present and future (secular historical time) becomes the 
living unity of the life of the world (sacred historical time) embodied in the life of the Church and its 
care for the living and the dead and the life that is to come. 
That is where I get my sense of history as the life and times of the world. It has informed all my 
thinking about the historical role of broadcasting as it once was, as it is today and as it projects into 
its uncertain future. History is providential because human beings are provident; they are blessed 
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with foresight and forethought with which they make history in the living present. But that present is 
always the gift of the dead who once lived in the world as we do now. And we the living have a care 
for the future of the world as our gift to our children and theirs. I end here, not (I hope) in 
confessional or autobiographical mode but in a last effort of self-clarification. I have tried to account 
not only for what I think and how, but also for the historical roots of what I think and the ways in 
which I think. In so doing I have tried to remain true to my deepest, abiding intellectual concern. For 
the meaning of human time in all its radical transcendence and non-transcendence is the final 
concern of the thesis submitted here and, in the fullness of time, the books that will follow from the 
work it contains. 
*********** 
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Chapter One 
Benjamin Contextualized: 
On "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" 
Introduction 
Within any academic field the processes that determine which works achieve canonical status is 
partly determined by the history of the field itself. Marx pointed out that when men determine 
to make a revolution they look to the past to provide them with roles and models. Likewise, 
more prosaically, emerging academic disciplines also consult the past for guidance and 
inspiration as they seek to clarify their concerns and stake out a distinctive domain of enquiry. 
One text that speaks eloquently from the past to later generations of academics concerned with 
media and communication is "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" by 
Walter Benjamin. He wrote this essay in 1936 as a contribution to an ongoing debate, within a 
small but distinguished circle of intellectuals, about the status and role of art in the then-new 
circumstances of "mass culture. " Four years later Benjamin, a German Jew, committed suicide 
after being refused permission to enter Spain, fearing he would fall into the hands of the Nazis. 
His collected works were not published until the mid-1950s in Germany, where they had an 
immediate impact, and he was unknown to Anglo-American readers until a collection of his 
essays was translated into English, with a brilliant introductory essay by his friend and admirer 
Hannah Arendt. This collection, Illuminations, published in 1968, includes the essay on 
Mechanical Reproduction and is the basis of Benjamin's worldwide reputation today. 
Illuminations contains selections made from the two-volume German Schriften, edited and 
introduced by Theodor Adorno and published in 1955. Arendt's "chief purpose" in making her 
selection was "to convey the importance of Benjamin as a literary critic" (Benjamin, 1968, p. 
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267). Most of the essays in the collection are either about literature (Baudelaire, Proust, and 
Kafka) or related topics (translation, book-collecting), with the exception of the celebrated 
"Theses on the Philosophy of History" (pp. 255-66). "Mechanical Reproduction" thus stands in 
some isolation from the rest of the collection. What makes it distinctive, apart from its subject 
matter, are certain aspects of Benjamin's interests and concerns, notably a political engagement 
with questions concerning art and commodity production from a (loosely) Marxist perspective. 
That perspective provides the thread that links the text with its resurrection, several decades 
later, in circumstances hugely different from those in which and for which it was originally 
written. This essay thus has two tasks: first, to account for the original circumstances that gave 
rise to "Mechanical Reproduction" and the debate to which it made a central contribution, and 
second, to briefly explain the reasons for its posthumous fame when it became available to 
English-speaking readers nearly forty years later. 
Art and Politics in the 1930s 
The period between World Wars I and 11 was one of profound economic, political, and cultural 
change in Europe and North America. What we now call "consumer capitalism" was decisively 
established in the West in the inter-war period, when mass markets were created for a whole new 
range of domestic and leisure consumer goods. Intimately linked to this was the wide social 
penetration of new electronic forms of communication (telephone and radio) and of "mass" 
entertainment (cinema and the record industry). "Mass society ... .. mass politics ... .. mass 
production, " and "mass culture" were key concerns in contemporary political, social, and cultural 
debates. On the whole, European intellectuals were hostile to the masses (the urban, industrial 
working classes) and to the new forms of mass culture that catered to their tastes. Artistic 
modernism, buttressed by theories of the avant-garde, ensured that the arts were "difficult" and 
beyond the grasp of the great mass of ordinary women and men whose "low-brow tastes" 
threatened to swamp and destroy "high-brow" standards of taste and ways of living - or so it 
seemed to many artists and intellectuals at the time (Carey, 1992). This was one aspect of the 
debate around the role of art and its relation to the masses to which Benjamin's essay contributed. 
But it had a more urgent political dimension in light of the deepening political crisis that grew 
directly from the economic crisis of 1929, which triggered the rise of Fascism in Europe in the 
1930s and ultimately the outbreak of World War 11. 
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A crucial issue concerned the implications of mass culture. Was mass entertainment yet another 
instance of the exploitation of "the masses, " or was it a potential means for their emancipation? 
The effect of economic and political crisis was to politicize culture and raise again the question of 
whether art could, or should, be directly involved in contemporary life and affairs. The question 
of political commitment for art and for the artist was intensely debated throughout Europe and the 
United States. In the Soviet Union, writers and intellectuals were called upon to be "engineers of 
the soul: " to throw themselves wholeheartedly behind the new Communist society and produce 
artistic representations of the men and women of the new Russia. A whole new genre of "socialist 
realism" in art and literature came into being to celebrate the achievements of the socialist 
revolution. In Britain, the intellectuals marched sharply to the left. They were deeply concerned 
with the prolonged social fallout of the economic crisis that created long-term unemployment in 
the industrial heartlands of the United Kingdom. They espoused new popular movements: for 
peace, for the republican cause in the Spanish civil war (Hynes, 1966). In the US, intellectuals 
became enthusiastic recruits to the New Deal administration and made films, photographed, and 
wrote about the impact of the Depression and the heroic efforts of the New Deal to counter it 
(Stott, 1986). 
In Germany, those intellectuals who were hostile to National Socialism, or whose lives were 
threatened, fled when Hitler came to power in 1932. Among these was a group of academics 
who were members of the Institute of Social Research, an independently-funded research center 
attached to the University of Frankfurt, later known universally as the "Frankfurt School. " Two 
of its leading figures were Max Horkheimer (the Institute's director for most of its history) and 
his close friend Theodor Adorno. Attached to the Institute as an associate fellow on a tiny 
stipend was Walter Benjamin. Shortly after Hitler came to power in 1933 the Institute's offices 
were searched by the police, and were later seized and confiscated for being "Communist 
property" (Wiggershaus, 1994, p. 128). Adorno and Horkheimer eventually re-established the 
Institute in the US, attached to Columbia University. They remained in the United States, 
German Jewish emigres in exile, until after the war when they returned, with much honor, to 
Frankfurt. Benjamin left Germany but remained in Europe. He was in Paris when the German 
army invaded France in 1940, and fled south to the Spanish border hoping to escape capture. 
It was this situation - the apparently irresistible rise of Fascism, the impact of mass production on 
art and culture, the accompanying new forms of art and entertainment (film, photography, radio, 
and gramophone records) - that Walter Benjamin addressed in "The Work of Art in the Age of 
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Mechanical Reproduction. " I consider his essay here, not as an autonomous text, but in relation to 
what inspired it and the responses to which it gave rise. Thus, I argue that Benjamin's essay 
makes a persuasive case for the emancipatory potential of new forms of "mass culture, " but also 
present Adorno's powerful criticism, "On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression in 
Listening, " which was written in direct response to Benjamin's essay and published two years 
later (193 8/1978). My aim is not to adjudicate on the outcome of this encounter, but rather to 
show the complexity of the issues it raised about the social and political role of art and its 
enduring relevance, for it was the return of this question in very different circumstances four 
decades later that prompted the resurrection of the texts under review here. I also present some 
key sources of inspiration drawn upon by both sides in the argument. In particular I will show the 
importance, for Benjamin, of his friend Bertolt Brecht, whose ideas about theater and politics 
underpin his thoughts about the contemporary situation of art. I will likewise highlight the 
contribution that the concepts of Georg Lukacs made to Adorno's response. In all this I aim to 
show how and why the question of art and politics mattered at the time. Far from being of merely 
academic interest, the issues that concerned Benamin and Adomo, Brecht and Lukacs, were 
compelling ones that intimately and fatefully touched their lives in different ways. 
Art, Reproduction and the Loss of Aura 
The central thesis of Benjamin's essay is that in modem conditions, art has lost its aura, which 
is destroyed by mechanical reproduction, or mass production. The meaning of "aura" is central 
to understanding the essay and to Benjamin's thinking in a wider sense. The Latin word aura 
means "breeze. " It is used as a metaphor for the subtle emanation things give off as the mark of 
their distinctiveness. In European painting, for instance, the aura of sanctity is represented by a 
halo around the saint's head, or a subtle glow around the figure of the Madonna. For Benjamin, 
Art is invested with and surrounded by aura, a halo of significance that distinguishes it from 
non-auratic, everyday things. In modem societies art proclaims itself as Art by its uniqueness 
and distance from daily life and its affairs - the two key marks of auratic art. There is only one 
Mona Lisa, for instance, and its significance as Art is caught up to a considerable extent in its 
status as a unique and singular thing. Art is also marked by its distance from everyday life, 
retreating into the museum, the gallery, the theater, or the concert hall. 
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In pre-modem times this was not the case. Art was embedded in the very fabric of society. It 
embodied and expressed a society's most intimate values and beliefs, its sense of its history and 
place in the world. As such, what we now call Art had a very different function then, and was 
closely linked to religion, magic, and ritual. In a beautiful essay called "The Storyteller, " 
Benjamin (1973) reflects on the decline of storytelling in modem societies, displaced on the 
one hand by the novel and on the other, by the newspaper. The former testifies to the collapse 
of tradition, the latter the extent to which experience has been displaced by information. 
Storytelling, Benjamin argues, is at the heart of traditional societies. It embodies and expresses 
the tradition; indeed, it is the tradition. The authenticity of the tradition (its living quality, its 
aliveness, its aura) is preserved in the practice of storytelling. But modem, secular rationality 
destroys tradition, ritual, magic, and religious beliefs. The Age of Reason invented a new thing, 
Art, which it invested with an invented tradition - Creativity, Genius, Beauty - to stand as 
timeless reminders of the human spirit. The aura of, let us call it, "Gallery Art" (which is what 
we mean by Art in modem times) is a secular mystique, and the "worship" of great art is a 
secular ritual practised largely by the European bourgeoisie and their intellectuals. 
Mass production destroys Art's aura because it destroys its twin characteristics of uniqueness 
and distance. Photography and cinema multiply the image ad infinitum. There may be one 
Mona Lisa, but there are umpteen photographic reproductions of it in all sorts of contexts, 
including the downright vulgar. At the same time, mass reproduction destroys the distance of 
the art object. No longer the unique original to which we all must go in reverence if we wish to 
see it, it is pried from its shell. It goes out into the world, where it circulates in many forms. It 
comes to us. The sense of reverence for the auratic art object is shattered. In the concert hall or 
at the art gallery we display our reverence by our concentrated and silent attentiveness to the 
performance or exhibition. But the mass publics for new forms of mass culture take a more 
relaxed attitude. They do not have to concentrate on the auratic experience. They can watch in a 
state of distraction. They can listen to music on the radio or grarnophone and do other things at 
the same time. 
What are the implications of the destruction of aura? For Benjamin, it is the democratization of 
art. What was once for the select few is now available for the many. Modem technologies of 
visual reproduction (Benjamin had in mind photography and cinema in particular) can become 
art forms for the millions. Moreover, they bring about transfon-nations in how we perceive 
reality, offering us new perspectives on the world. The camera is deeply enmeshed in the web 
of reality. It can go to places that were hitherto inaccessible to most of us. Movement can be 
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speeded up and slowed down to reveal the beauty of things not available to ordinary perception 
- say, the moment of impact of a drop of water. The cinematic close-up creates a new kind of 
intimacy in public, allowing millions access to the human face that was formerly reserved as a 
look shared only by lovers or by parent and child. In all this, what Benjamin calls the "theology 
of art" - its ritual or cult value as a thing of beauty and a joy forever, the worship and 
canonization of art by its ideologues, the intellectuals - is put in question. Mass reproduction 
destroys the unique authenticity of the original work, which can no longer be worshipped as 
such. "The total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be 
based on another practice -politics" (Benjamin, 1973, p. 226). 
Like many European intellectuals at that time, Brecht still believed in the revolutionary 
potential of "the masses. " His views on the relationship between the masses and new modes of 
production were spelled out in a 1934 lecture he gave in Paris to the Institute for the Study of 
Fascism, published three years later in essay form as "The Author as Producer. " Here Benjamin 
argued that the revolutionary potential of new technologies depended on the role, in the 
production process, of the intellectual (writer, author), who must align himself with the masses. 
It is no use invoking the autonomy of the poet, his freedom to write whatever he pleases 
(Benjamin, 1978, p. 255). Art is not about self-expression: the author must serve the interests of 
the people. At the same time, in new "mass" forms of writing such as newspapers, there is a 
greater opportunity for readers to play an active part rather than being mere consumers. They 
can write letters and influence editorial opinion. In the new post-revolutionary Russian cinema, 
Benjamin points out, ordinary Russians are used instead of actors to portray "the masses. " 
Thus, new forms of mass communication may transform consumers into active participants. 
Benjamin is arguing for a new relationship between authors, products, and audience. Not the 
worship of the author (as Genius) or of the work (as Truth and Beauty) by an adoring audience, 
but a more equal and collaborative relationship in which the author gets down from his pedestal 
and aligns himself with the audience (the masses), takes their point of view, and gives it 
expression in his work. 
This was the kind of theater Bertolt Brecht tried to create. For Brecht, the dominant theatrical 
tradition - the whole commercial business, or "apparatus" of theater - served primarily to 
confirm middle-class audiences in their good opinion of themselves. It did nothing to make 
them confront contemporary reality or question their own social attitudes and values. Brecht 
thought of this kind of theater as "culinary consumption" - pleasant, bland food dished up for 
41 
bourgeois audiences who wanted nothing more than a comforting, self-affirming, emotional 
theatrical experience. He, by contrast, wanted to create theater for new non-bourgeois 
audiences who did not ordinarily go to the theater. He wanted a theater that a working-class 
audience would enjoy, where they would feel at ease and not constrained to be "on their best 
behavior. " Going to the theater could be fun. It could also be a learning experience, inviting 
audiences to think about the contemporary world and their position in it. It should therefore be 
realistic in a double sense: in respect to what is actually going on in the world, and to how this 
affects those for whom the tale is told (i. e., working-class audiences). To do this, Brecht 
argued, the new theater must employ new techniques and methods: "Reality changes; to 
represent it the means of representation must change too. Nothing arises from nothing; the new 
springs from the old, but that is just what makes it new" (197 8, p. I 10). In all this, the aim was 
to achieve a new kind of involvement for a new kind of audience. Not the cozy, self-affirming 
emotional involvement that bourgeois theater offered its audiences, but active, conscious 
political involvement. Theater that would make people think, that might change their attitudes; 
theater that could play a part in social change rather than merely re-affirming the existing order. 
Brecht's ideas about theater underlie much of Benjamin's thinking in both essays under 
discussion here. In "The Author as Producer, " Benjamin (1978) makes the links between his 
and Brecht's ideas explicit (pp. 261-2,265-7). He also makes clear that he is discussing the role 
of art in relation to class struggle. The instruments of production are in the hands of the enemy 
- the newspaper, for instance "belongs to capital" (p. 259). The new technologies have no 
revolutionary potential in themselves but are put to reactionary use in reactionary hands. 
Consider the case of "art" photography: "It is unable to say anything of a power station or a 
cable factory other than this: what a beautiful world! .... It has succeeded in making even abject 
poverty, by recording it in a fashionably perfected manner, into an object of enjoyment" (pp. 
262-3). This is what Adorno meant by "the barbarism of perfection: " technically perfect images 
dished up for culinary consumption, that aestheticize the world and thereby close off the 
possibility of any critical perspective on a less-than-perfect reality. In "The Author as 
Producer, " Benjamin (1978) calls on intellectuals (writers, journalists, photographers, etc. ) to 
work within cultural institutions to subvert their functions. They must change their practices 
and use the new instruments of communication for politically progressive purposes, to make 
them work in the interest of the masses rather than against them: "Technical progress is for the 
author as producer the foundation of his political progress"' (p. 263). 
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In "Mechanical Reproduction" Benjamin (1968) takes a less explicitly political line. He no 
longer calls on intellectuals to change the apparatuses of cultural production from within. 
Rather, in contradiction to his argument in "The Author as Producer, " he seems to see the 
technologies of mass cultural production as having an intrinsic emancipatory potential. By 
transforming the scale of cultural production and distribution, he argues, they play a 
democratizing role, bringing culture to the millions and shattering the aura of culture as 
something for "the happy few. " And by transforming the nature of perception, they offer new 
perspectives on contemporary reality that were hitherto unavailable. 
This begins to sound like technological determinism, a questionable line of thinking that treats 
technological innovation as an instrument of social change irrespective of the uses to which it is 
put. In "The Author as Producer, " Benjamin argued (quite rightly) that photography, when put 
to modish, use had a flatly reactionary social function. In "Mechanical Reproduction, " 
however, he appears to believe the camera per se can change perceptions of reality. But 
Benjamin is alert to the possibilities offake aura, by which he means the re-appropriation of 
mass culture for ritual purposes: 
Fascism sees its salvation in giving the masses not their right, but instead a chance to 
express themselves. The masses have a right to change property relations. Fascism 
seeks to allow them expression while preserving property. The logical result of Fascism 
is the introduction of aesthetics into political life. The violation of the masses, whom 
Fascism, with its Rihrer cult, forces to its knees, has its counterpart in the violation of 
an apparatus which is pressed into the production of ritual values. (1978, p. 243) 
A socialist politics is committed to revolution on behalf of the masses in order to eliminate the 
inequities of property relations in capitalist societies. It therefore seeks to rouse the masses to 
the overthrow of the existing social and political order. Fascism, by contrast, is committed to 
preserving unequal economic and social relations. It recruits the masses to politics, not to 
mobilize them for social change, but to allow them to express themselves, "to let off steam. " 
This is why Fascism aestheticizes politics. It transforms politics into theater, a spectacle in 
which participants can participate directly in political life but cannot effect change. It does this 
through the fake aura of the mass rally with its ritual pomp and pageantry, and the cult of 
Fiffirer-worship which is given charismatic expression on such occasions. The forms of mass 
culture (cinema, radio) are harnessed to the purposes of propaganda and the cult of the event. 
All this leads to one thing: war. Against the aestheticization of politics by Fascism, socialism 
responds by politicizing art. That was the objective of Brechtian theater, and the final point of 
Benjamin's essay. 
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The Fetishization of Music 
Benjamin sent a copy of "Mechanical Reproduction" to Adorno for comment. He hoped 
Adorno would publish it in the Institute's journal, Zeitschrififtir Sozialforschung (Journal for 
Social Research). Adomo, however, was displeased by two aspects of the article: first, the 
"flatly reactionary position" assigned to auratic art and the progressive role assigned to new 
technologies of mechanical reproduction. Second, and relatedly, the presence in the essay of 
Brechtian themes concerning art and politics. 
Adorno set out his immediate responses in an exchange of letters with Benjamin and, in a more 
considered way, in an article, "On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of 
Listening" (1978), which put forward a detailed counter-argument to the case for mass culture 
that Benjamin had advanced. In his essay, Adorno attacked the impact of the industrialization 
of music on contemporary musical life. Two related technical developments at the end of the 
nineteenth century had an enormous impact on every aspect of musical life in the early 
twentieth century. These were sound recording and the radio, both major instances of the 
mechanical reproduction of sound. Before the gramophone and the radio, music was necessarily 
a live art in which the performance itself was central to the experience. It was thus a social 
activity, involving players and audience in the production and experience of the musical event. 
But the record and the radio shattered the immediate social relations of musical life by their 
destruction of the performed event. Music now had two separate and unconnected moments: the 
moment of production (the recording, the radio transmission) and the moment of consumption 
(listening via radio or the gramophone). What connected these two moments was the musical 
"product. " These two new "social technologies of sound" had the effect, Adorno argued, of 
reifying music. 
This concept was drawn from Georg Lukacs's influential essay, "Reification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat" (1923), which aimed at expanding the implications of 
commodity fetishism outlined by Marx (1867/1976) in a famous section of Capital, "The 
Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret" (pp. 163-77). A fetish is an object endowed with 
magical properties - for example, a charm purchased to protect oneself from harm or 
misfortune - and fetishism is the worship of such objects. Marx treated commodities, especially 
money, as fetish objects. The magic of money is the riddle of the commodity fetish (p. 187). 
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The fetishism of commodities (manufactured goods) is the objectification of the social relations 
of production into relationships between things. This processes displaces and devalues human 
social life. When manufactured commodities realize their value as commodities in exchange for 
the universal commodity (money), they do so at the expense of those who made the commodity 
but have no control over the objects of their labor and derive little benefit from it. If labor is, as 
Marx claimed, the expression of our common human nature, then the fate of labor under 
capitalist conditions indicates that "[t]he devaluation of the human world grows in direct 
proportion to the increase in value of the world of things" (Marx, 1844/1992, pp. 323-4). 
Lukacs extended the implications of Marx's analysis to include all aspects of social, cultural, 
and intellectual life, via the concept of reification. "Reification" is rooted in the Latin word res 
(thing) and means, literally, "thingification. " Lukacs argued that the commodity structure had 
penetrated all aspects of society, both inner and outer, and remolded it in its own image. Thus, 
the reified commodity-thing becomes "the universal category of society as a whole. " 
Adomo, in turn, applied Lukacs's analysis of the reified world to contemporary musical life. It 
was not simply that music was reified as a marketable commodity-thing in the form of a 
gramophone record. It was fetishized (glamorized, worshipped) in all sorts of ways that 
combined to conceal the fate of music in modem times, namely, the loss of its social, sociable 
character and with that, the accompanying possibility of true musical pleasure. The first part of 
Adomo's essay explores the many ways in which reffied music exhibits its "fetish character" 
through the fetishization of performance, the stylization of production, and the fetishization of 
consumption. All three aspects - production, product, and consumption - bear the stigmata of 
reification. 
The fetishization of performance shows up in various ways. First, there is the worship of "the 
beautiful voice. " Then there is the fetishization of the great composer or conductor, particularly 
the latter. Finally, there is the notion of the authentic (great, "true") performance, a tendency 
greatly enhanced by the professionalization of music-playing and the notion of the "definitive" 
recording. This shows up in popular as well as classical music, as has been astutely analyzed by 
Simon Frith (1986). The fetishization of authenticity (the great voice, the great performance, 
the great conductor) is an aspect of a total standardization and conformity that allows no place 
for imperfection. The professionalization of music (itself an accelerated consequence of new 
technologies) devalues all other musics, which are now relegated to the inferior status of 
45 
"arnateur" performance. In a telling phrase borrowed from Eduard Steuermann, Adomo wrote 
of "the barbarism of perfection, " which he regarded as the definitive reification: 
The new fetish is the flawlessly functioning, metallically brilliant apparatus as such, in 
which all the cogwheels mesh so perfectly that not the slightest hole remains open for 
the meaning of the whole. Perfect, immaculate performance in the latest style preserves 
the work at the price of its definitive reification. It presents itself as complete from the 
very first note. The performance sounds like its own phonograph record. (p. 284). 
The stylization of production means its standardization into something like an assembly-line 
sound. Adorno detected this development in the emergence of the pop song. The 
standardization of music meant its transformation into "easy listening, " something that was 
instantly and effortlessly consumed, epitomized by the catchy tune or refrain and the 
standardized rhythm (four beats to the bar). This mass-produced music pointed, Adorno argued, 
to the fateful separation of music into two distinct categories, "serious" and "popular. " He 
traced this division back to the eighteenth century, claiming that Mozart was the last composer 
who effortlessly combined both elements in his music. Thereafter, music diverged increasingly 
in two separate directions, a tendency finally sealed by its commodification as the three-minute 
recording aimed at maximizing profit in the quest for a hit. 
All this loses sight of the intrinsic pleasure of music, which is in performance. It has regressed 
to an isolated pleasure for an isolated listener, who fetishizes the act of listening but loses sight 
of that which is listened to. This shows, Adorno argued, in the peculiar obsessions of equipment 
freaks who fetishize sound as an abstract thing independent of what is being played. Adorno 
pointed to radio hams as an instance of this process. We might point to hi-fi freaks and the 
fetishization of perfect acoustics. It also shows in the phenomenon of the fan who knows 
everything there is to know about the fetishized object, who writes to radio stations demanding 
more airtime for the object-fetish, and who is lost in fake ecstasy at live performances. In all 
such ways the fan is in thrall to the "star" fetish object. 
Yet no one really listens to music any more, Adorno argued. More music is available on a daily 
basis than was ever possible in earlier times. In fact, thanks to the music industry, it is almost 
impossible to escape from music nowadays. But the more there is, the less people listen. The 
reification of music is indicative of music's regression from a worldly, social pleasure to an 
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inner state of mind, a matter of subjective taste ("I know what I like"). Reified music is, first 
and last, in the head of the isolated, individual consumer of music. 
Adorno saw all these aspects of reified, fetishized music as indicative of the regression of 
listening. This term, taken from Freudian psychoanalysis, means a reversion to an earlier 
childlike state. What Adorno meant by this is that listening to music no longer has an adult 
character; it has lost any critical, rational function. "Regressive listeners behave like children. 
Again and again and with stubborn malice, they demand the one dish they have once been 
served with" (p. 290). The reification of music produces a kind of mass infantilism in listening 
publics who no longer listen any more. What is thus lost is the possibility of resistance or 
criticism, and beyond that, the possibility of autonomous art: art as the expression of human 
autonomy, independence, and freedom. 
Autonomous Art 
Adorno believed in the redemptive possibility of what he called "autonomous art. " 
"Autonomy" (Gk: autos, self; nomos, law) means self-government. In a philosophical sense it 
means that human beings, by the exercise of their will, are self-determining. Human freedom, 
in principle and practice, presupposes individuals as autonomous, self-ruling agents who are 
free from heteronomous constraint (the constraints of extemally-imposed law or rule). 
Autonomous art is thus the free expression of a self-determining, creative "author" who 
produces the art work. More crucially, this integral artistic freedom is embodied in the 
autonomy of the form and content of the art work itself. Art, in other words, obeys its own 
laws. As such, it stands in opposition to mass culture, which is governed by heteronomous 
factors, most obviously the profit motive. The heteronomy of mass culture reveals itself in the 
search for mass audiences. In order to reach large and diverse audiences the form and content 
of cultural products must be simple, accessible, and easy to understand. Thus, theforms of mass 
culture are determined by heteronomous factors. It follows that the autonomy of autonomous 
art must reveal itself in forms and content that resist the pull of heteronomous forces. If 
heteronomous culture offers easy, accessible, simple pleasures, then autonomous art can be 
none of these things. 
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Adomo accepted and defended autonomous art as "difficult. " It is meant to be. That is how it 
resists easy "culinary" consumption. Autonomous art demands real effort and commitment on 
the part of the reader, listener, or viewer. Benjamin might defend the "distracted attention" of 
mass audiences, but Adomo would have none of it. The concentration demanded by modem art 
was the mark of its negation of the culture market. In an exchange of letters on the topic, 
Benjamin tactfully conceded, "I have tried to articulate positive moments as clearly as you 
managed to articulate negative ones" (Taylor, 1980, p. 140). 
But Adomo also rejected the political stance of Benjamin and Brecht. Art for Art's sake, he 
declared, was in need of defence and rescue from "the united front which exists against it from 
Brecht to the [Communist] Youth Movement" (Taylor, 1980, p. 122). Adomo (1978) made his 
views on this matter plain in an essay on "Commitment" written many years later, criticizing 
Jean Paul Sartre, Lukacs, and Brecht, all of whom defended the position that writers should be 
politically "engaged" and express this commitment in their work (pp. 300-17). Adomo does not 
wholly reject their position. But he points out that Lukacs's defense of socialist realism against 
modernism served to prop up the dreadful Stalinist tyranny. As for Brecht, it is easy to prove 
the discrepancy between his ideas about theater and his theatrical practice. And indeed, Brecht 
himself conceded that what he really cared about was the theater itself, irrespective of politics. 
The case against commitment is that it can too quickly collapse into heteronymy. When it turns 
into propaganda, as it so easily does, it betrays it own cause and commitment, namely, truth. 
That was the sticking point for Adorno. He defended to the last the autonomous work of art for 
its stance against its betrayal by contemporary economic and political life. If it offered few 
pleasures, if its appeal was limited, it was nevertheless true to itself. Its negativity exposed the 
essentially negative character of dominant fonns of economic, political, and cultural life even 
as they thought of themselves as affirmative. 
Aftermath 
When Benjamin's work became available in English in the 1970s it played into a time in which, 
like the 1930s, culture was repoliticized; not by a downturn in the global capitalist economy 
and its political consequences, but by the new social movements of the 1960s - especially civil 
rights and feminism - and the American war in Vietnam. The French "cultural revolution" of 
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May 1968 had ramifications throughout Europe, which showed in concerted attempts to 
repoliticize mass forms of entertainment, particularly cinema (again) and the newer mass 
medium of television. In this context Brecht's ideas for a revolutionary theater were taken up 
again and applied to filmmaking and television drama production. Benjamin too appeared in 
these debates, but usually as a supporting player (Harvey, 1980; Walsh, 1981). 
In the 1970s, British Cultural Studies was redefining itself under Stuart Hall's directorship of 
the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University. In its concern to 
retheorize the meaning of culture, the Centre looked outside Anglo-American empiricism, of 
which it was deeply suspicious, and turned to Continental theory for support. As part of this 
general process, the newly available work of Benjamin was taken on board within the 
overarching frame of Western Marxism (New Left Books, 1977), as Hall (1980) noted in a 
synoptic review of the development of Cultural Studies: 
It was therefore of the utmost importance that at precisely this moment [the early 
1970s] many of these long-forgotten or unknown "Western Marxist" texts began to 
appear in translation, largely through the mediation of New Left Books and Merlin 
Press. English Cultural Studies thus had to hand, for the first time, an alternative source 
of theorizing within Marxism about its characteristic problems: in Lukacs' literary 
historical work, Goldmann's Hidden God, the first translations of Walter Benjamin, the 
early texts of the 'Frankfurt School' (known previously only because American 'mass 
society theorists' were taken to have successfully refuted Adomo's pessimistic 
critique), Sartre's Question ofMethod. (p. 25) 
Yet within this essentially political agenda, whose primary objective was to rethink Marxism, 
Benjamin was, at best, a warmly admired but marginal figure (McRobbie, 1994, pp. 96-9). He 
was always a somewhat eccentric Marxist (he had little faith in "progress"), and his overtly 
political writings of the 1930s with their Brechtian motifs reflected only one strand in the 
thinking of this complex, melancholy "man of letters. " 
In the "post-Marxist" 1980s, attention turned to other aspects of Benjamin's thinking and he 
was read as a pioneering cultural analyst of "modernity" (Frisby, 1985), this problematic now 
being raised in debates about its supercession by "postmodernity". A long-tenn project, 
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uncompleted at his death and largely unpublished, was the study of nineteenth-century Paris 
and its culture - the everyday life of a great city - as emblematic of the experience of 
modemity. Benjamin's notes on this topic were published in German in the 1980s and made 
available in English by Susan Buck-Morss in 1989. Literary and cultural theory became 
increasingly interested not only in the subject matter of Benjamin's project but also in how he 
went about it: the fragmented, allusive style of writing; the concern with the meaning of history 
as crystallized in everyday experience, in marginal things, and in exemplary urban types, most 
famously thefldneur who strolls the city streets (Wolff, 1993; McRobbie, 1994). 
In the 1990s "Mechanical Reproduction" had another rebirth, this time in relation to the impact 
of digital media and the rise of the Internet. Benjamin had emphasized the impact of new 
technologies on the visual arts. The digitization of the image reopened old questions about the 
"truth" and "authenticity" of the original, especially in relation to photography (Wells, 1997). 
Out there in cyberspace, students in film/TV programs write essays on "Art and Authenticity in 
the Age of Digital Reproduction, " while contemporary artists explore the convergence of text, 
sound, and visual images. Today, references to Benjamin's essay crop up all over the place. It 
has become an essential reference in an increasingly diverse set of academic discussions 
concerning cultural and media studies; feminist writing; film, photographic and art theory; 
literary and social theory; history and technology. It is interpreted in a variety of ways, with less 
emphasis on its overtly Marxist concerns and more on the general questions it raises concerning 
art and the political and cultural implications of today's new technologies. Clearly Benjamin 
attempted a redemptive reading of the then-new media of film and photography, arguing 
against the grain of prevailing intellectual opinion so forcefully expressed in Adorno's critical 
response. Those who see the Internet as offering the possibility of the "global" rather than the 
"mass" democratization of politics and art invoke the spirit of "The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction. " 
In his own time, Benjamin sought to find a framework and a vocabulary with which to make 
sense of newly emergent technologies and their social and political potential. This could only 
be done, as he well understood, within the context of the tradition in which the present is, at any 
time, embedded. The function of any canon serves, in part, as a collective aide-memoire, a 
reminder that what we encounter today was once faced by others and, at the same time, as a 
resource for making sense of the enigmas of the future as they emerge into the present light of 
day. 
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Chapter two 
Canonization Achieved? 
Stuart Hall's "Encoding/Decoding" 
[with Michael Gurevitch] 
The centrality of Stuart Hall's "Encoding/Decoding" essay in the Cultural Studies literature has long been 
recognized. This paper does not purport to offer yet another analysis of the "encoding/decoding" model, a vein 
that has been mined extensively and has produced a rich literature. Rather, it considers briefly the issue of the 
canonization of scholarly texts, provides a "biography" of Hall's essay, and concludes with some thoughts on 
the assumed canonic status of that essay. 
A number of questions emerge when we consider the canonic status of any text in the mass communication 
literature. The first has to do with identifying the boundaries of the field. Defining the field of mass 
communication scholarship narrowly, that is, as a self-contained and bounded field, the pool of works from 
which "canonic" texts are to be selected will necessarily be fairly narrow, and the works chosen will have to be 
assessed as meriting such status within that smaller pool - i. e., as the bigger fish in a fairly small pond. If, 
however, we locate mass communication research within the broader context of the social sciences, or as sub- 
area within the more general study of the sociology of knowledge and culture, then the formerly big fish (from 
the small pond) might be dwarfed by even bigger fish. Canonic status is thus clearly relative. 
A second question has to do with whether canonic status inheres in the text itself, its power, its revelatory 
insights, or whether it depends in larger measure on the work it spawns. In other words, is canonization 
achieved, or is it bestowed by virtue of its progeny, its impact on future work? If the latter, then perhaps it is 
more appropriate to describe an influential work as seminal rather than canonic. Thus, the impact of a given 
work is revealed in the works that follow it, are inspired by it, or carry its ideas further. A search for the DNA of 
scholarly works could reveal their parenthood, their longevity, their short- and long-term impact. 
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More generally, however, canonization depends on death, for sainthood can only be authenticated when life has 
ended. Perhaps it is the same with texts: their canonization is at once their sanctification and their mortification. 
The canonized text no longer lives within a set of concerns and commitments. It is no longer something to be 
thought with or about, engaged with and argued over, confronted or challenged. It becomes something to be 
ritually invoked, like the auxiliary saints summoned up from the dead to give aid to the living. Such a fate, we 
argue, has befallen the text known today as the "encoding/decoding model, " the ur-text of media studies as it 
developed within the larger project of Cultural Studies at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) 
under Stuart Hall's direction at the University of Birmingham in the 1970s. 
Biography of an Essay 
"Encoding/Decoding" was published in Culture, Media, Language, by Hutchinson & Co. in 1980. It appeared in 
the third sub-section of the book, called "Media Studies. " A footnote at the start of the article tells us that, as 
published, it is an edited extract from a longer piece called "Encoding and Decoding in the Television 
Discourse, " CCCS Stencilled Paper No. 7, produced at the Centre in 1974. The paper was originally presented 
by Stuart Hall to a colloquium at the Centre for Mass Communication Research at the University of Leicester in 
1973; for the benefit of CCCS students, some notes on its reception at the colloquium and points for further 
consideration were subsequently added at the end. The paper received another airing a year later, when it was 
presented as "Encoding and Decoding" in a symposium on Broadcasters and the Audience held in Venice as 
part of the Prix Italia. Throughout the 1970s CCCS produced and published, along with its stencilled papers, a 
series called "Working Papers in Cultural Studies" (WPCS). At the end of the decade Hutchinson contracted to 
publish the material hitherto produced and disseminated by the Centre, along with unpublished work in progress 
and future projects. Culture, Media, Language is subtitled "Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-1979". 
Thus the appearance of "Encoding/Decoding" in a published book marks both an end and a beginning - the end 
of a samizdat culture of dissemination and circulation, and the entry into mainstream academic literature. 
At first sight, the published version of "Encoding/Decoding" (hereafter E/D) is a slight piece. It is only ten 
pages long, and is not overburdened with scholarly footnotes and references. It has a provisional, unfinished air 
about it. It is a "work in progrese' that might be further reworked. Its title proposes a topic that needs no further 
elaboration than two words separated by a slash. It has by now contracted to an internal shorthand reference that 
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all concerned (the members of CCCS) understand. At the same time it indicates an external reference point, SIIZ 
(Barthes, 1975), that elaborated a model for analyzing the various codes that constitute the (literary) text. In 
itself E/D makes no claims whatever to canonical status. It is a text without aspirations to an afterlife. 
Thus, the significance of E/D might be understood as running counter to the Derridean proposition that "Il ny a 
pas de hors texte. " The importance of this particular text lies not just in its immanent properties but also in what 
lies outside it: the issues, concerns, and commitments that called it into existence and that prompted its changes 
of direction and revisions. These concerns were not static, but evolved over the eight or so years that preceded 
its emergence in published form. To clarify those concerns is not to furnish a historical backdrop to the text (its 
"context"). It is to begin to account for the textual features of the published article itself in its provisional and 
unfinished character. If the text-as-published does not seem to propose itself as something that was conceived in 
the first place as written-to-be-published, we might reasonably seek its raison detre as residing elsewhere. To 
illurninate the text in this way, then, is to recover the concerns to which it was a crucial contribution. That 
means invoking the working life of the Centre in the 1970s and its samizdat culture of writing as work-in- 
progress, working papers that contribute to the unfolding project of cultural studies, the study of contemporary 
culture. 
Even "insiders" - those who were part of CCCS's work in the 1970s - may find it hard now to recover the 
excitement that permeated the Centre at that time; how eagerly, for instance, one awaited the next issue of 
WpCS. When "On Ideology" (WPCS 10) appeared in 1977, it was as if in answer to prayer: now at last the rest 
of us might catch up and find out what on earth it really meant. We knew we were getting it direct from the 
source, from where the action was. Today, media, communication, and cultural studies are all recognized as 
cognate areas in higher education, and undergraduate, graduate, and post-graduate programs in them are ten a 
penny. They are furnished with their appropriate fields of inquiry, established bodies of research, and theoretical 
literatures. But thirty years ago none of this existed. To a very considerable extent, a new academic field 
ernerged from the work of CCCS in the 1970s. It was not clear at the time that that was what, in fact, was 
happening. Rather, in a brief ten-year span, something extraordinary crystallized at CCCS, inspired by the 
charismatic brilliance of Stuart Hall, who enthused and energized a generation of students. They would become 
his disciples going forth to spread the word and establish the academic credentials of something that was yet to 
be recognized as "cultural studies. " 
The period between the first presentation of E/D (1973) and its publication (1980) was one of astonishing 
productivity for Hall himself. The aptly-named "working bibliography" of his writings at the end of a book 
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produced in his honor by David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (1996) reveals a continuing 
flow, in these years, 
of written contributions to an extraordinarily wide range of issues (pp. 504-14). For all the tensions generated 
by 
the Centre - and doubtless, in part, because of them - the 1970s was the high point of Hall's work 
in terms of 
teaching and writing, and the encoding/decoding model was at the center of both. Colin Sparks (1996) describes 
it as "one of Hall's major intellectual achievements during [this] period" 
(p. 86). 
By the time Media, Culture, Language was published in 1980, Hall had left Birmingham to take up a chair in 
sociology at the Open University. He had 
been in CCCS since 1964, and its director since 1968. After fifteen 
years, he was exhausted: 
I felt I'd been through the internal crises of each cultural studies year once too often .... Then the 
question of feminism was very difficult to take ... if I'd been opposed to feminism, that would 
have been a different thing, but I was for it. So, being targeted as 'the enemy', as the senior 
patriarchal figure, placed me in an impossible position. -In the early days of the Centre we were 
like the Alternative University. There was little separation between staff and students. What I saw 
emerging was that separation between generations, between statuses - students and teachers - and 
I didn't want that.... So I wanted to leave, because of all these reasons. (Morley & Chen, 1996, p. 
500) 
Now none of this - the life of the Centre in the 1970s, its "lived reality" - is necessarily relevant to its written 
output. There is no necessary correspondence between life and works, either in the case of individuals or 
institutions. However, the rows, the banging doors, the angry silences, the bruised egos were provoked not, as in 
soap operas, by the grittiness of interpersonal 
life and family relations, but by passionate commitments to 
particular political and theoretical positions (Brunsdon, 1996). To 
hear in the texts produced and published by 
the Centre the echoes of "the noise of theory, " of things hotly and loudly contested, is to begin to see how they 
once mattered and what they meant at a time which, though only twenty or thirty years ago, now seems 
infinitely remote. But why should that matter now? It matters not at all if texts are proposed as autonomous 
objects of inquiry, uncoupled from their historical conditions of production, palimpsests upon which later 
readers inscribe their own concerns. That, however, is not the position E/D argues for. 
A A4odel In Opposition 
-Encoding/Decoding" can be seen as a response to what was regarded as the dominant paradigm in media 
scholarship at the time, associated primarily with the American tradition of media effects research. The 
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mainstream of American work until the late 1960s still carried the hallmarks of a positivist, quantitative, 
empirically-oriented study of mass media roles in society and their effects on audiences. 
Interestingly, however, 
Hall's critique is aimed not at American scholars but rather at a target closer at hand, British media scholarship, 
which he viewed as belonging in that positivist, empirical tradition. When asked about the origins of 
the essay in 
an interview conducted 
in the early 90s, Hall said: 
The piece has a number of different contexts .... The first, in a sense, is a kind of 
methodological/theoretical context, because the paper was delivered to a colloquium, which was 
organised by the Centre for Mass Communication Research at the University of Leicester. Now 
the Centre for Mass Communication Research was a traditional centre, using traditional empirical 
positivistic models of content analysis, audience-effects survey research, etc. So the paper ... has a 
slightly polemical thrust. It's positioned against some of those positions and it's positioned, 
therefore, against a particular notion of content as a performed and fixed meaning or message. 
(Cruz & Lewis, 1994, p. 253) 
And, a little later: 
The encoding/decoding model was not a grand model. I had in my sights the Centre for Mass 
Conununication Research - that was who I was trying to blow out of the water. (p. 255) 
Some time later Hall was invited to participate in a Council of Europe colloquy on "Training in the Critical 
Reading of Television Language" organized by James Halloran, then director of the Centre for Mass 
Communication Research in Leicester. Hall acknowledges Halloran's contribution to the proceedings as 
properly raising the question of studying 
"the whole mass communication process, " from the structure of the 
production message at one end to audience perception and use at the other. 
However, the key difference between 
Hall and Halloran (and, more generally, between Birmingham and Leicester) is that the former came out of 
literary studies (initially concerned with texts, language and meaning), whereas the latter came out of sociology, 
more particularly American mass communication sociology. Furthermore, the concerns of 
Hall and of CCCS 
were beginning to 
be situated within a specifically Marxist framework, whereas Leicester had no such clear 
theoretical/political agenda. 
, Ibe key point of difference, for Hall, is that the communication process, through all its various stages, is not 
neutral. Mass communication sociology regards communicative 
failures as kinks in the system, "technical faults 
in transmission" (1973, p. 19). Through the interventions of professionals in sociology and education, cultural 
policies might 
be directed towards "helping the audiences to receive the television communication better, more 
gectively" (P. 1). As Hall saw it, such a position does not begin to address, does not even see, what the C 
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problem really is: namely that "in societies like ours, communication 
between the production elites in 
broadcasting and their audiences is necessarily a form of 'systematically distorted communication"' (p. 19). The 
presumed neutrality of both the communicative process and the 
interventions of academics contributes to that 
systernic distortion and is, albeit unconsciously, a political choice even 
if not seen as such: 
To misread' a political choice as a technical one represents a type of unconscious collusion to which 
social science researchers are all too prone. 
Though the sources of such mystification are both social and 
structural, the actual process 
is greatly facilitated by the operation of discrepant codes. It would not be 
the first time that scientific researchers had 'unconsciously' played a part 
in the reproduction of 
hegemony, not only by openly submitting to it, but by simply operating the 'professional bracket'. 
(Hall, 1973, p. 19) 
These are the concluding sentences to Hall's 1973 paper, which clearly fire a broadside at a rival research centre 
in the same field. They were excised in the 1980 published version, however, for the focus of attention had 
by 
then changed. 
A Text in Transition 
Let us consider, then, which parts of the earlier draft disappear in the later, revised version that gets 
into print. 
The focal topic of the Leicester colloquium - television as discourse - in part determined the paper's address, 
while its location 
in part determined the "take" on the topic: what the paper was setting itself against as much as 
what it was 
for. What it was arguing for was a serniotic decoding of elements of popular culture, which are 
variously treated as texts, messages, and practices of signification. 
To decode the text is not simply to produce a 
"reading" of the message as if it were in any way transparent. Rather, it invokes a "hermeneutics of suspicion" 
that regards the forms of popular culture (cinema and television in particular) as "systematically distorted forms 
of communication. 
" 
This phrase, introduced in quotes in the first paragraph of the paper but not attributed until much later (Hall, 
1973, P. 16, n. 23), is from an essay of that title by Jurgen Habermas, which treats Freudian psychoanalysis as a 
". scientific" resource for unravelling the systematic distortions of the unconscious as manifested in the 
discourses of patients in the therapeutic situation. If the texts of popular culture are like dreams "that express in 
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'disguised' form the repressed content of a culture" (p. 11), then the critical analytical task is akin to Freudian 
decodings of the "condensation and displacement [that take place] in the encoding of latent materials and 
meanings through manifest symbolizations" (p. 10). If "depth analysis" gets through to the latent meanings 
concealed by the "phenomenal forms" of popular culture, then decoding is the means of cracking open what 
is 
hidden (disguised) in their codes. The emerging field of serniotics, most closely associated in the essay with the 
work of Umberto Eco and Roland Barthes, is used to move between the surface structures of popular texts and 
their deep, mythic structures. These ideas are developed in a lengthy discussion of the western as a genre in 
cinema and, later, television (pp. 5-11), no traces of which remain in the published version of the paper. 
David Morley and Charlotte Brunsdon (1999), in their engaging account of the working life of the Centre in 
those years, note that "[t]here were many boxes of something labelled 'The Western' in Birmingham in the 
1970s, the uncompleted labour of yet another CCCS proj ecf ' (p. 3). This was doubtless the trace of a much 
earlier engagement with cinema on Hall's part. In 1961 he began teaching media, film, and popular culture at 
Chelsea College, University of London. Through the education department of the British Film Institute, he 
worked on film and television with Paddy Whannel between 1962 and 1964, which resulted in their 
joint 
publication, The Popular Arts (1964). But the concern with cinema (a key popular art) and television 
fiction 
genres, which was the substantive heart of E/D in 1973, had vanished seven years later. 
E/D is thus a text in transition. Present in the first version, but on its way out, is the residual trace of a complex 
of concerns with the textual analysis of the forms of popular culture. There, but not yet central to the model, 
is 
the break into a complex Marxism that would become the defining characteristic of Hall's work through the 
1970s. For this, the concept of ideology would be central. Althusser's essay on "Ideological State Apparatuses" 
and Gramsci's more historical concept of hegemony drawn from The Prison Notebooks both take a bow towards 
the end of the paper. Each had become available in English only a year or so earlier. But neither had yet been 
fully assimilated into a reworked Marxist analysis of culture, which would become Hall's most significant 
contribution to a field of study that he, more than any other individual, helped to establish. 
The 1980 Text 
I he main difference between the stencilled paper and the text as published is the excision of the serniotics of the 
western, which reduces the overall length by a third. It has, moreover, been topped and tailed. Gone are the 
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references to the topic of the colloquium to which it contributed, and the overt polemics against the sociology of 
mass communication and behaviorist psychology have been much toned down. Whereas the earlier paper read 
like a contribution to the deconstruction of texts via semiotics, the published version reads like a contribution to 
the interpretation of texts by audiences within a Marxist/class-based problematic, with the "dominant ideology" 
as the master concept underpinning the piece. The emphasis in the model and its theoretical base has shifted. 
For those reared in the American tradition of mass communication research, an initial reading of the essay may 
f-Irst trigger a sense of djjý vu. The terms "encoding" and "decoding" have been familiar since Claude 
Shannon's 1949 essay, "Mathematical Theory of Communication, " in which Shannon, an electrical engineer, 
sought to enhance the integrity of the communication process by protecting messages from being garbled and 
distorted by "noise. " His model of communication and information processing consisted of 
source o encoder o message o decoder o destination 
This outline was picked up by Wilbur Schramm, who elaborated the model of the communication process 
between two people as 
encoder i --o. (message 1 -1 decoder 
nterpretcr interpreter 
Schramm thus introduced notions of feedback into the model, and then further contextualized it within the 
general framework of social relationship and a sociocultural environment. 
Hall's use of the terminology of encoding and decoding looks superficially like a throwback to the Shannon and 
Schramm models. But that impression is misleading. Hall begins his essay by referring to the "traditional" 
model of sender-message-receiver. He then criticizes the linearity of this model with its focus on message 
exchanges, and offers an alternative model of communication based on Marx's model of commodity production, 
CoMprising the stages of production, circulation, distribution/consumption, and reproduction. Thus, Hall 
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incorporates the notion of production, essential to an analysis of the mass media as content-producing 
organizations, into the encoding/decoding framework. 
Hall then highlights the institutional structures of the production of media messages, in terms analogous to 
marx, s I'labour process, " and uses the encoding/decoding labels to identify what he calls "meaning structure I, " 
referring to the encoding side of the equation, and "meaning structure 2, " referring to the 
decoding side. The 
two rneaning structures are not necessarily symmetrical. In fact, Hall assumes that they rarely, if ever, overlap. 
Unlike Shannon, however, Hall is not concerned about this absence of symmetry. On the contrary, he views it as 
essential to the argument that the decoding process may be independent of the encoded meaning, with a 
life and 
power of its own. Thus, while his theoretical framework draws on the basic principles of structuralism and 
serniology, it also challenges the semiological claim about the power of the encoded text and the notion that 
meanings are firmly embedded in the text. The receivers of messages are not obliged, in this view, to accept or 
decode messages as encoded, and can resist the ideological power and influence of the text by applying 
divergent or oppositional readings. 
The model can therefore be applied in at least two ways, depending on whether the emphasis is placed on the 
moment of encoding or that of decoding. More exactly, what is obscured in titling the piece 
"Encoding/Decoding" is the crucial question of what is encoded in the first moment and decoded in the second, 
namely, "the television 
discourse. " To flesh it out more fully: the first moment is "encoding o program (text)- 
as-discourse, " and the second moment is "program (text)-as-discourse o decoding. " While the stencilled paper 
focuses more on the moment of encoding, the published version moved towards the moment of decoding. 
Ibis leads to another significant contribution of the essay, namely the introduction of the notion of different 
modes of decoding. This discussion is adapted from a typology of value systems proposed by Parkin in Class 
Inequality and Political Order (197 1). Parkin proposes a threefold typology: a dominant value system, which 
results in deferential or aspirational orientation among people in a class system; a subordinate value system, 
leading to accommodative response; and a radical value system, which promotes oppositional interpretation of 
class inequalities. Hall's typology is, by and large, similar. He labels the first the "dominant-hegemonic 
position, " in which the message is decoded "in terms of the reference code in which it has been encoded. " 
Located within this position is the professional code, "which the professional broadcasters assume when 
encoding a message which has already been signified in a hegemonic manner. " The second he labels the 
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"negotiated code, " which "contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements. " Finally, the "oppositional 
code" refers to decoding in a "globally contrary way" (pp. 136-8). 
Despite the similarities between Parkin's and Hall's typologies, however, there is a basic and significant 
difference between them. Whereas Parkin's typology of value systems is essentially a sociological one, relating 
different value systems to class differences, Hall's typology is semiological, deploying the typology to identify 
different modes of decoding and meaning-making. This shift from the sociological to the semiological provided 
the theoretical grounding for the first major study informed by the encoding/decoding model, namely, Morley's 
The Nationwide Audience. 
The Nationwide Audience: An Empirical Application 
Hall's 1973 text had a largely internal reference point, produced for the students at CCCS, and the Media 
Studies Group in particular, as a kind of diagnostic model and toolkit for their work in progress. This largely 
accounts for the provisional feel of the text and its "incompleteness. " What completes the piece, what validates 
it (or not), is its application in concrete instances. This is a text whose autonomy is indeed relative - relative, 
that is, to the work it inspired and supported. In his note on responses to the paper as presented at Leicester, 
written as an addendum "for Centre Members Only" (note the strong sense of an exclusive in-group), Hall 
(1973) remarked, "The paper was quite well received, many of the questions being directed to discover whether 
the centre had begun to make the schema outlined at the end of the paper [i. e., the different ways in which the 
television message might be decoded] 'empirical and operational'! " (unnumbered [p. 2 fl). Hall's exclamation 
mark signals that Centre members already know the answer to that question. The whole point of the schema was 
precisely to make it operational, that is, to apply it to television programs and to test empirically whether "real" 
viewers decode the programs in the ways predicted by the model. 
The work of two students in the group, Charlotte Brunsdon and David Morley, was developed precisely to test 
aspects of the model: namely, the codes of television as inscribed in a particular program, Nationwide, and in a 
separate exercise, how actual viewers made sense of the program's encoded "ideological problematic" as they 
had analyzed it. Did viewers "buy" its message unproblematically? Did they adopt a more nuanced 
C'negotiateV) interpretation of it? Or did they refuse to buy the program's (ideological) world-view and 
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possibly come up with an oppositional decoding that "saw through" and unmasked the program's ideological 
discourse (a highly specific framing of the meaning of "nationhood")? 
Morley and Brunsdon hoped to run a full check on the model - the moment of encoding, the program as 
encoded, and the program as decoded by selected viewers - but succeeded in dealing only with the last two. 
They wanted to study the production process, the internal operational practices, the professional culture of 
broadcasting, and the "moment of encoding" that yielded the program-as-broadcast (David Morley, personal 
communication). But that was virtually impossible for, with a few exceptions, access to the BBC for academics 
was very hard to come by in the 1970s. The model had proposed a tripartite structure whose three "moments" 
were integrally connected, so that the "proof' of the schema lay in examining all three aspects of it. But it was 
the model's subsequent fate to be read with such an emphasis on the moment of decoding that the other two 
moments were gradually effaced. 
Through the 80s and into the 90s, E/D was ritually invoked as the ur-text of a reincarnate audience studies, kick- 
started by Morley's work on Nationwide. What was lost was the full heuristic value of the model for research 
into the culture of television. To recover something of the ways in which it was put to use in the Centre, we 
must flesh out the key theoretical problems it attempted to resolve within the given Marxist take on culture 
(itself a contentious issue), and to note something of the trajectory of the Media Studies Group across the 
decade. To address the latter point first is to elaborate further the attempts at the time to implement the model at 
both the encoding and decoding ends of the process in relation to the professional culture and practice of 
broadcasting. 
Largely overlooked now, but very important at the time, was the Media Group's detailed study of one 
Panorama program (Hall et al., 1976), the third and final of three programs broadcast during the run-up to the 
election. It was transmitted on Monday, October 7,1974, three days prior to polling day, and was called "What 
Kind of Unity? " -a title that questioned the theme of national unity against a background of resurgent 
nationalisms in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland and pressures for political devolution. The paper is a 
careful analysis of the operations of ideology, understood as the struggle over meanings within an accepted, 
unquestioned consensus (the legitimacy of parliamentary politics). It is a brilliant exploration of the ways in 
which preferred meanings are inflected through television discourse which, in this program, was controlled 
partly by the BBC and partly by representatives of the political parties. What is programmatically sketched in 
E/D is thus put to work here in a detailed case study of the moment of encoding: 
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In relation to the messages available through Television we shall suggest that they never 
deliver one meaning: they are, rather, the site of a plurality of meanings, in which one is 
preferred and offered to viewers, over the others, as the most appropriate. -The broadcasters' encoding practices ... aim at establishing a transparency between the 
presentation of the topic, as embodied in the program, and the view which the audiences 
'take' of it. The broadcaster tries, by all the technical and communicative competences at 
his command, to bring the encoding and decoding moments into alignment: it is an attempt 
to realise a certain kind of ideological closure, and thereby to establish a preferred reading 
of the topic. -However, it is in the nature of all linguistic systems which employ codes, 
that more than one reading can potentially be produced.... It follows, in our view, that 
different audiences ... can make more than one reading of what has been encoded. 
(Hall et 
al., 1976, pp. 53,67). 
The article is much longer and more closely argued than E/D, as published. Reading both pieces together makes 
clear the essentially programmatic and diagnostic function of E/D itself, whose subsequent fate was largely to 
serve as a mandate for the study of how audiences decoded the messages of television. What did not carry 
forward was the commitment to a careful, detailed analysis of the discourses of television, as exemplified in the 
panorama and Nationwide studies. The focus on the moment of decoding at the expense of the moment of 
encoding uncoupled whatever audiences made of television programs from the study of the ideological labor 
that went into their making. Thus, the two halves of an integral model were tom asunder. The unity of E/D 
itself, in the moment of its publication in 1980, was not retained, since the "momenf' of CCCS itself had already 
passed into history. 
The Beginnings of Canonization 
It could be argued that by shifting the attention of critical researchers toward the audience, The Nationwide 
, 4udience unintentionally 
launched the process of E/D's canonization. In a historical narrative describing the 
contexts in which the work of CCCS's Media Group took place, Morley identifies the study's two different 
Ilistories, one external and the other internal. The external context was the political and economic convulsions in 
13ritain in the early 1970s, notably the miners' strike and the eventual ascendance of Margaret Thatcher to 10 
I)owning Street. The internal one had to do with the 
imported mixture of 'continental Marxism' (Althusser, Benjamin and Gramsci) and serniology 
(Barthes, Eco and Gauthier) which provided what seemed like powerful new theoretical tools 
with which to address both the general question of the role of ideology in the maintenance and 
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reproduction of the social order and, more particularly, the role of the media in the dissemination 
of ideology. (1999, p. 5) 
Within that broader framework a more specific trajectory emerged, albeit in a minor key, that focused on the 
need to develop a better model of the media audience than was offered at the time by either the media effects or 
uses and gratifications approach. Morley refers here to the "hypodermic needle" approach, on the one 
hand - an 
early (and quickly discredited) paradigm of media effects - and the "liberal models of the sovereignty of the 
rnedia consumer and their relative imperviousness to media 
influence, " on the other (p. 6). The latter seems to 
jurnp together two profoundly different approaches: the "limited effects" school of thought and the uses and 
gratifications tradition, which holds a wholly different view of audiences as media consumers. 
While one might 
object to the easy dismissal of such different approaches to the study of media effects, 
it is nevertheless correct 
that absent from these approaches was any theorized discussion of the notion of meanings in media contents, 
and of audience members making sense of media messages, 
i. e., their role as decoders. E/D provided a model in 
which the role of audiences as decoders was reinstated. 
The Contribution to Cultural Studies 
The publication of E/D not only facilitated a return to the audience in cultural studies, but also gave a new 
inflection to the role of media organizations as ideological agencies, that is, as encoders. Audiences had been 
assumed to be passive recipients of media messages, subject to the ideology carried therein. As Morley 
(1999) 
notes, "the 'common sense' of cultural studies as we have it today, with its taken-for-granted prioritisation of 
matters of consumption and its recognition of the importance of 'active audiences' simply did not exist at the 
time of The Nationwide Audience in 1980. " E/D opened the door for the notion of audience resistance to media 
messages, inspired 
by Gramsci's notion of hegemony as well as by the evidence of ordinary viewers' 
consumption of television. Clearly, if securing hegemony required ongoing ideological work, it was due to 
possible audience resistance. And 
if media consumption required audience activity in decoding media content, 
, possibility of 
resistance was built into the process. the 
Igow is Canonization Achieved? 
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E/D, s contribution to media studies would alone have secured its position as a seminal text. It is useful, 
however, to consider as well the conditions under which any scholarly work achieves a position of influence. 
First is the importance of timing. Although clearly unanticipated at the time, it can be argued in hindsight that 
the significance of any single piece of scholarship depends on its appearance at the right, and ripe, time. E/D 
challenged the dominance of positivist social science at a time when this tradition was increasingly under attack. 
By the time it appeared, the barrenness of social scientific approaches to the study of audiences had become 
quite apparent. Even the uses and gratifications approach, despite its interesting insights into audience behavior, 
could not respond adequately to attacks by critical scholars (see, e. g., Elliott, 1974). At the same time, the 
preoccupation of cultural studies with textual analysis showed a different, and no less damaging, form of 
myopia with regard to the audience. E/D offered a corrective to both. 
Second, E/D offered new and radically different wine in what at first appeared to be old bottles. As suggested 
earlier, the terminology of encoding and decoding was introduced into the study of communication generally, 
and mass communication research specifically, almost from the moment of its birth. It was thus well entrenched. 
While E/D spoke a new language, it may not have struck non-Marxist media scholars as alarmingly 
revolutionary. Thus, the terminology may have suggested continuity even as it subverted the older conceptual 
frameworks. 
]3ut the test of seminality inheres primarily in a text's capacity to open new doors and trigger new questions. 
The emergence of reception analysis as a new approach to audience study attests to ED's influence. Within that 
frarnework, interest in audience decodings coincided with an awakening to the possible consequences of media 
globalization. The encoding/decoding framework facilitated new approaches to questions about how audiences 
in different societies and of different cultures made sense of imported texts crafted in a different cultural 
environment (see, e. g., Liebes & Katz, 1990; Ang, 1985). This, in turn, highlighted the significance of 
cornparative audience studies. Growing interest in the globalization of television news could now be addressed 
not only to the institutional dimensions of the process, but also to different national audiences' decodings of 
television news stories. 
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A Final (Skeptical) Note 
No one is a prophet in his own town. Since the publication of "Encoding/Decoding" questions have been raised 
about various aspects of the model, not least from inside the critical/Marxist school. Political economists, 
especially, have been critical of the possibility of audiences negotiating media messages and even resisting their 
meanings. In a different vein, the notion that a preferred reading is built into the text may be attractive 
analytically, but is not easy to test empirically. Likewise, assumptions about the dominant mode of encoding 
raise questions about the intentionality of those who craft the message. More generally, in a polysemic world, 
any hard and fast classification of modes of encoding and decoding becomes slippery. 
The doubts do not stop there. According to Sparks (1996), "Hall appears to have abandoned the attempt to 
develop [the encoding/decoding] model at the start of the 1980s. " By then, he had turned his attentions 
elsewhere. In a wide-ranging interview about E/D, Hall reflects on the model and its problems: "the 
encoding/decoding model wasn't a grand model ... I didn't think of it as generating a model which would last for 
the next twenty five years for research. I don't think it has the theoretical rigor, the internal logical and 
conceptual consistency for that. " Later, on the problems of testing the model, he says: 
Morley's work is not quite the encoding/decoding model ... it wasn't a model which was 
specifically designed to be the reference of a long period of empirical work. It's only once I have 
written it that I saw that if you were going to contest an old model of audience research and open 
a new one, then somebody's going to try and put it into effect. And then, with Dave Morley, we 
had the real problem: how the hell do you actually test it with some actual folks? 
]3ut never mind. As we argued at the opening of this essay, despite the problems, the difficulties, the 
doubts, and the self-doubts, the canonic status of a text often inheres not in the text itself but in what it 
brings about. Some texts are born canonic, some achieve canonization, and some (at their peril? ), have 
canonization thrust upon them. 
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Chapter Three 
The Brains Trust (1941): 
the management of live-to-air talk on radio 
Introduction 
We study the past in order to understand the present. What today is familiar and taken for 
granted once was not so. There was a time when radio and television did not exist. When 
these new social technologies of communication began their historical, institutional life those 
involved were faced with the task of finding immediate, practical solutions to the question of 
how to 'do' broadcasting across the whole range of an emerging programme output. What is 
radio news? What is television news? In each case, starting from scratch, answers had to 
found to such basic questions by those who pioneered what we now simply take for granted. 
Today everyone knows what broadcast news is, by virtue of routine broadcast practices that 
produce it as such. In this chapter I engage with another fundamental problem for 
broadcasters, from the beginning through to today, namely the management of liveness, 
perhaps the most basic characteristic of radio and television. I want to show what the 
problems of live broadcasting are and, at the same time, how they can be dealt with 
successfully so that the effects of liveness are precisely what audiences respond to and enjoy. 
I will focus this issue in terms of the management of spontaneous, unscripted live-to-air 
discussion on radio, something by now so utterly familiar that it is hard to see what the 
problems with it might be. In order to do so we must go back to a time when such talk was 
not the norm on radio and try to uncover what prompted moves in the direction of live, 
unscripted discussion for listeners and how it was done. 
I first tell the story of the production of a single wartime BBC radio programme, the Brains 
Trust. Although it is, I think, an interesting story in its own right, it serves to illuminate some 
of the most enduring characteristics of radio as a broadcast medium, and is meant as a 
contribution to our understanding of radio today. My account is based on primary sources 
drawn from the BBC's written and sound archives and from contemporary accounts by those 
most intimately involved in the programme. But the focus of this chapter is not on the 
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history of the BBC, or on how to do historical research which I have discussed elsewhere 
(Scannell 2002). It is rather on the pre-history of programmes-as-broadcast; the whole 
complex, hidden process of coming up with an idea for a programme and its subsequent 
development from concept to realisation as a transmitted broadcast. At the heart of my 
discussion is a concern with the communicative intentionality of this process. Talk is 
seemingly the most natural of things, but talk on radio is not quite the same as the ordinary 
everyday conversations that we have with one another. It has an institutional setting. It is 
something to be managed by the broadcasters in ways that include, rather than exclude 
listeners. For it to be effective it must speak to listeners and the circumstances of listening. 
The talk that goes on air must appear to listeners as meant and intended for them. The aim of 
this chapter is to show how this is the outcome of invisible institutional practices that 
produce talk on radio as an entertainment, a good in itself , for the enjoyment of listeners. 
The Brains Trust 
The Brains Trust was the first live, unscripted discussion programme on British radio in which 
the speakers responded spontaneously and without foreknowledge of them, to questions sent in 
by listeners. ' It began in response to a request by the planners of the Forces Programme, in the 
autumn of 1940, for something that would alleviate the boredom of the troops in their billets and 
at the same time respond to an identified felt need for information and discussion in the most 
general sense. This particular programme request could have gone to any one of three 
production departments for development: Talks, Features or Variety. Each had a quite different 
internal culture, with a different ethos in relation to their common task of making programmes. 
In short, if the programme went to Talks its defining communicative characteristic would be 
'intellectual; if it went to Features, it would be 'artistic', and if it went to Variety it would be 
tentertaining'. 2 It was therefore a crucial decision to send it to Variety, thereby prefiguring the 
decisive communicative form the programme would take. But even then, within any production 
centre there are different producers with different attitudes and styles towards the common task 
of producing, in the case of Variety, entertainment. Thus, it was significant (it made a 
difference to the subsequent history of the program) that the Head of Variety, John Watt, chose 
to delegate its development to the good genius of Howard Thomas. Individuals can and do 
1. What follows is mainly drawn from Howard Thomas's accounts of the programme (Thomas 1944, 
1977), which he treats as very much his own creation. The production files in the BCC Written 
Archives at Caversham, ( WAC) show that this claim, which Thomas vigorously asserted (demanding 
that the programme be billed as 'originated by Howard Thomas') was disputed within the Corporation 
partly because the original demand for a question/answer programme was handed to the production 
departments from programme planning, partly because Douglas Cleverdon was, from the beginning, 
the programme's co-producer and partly because of a corporate culture of anonymity. There was much 
conflict about all this at the time, but there is no doubt that the Brain's Trust was Thomas's brainchild. 
2 See Scannell and Cardiff (1991) for detailed accounts of the formation and development of these 
areas of production in the pre-war BBC. 
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make a difference within the corporate culture of production in the BBC, which Thomas had 
joined in 1940, from a career until then in advertising and commercial radio. 
The brief Thomas received from Watt was succinct: to create an informational programme that 
was 'serious in intention, light in character'. The form that the programme eventually took was 
'no sudden inspiration. Like most good and simple ideas it was hammered out during weeks of 
hard thinking' (Thomas 1944: 13). Thomas wanted a programme with'mass appeal', to bring 
listeners into 'personal' contact with some of the best brains of the day in the most friendly and 
informal way. They had of course been heard on radio before. Indeed the mission of the Talks 
Department, before the war had been precisely that. Yet if the idea had been developed by 
Talks, so Thomas argued, it would have put enlightenment before entertainment whereas he put 
a premium on the latter. The kind of talk that Thomas wanted to capture was something like 
table-talk, the lively after dinner conversation of the educated intelligentsia. 'Spontaneous 
answers by interesting people, that was it'. The key to securing the effect of liveliness and 
spontaneity was to have a panel of speakers and a Question Master (Howard coined the term) to 
introduce the speakers, to set them the questions and to control and manage the talk that went 
out over the air. 
Thomas put up his ideas for a programme he originally thought of calling Any Questions 3 in a 
seven page memorandum (26 November 1940. WAC 51/23/1). It was accepted and he now 
began the task of transforming ideas into reality. Questions were invited, on air, and they came 
in, at first in a trickle then a torrent. By the time its fame was established the programme 
received two and a half thousand questions a week, rising to a peak ofjust under four thousand. 
It took two staff two full days each week to deal with such a volume of mail. Many letter writers 
wanted further information on topics discussed the previous week, and they were supplied, 
where appropriate, with suggestions for further reading. Questions suitable for the programme 
were classified into broad topic areas and then selected both for variety of subject and in relation 
to the interests and personalities of the speakers. Thomas would then go home with a bundle of 
about a hundred possible candidate questions and whittle them down to a dozen or fifteen. 
These were then typed up and passed to Basil Nicolls for final approval. 
3. A program of this name began on West Region October 12 1948. The title was conceived quite 
independently, but it was based on the Brains Trust format, and invited questions on current political 
issues from a live audience to be answered by a panel of four (of whom two at least were always MPs) 
through the program's host (or question master). Any Questions is still running on BBC Radio 4 today, 
more than half a century later. Its companion program on Radio 4 is Any Answers in which listeners 
respond on air to the issues raised each week in Any Questions. The format transferred to television in 
the 1970s and Question Time (BBC 1) remains the BBC's long running flagship program for the 
weekly discussion of current affairs. Thus a concept developed over sixty years ago is still in use today 
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The vetting of the question list was partly to do with the circumstances of wartime broadcasting, 
but as much to do with the internal culture of the BBC where 'referral up' by producers on 
matters that might have policy implications was by now deeply engrained in the institutional 
culture. Until the end of 1942 Basil Nicolls, as Controller of Programmes, was solely 
responsible for vetting the programme. On one occasion he wrote to the producer instructing 
him to avoid'all questions involving religion, political philosophy or vague generalities about 
life'. He routinely weeded out anything that he thought might cause 'irritation in Parliament'. At 
the beginning of 1943 the Board of Governors relieved Nicolls of his task only to take it upon 
themselves. They solemnly debated whether or not a question on the profit motive should have 
been allowed (in their view it should not) and it was they who dealt with a request from the 
Archbishop of Canterbury that there should be at least one regular member of the programme 
who spoke for Christian opinion. 
All this interference from above came to be deeply irksome for the regular speakers and for 
Howard Thomas. But his main concern, as the questions began to come in, was to pick the right 
speakers and then find the right way to bring out the best in them at the microphone. He found a 
perfect mix in the balance between the characters and performances of the three regular 
panellists. There was Julian Huxley, the scientist: knowledgeable and factual, perhaps rather dry 
and occasionally irritable, but whose solidity and seriousness was the backbone of the 
programme. Then there was Cyril Joad-never short of an opinion, widely read, a fluent and 
occasionally brilliant speaker who, even if he didn't know what he was talking about, was never 
dull. He and Huxley were perfect foils; their disrespect for each other's views and their 
willingness to 'mix it' brought a clash that attracted millions. These two, though very different, 
were clearly 'brains'. The last in the original triumvirate was not, but Thomas insisted on him, 
overriding Cleverdon's objections and arguing that it was essential to have a link between the 
professors and the listeners who had never heard a professor. Archibald Bruce Campbell, an ex- 
navy man, was widely travelled with a colourful turn of speech and an attractive broadcasting 
manner. His no-nonsense common sense views could bring the talk down to earth again after 
the lofty flights of Joad. Campbell was relished by listeners for his curious bits of information 
and odd facts. He once declared on the programme, in all seriousness, that he knew a man so 
allergic to marmalade that whenever he ate it for breakfast, steam came out of his head. Like the 
other two, he was a natural performer. Thomas did not create, or even develop their radio 
characters, but he did carefully choose them as a combination. What they stood for seemed, to 
him, the right blend; the cool brain, the ready tongue, the voice of experience (Thomas 1977: 
74). 
as the BBC's preferred fonnat for the discussion of politics on both radio and television. 
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The programme was recorded each week on Friday afternoon, either on film or tape, in the 
BBC's Maida Vale studios. It was recorded 'live', in one continuous take, as the discussion 
unfolded in the studio. 4 Although there was sporadic behind the scenes discussion about 
whether the programme should be transmitted live-to-air, recording was preferred for a number 
of reasons. In the early years of the war, all programmes were scripted for security reasons, and 
it was to overcome this considerable handicap to its spontaneity that Thomas decided to record 
it each week (Thomas 1944: 82). There were further advantages. It gave time-flexibility to 
broadcasters and performers allowing the programme to recorded at a time convenient for the 
panellists and freeing them from the obligation to be in a BBC studio each week at the time of 
the programme's transmission. Moreover it gave the possibilities of repeats (the programme 
was broadcast twice weekly) and for transmission in the BBC's rapidly expanding wartime 
overseas services. 
Before the weekly recording session Thomas first took the weekly panellists out to lunch at the 
BBC's expense. A drink or two-no more-lest excess should dull their subsequent 
performance, was allowed to the participants. Both food and drink, as legitimate programme 
costs, had to be wrung from an unwilling BBC administration, but Thomas defended the 
expense as a necessary preliminary to getting the best out of the speakers. It helped them to 
relax, it introduced guests to the regulars, it created familiarity, it loosened tongues. In short, a 
good lunch accompanied (hopefully) by good table-talk was the best way to begin to loosen up 
the participants for the talk-to-come. Once in the studio they were seated at a table with a 
microphone in the middle. Every session began with a ten-minute warm-up with a couple of 
unrecorded questions put to the panel by McCullough. This preliminary was essential in a 
number of ways. It was indispensable for newcomers, allowing Howard Thomas to spot their 
idiosyncrasies and, where possible, correct them. Some, when speaking, would turn to the 
person next to them, thus deflecting their voice from the microphone. Others would talk at the 
table, holding their heads down as they spoke. Others covered their mouths. There was the 
occasional over-emphatic table-thumper. Some could not keep still, leaning forwards then 
stretching backwards, twisting and turning their heads - the result, as heard by listeners, was an 
unpleasant series of gushes and fades as their voices came and went. While Thomas attended to 
such matters the sound-engineers attended to the properties of the speakers' voices in relation to 
4. Liveness should not be conftised with immediacy. A programme, in order to be 'live', does not 
necessarily have to be transmitted in the moment of its production (ie in real time). The effect of 
liveness is preserved in recording in a number of ways (Bourdon 2000), but most simply by recording 
in one continuous unbroken take. Continuity editing, very common today, procures the same effect. I 
have found no evidence of post-production interventions to tidy up, for whatever reason, the original 
'live' recordings of the Brains Trust. 
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the microphone and its properties. Pitch and volume had to be adjusted and balanced to produce 
an even-sounding programme for absent ears. Shouters could be softened, whisperers coaxed to 
increase their volume. Naturally loud voices were placed at the comers of the table, at an angle 
to the microphone. Quiet voices were placed full on to it. As a rule this was where women were 
positioned to stop them raising their voices and sounding shrill. Joad and Huxley were always 
placed opposite each other to allow them to spar more easily. 
After the warm-up the programme quickly slipped into the real thing. The green light came on. 
The programme was now 'on record' and McCullough deftly introduced each participant before 
sailing into the first question. Thomas himself always sat in on the sessions. Positioned slightly 
behind McCullough and away from the table he tried, from moment to moment, to hear the talk 
with an ear for the listener. When he felt a discussion was getting too wordy he would pass a 
note to the question master telling him to wrap it up. Thomas was always keenly sensitive to the 
programme's pace, tempo and balance. To maintain tempo he would, if necessary, switch the 
order of questions. If for instance Joad had discoursed at length on a philosophical question he 
would tell McCullough to bring forward a question on snakes for Huxley. 
It was extraordinarily hard to convince listeners that the talk was completely unrehearsed. The 
BBC publicly guaranteed the questions were not known in advance by any of the panel. 
Thomas would point out how it was virtually impossible to read a prepared script in the 
completely natural manner that characterised the Brains Trust. If speakers knew the questions 
ahead of their of their replies their answers would be duller, longer, less provoking. It was the 
spontaneity, the slips, the verbal clutchings in mid-air and the occasional flooring of the 
speakers that listeners enjoyed. Spontaneity, as an achieved effect-in-public, as an effect-for- 
others, never simply happens. It must be planned and worked for. If it is to be achieved it must 
be so effortlessly. Here is Joad, in full flight, on the question, 'what is happinessT 
In Aristotle's famous metaphor it's like the bloom on a young man's cheek in 
perfect health. It's not a part of health, but it's something added. Its a its a si: gn 
that the organism is functioning appropriately on an appropriate subject matter. 
Well now I should think I should like to put that by saying that happiness is 
something that doesn't yield itself to direct pursuit but comes incidentally. It's 
not a house that can be built with men's hands. It's like the kingdom of heaven, 
it can't be taken by storm. It's like a flower that surprises you, a sort of song 
that you hear as you pass a hedge rising suddenly into the night. I'd I'd like to 
say that er really the best recipe for happiness that I know is not to have leisure 
enough to wonder whether you're being miserable or not. In other words, it's a 
by-product of activity. 
0 
McCullough. Well I'm sure that uh () all over the country uh () at the end of 
that () answer to that question there was a burst of applause. I would just like 
to say that ah professor Joad answered that without any notes and without 
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knowing what the question was. Hhh you may find it difficult to believe I do 
very much so sitting here watching him and I congratulate him. 
Talk in public 
The immediate impact of the Brains Trust in wartime Britain, was in large part due to a felt 
need for spontaneous, open public discussion in a time of grave national crisis. The three regular 
speakers, Huxley, Joad and Campbell became household names, and their idioms of speech 
quickly became catch-phrases: 'It all depends what you mean' (Joad), 'When I was in Patagonia' 
(Campbell). At the height of the programme's popularity Life magazine sent over its star 
photographer from the USA for a three page photo-spread and special filmed versions were 
recorded and shown in the Odeon cinema chain. 5 In many cinemas there was a buzz of 
discussion as they were shown and in some, bursts of applause. In the Mile End, Fulham and the 
Elephant and Castle the reception was unfiiendly. 'What's the difference between Right and 
LeftT caused such an uproar in one or two cinemas that the film was taken off before its run 
was over (Thomas: 1944: 25). Within a couple of years the Brains Trust format was being 
copied everywhere, including the fictional village in which the ten year old William Brown 
lived: 
It was the time when the Brains Trust movement, so rashly started by the BBC, was 
sweeping England. Every town, every village, every parish, every street had its Brains 
Trust, at whose meetings earnest seekers after knowledge discussed the scientific, 
political or economic problems of the day.... The village in which William lived was 
not immune from this latest craze. A local Brains Trust, under the direction of Mr. 
Markson, the head master of the school which William attended and the acknowledged 
intellectual leader of the neighbourhood, met regularly at the various members' houses 
and discussed such things as the Theory of Time, the Beveridge Report, Post-War 
Reconstruction and the Origin of Matter. [Crompton 1989: 1] 
William was not particularly interested in any of this. He had listened once to the BBC Brains 
Trust on the wireless and had been so bored that he had taken care never to listen again. But the 
impact of the programme on the grown-up world at that time was enormous. In London political 
5. The WAC press cuttings for the Forces Programme (1941-45) show how continuously newsworthy 
the Brains Trust and its three 'resident' performers became for the daily and weekly press. There was a 
photo-feature spread on the programme in Picture Post (3 August 194 1), and Illustrated (3 November 
194 1) ran a cover story on 'Why Professor Joad plays hockey'. The front-page photograph showed the 
50 year old Joad in shorts surrounded by young women kitted up, apparently, for a game of hockey. 
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meetings were arranged according to the Brains Trust format, complete with question master. 6 
They were, in Thomas's account, very successful, helping to dissolve the barrier between 
platform and audience, and displacing the solo performer, the drab speaker'who trudged 
through his notes and unloaded his cliches on an unhappy audience' (Thomas 1944: 9). When 
millions of people had become accustomed to ready speech, ready wit and cogent arguments, 
Thomas predicted, they would have neither time nor patience for the old-style Public Speaker. 
The Brains Trust had two kinds of listener: those who attended to the substance of what was 
said-the 'earnest seekers after knowledge'-and those who were entertained by the 
personalities of the speakers, the crackle of opposing opinion, by the play of wit and the 
occasional sheer brilliance of the talk. The programme's fonnat was a device for producing such 
effects; talk-in-public as an art, the art of conversation. 
The recently developed history of conversation reveals something of the anxieties 
experienced, over the centuries, by people when, in social gatherings, they know they will be 
called upon to enter into conversation with strangers. Conversation, of course, leaves no 
historical trace, but since the beginning of book publishing there has been a continuing flow 
of guides and manuals to conversation throughout Europe, offering advice to the anxious 
about how to succeed in this social art (Burke 1993: 89-122). Much of the advice, in the many 
European manuals and guides from the 17'hcentury onwards, amounts to the kinds of common- 
sense considerations attended to both by the producer of and the listeners to the Brains Trust. 
Don't talk about yourself all the time; don't monopolise the talk; don't talk too long; don't 
interrupt ..... such commonplace rules of conversation have, as Peter Burke notes, been passed 
on down through the centuries (Burke 1993: 94). The last point was particularly keenly felt by 
listeners to Joad and company. Howard Thomas notes that on one occasion a lady MP, who was 
particularly prone to jump in while others were talking, received over 800 letters of complaint. 
Equally listeners disliked too many ers and ums - guest speakers and McCullough were 
frequently taken to task for this failing. All listeners admired the felicity of fluent, extempore 
speech. 
If we ask where, in England, such an art was supposedly cultivated we return to the dinner table, 
or more exactly the high tables of 19th century Oxford and Cambridge. At those tables, 
Matthew Arnold noted, there were 'professional conversationalists, as at the present time there 
6. There were Agricultural Brains Trusts for farmers; Dig For Victory Brains Trusts for 
allotment holders and gardeners; Army, Navy and Air Force Brains Trusts; Women's Institute 
Brains Trusts, and even - on the BBC -a Religious Brains Trust called The Anvil which was 
not, however, a success. 'Made of tin, and they strike it with cardboard hammers' was the 
unkind description of it in the House of Commons (Thomas 1944: 10) See also BBC 
Handbook (1942: 72-3) for further details of the immediate impact of the Brains Trust. 
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are professional beauties' (St George 1993: 50). Those with a reputation as 'conversationalists' 
were, in the 19th century, frequently invited to dinner in the expectation that they would 
sparkle at the table while others would listen. They would go primed with a supply of 
information, anecdotes and witty epigrams that they had already prepared and committed to 
heart, and they arrived determined to get through their fund of talk no matter what (Benson 
1920: 66). Joad granted that he, as a university professor, was quite at home with the idea of 
saying publicly what he thought about all manner of things because that, so to speak, went with 
the job. Huxley belonged to a distinguished family which, over several generations, had 
established itself - by the achievements of individual members and by inter-marriage with other 
such families - as a leading clan in what Noel Annan has called the British 'intellectual 
aristocracy'. Pierre Bourdieu, in his monumental study of cultural distinctions as markers of 
social difference, discusses what he calls 'the entitlement effect' in relation to the academic elite 
in particular (Bourdieu 1984: 18-25). By virtue of his status as a professor someone like Claude 
Levi-Strauss (a well-known French academic in the 1960s) was, he argued, entitled to speak 
outside his own particular sphere of knowledge (anthropology), and indeed derived additional 
prestige from so doing. It is thus entirely apt for someone who is, as the French say, an 
accredited maitrepenseur, to appear on radio or television talk-shows and hold forth on art, 
politics and the state of the world in general. Such publicly performed fluency is part of the job 
of being a public person. 
Such persons were invariably men. In mixed social gatherings women rarely spoke other than to 
admire, flatter or encourage males holding forth. As for public speaking, women were invisible 
since there were virtually no openings for them in public life. Thus, finding good women 
speakers for the Brains Trust was one of Thomas's hardest tasks. Women, he declared, had 
never inspired affection on radio. They did not seem to radiate the warmth, geniality and 
friendliness a man could engender. They were more conscious of their radio audience, more 
inclined to think in terms of how they sounded to listeners and thus tended to become too self- 
aware and unnatural. It was hard to find a'humanwoman. They were over-careful and over 
cultured in their speech and it was no easy matter to find women who could mix, 'in something 
of an after-dinner fashion with a company of men'. 7 In spite of all this Thomas did discover 
some excellent regular women participants for the programme, most notably Agnes Hamilton, 
Jennie Lee, Dr Edith Surnmerskill and, above all, Barbara Ward whose lucid answers and 
attractive style made her a favourite with listeners. These, along with Sir Malcom Sargent, 
Kenneth Clarke, Gilbert Murray, Sir William Beveridge and an unnamed 'eminent physician' 
7 It was a commonplace prejudice amongst (male) broadcasters at the time that women did not make 
good broadcasters. The characteristics described by Thomas are all attributable to the lack of 
confidence, exacerbated by lack of experience, which made women acutely self-conscious when 
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(Lord Moran, Churchill's doctor) made up the roll-call of the best-liked regular guests on the 
programme in its first few years. 
Today we all assume that we are all entitled to our opinions; not merely to 'think' them, but to 
express them publicly and have them respected (or, at least, allowed) by others. At the start of 
the 21" century the notion of discussing things in public and in private, as something that 
anyone and everyone does, is entirely unremarkable. But it was not always so. Broadcasting, in 
the last century, transformed our ideas about who was entitled to have opinions and on what. In 
the early 20ffi century, in British society, there was a great deal that could not be talked about in 
private or in public. It was a conversational convention that sex, religion and politics were not 
suitable topics for discussion-are at least not in the presence of women, children or servants. 
The loosening of 'the universe of discourse' (of what can be talked about and by whom) is a 
feature of the second half of the 20'hcentury. It is intimately linked with the ubiquitous presence 
of radio and television broadcasting in the daily lives of whole populations whose combined 
effect has been the transformation of the social and political public sphere. 
From scripted to unscripted talk 
The most basic characteristic of radio and television, as time-based media, is that they are 
potentially live to air and in real time. In live, real-time broadcasting there is no interval 
between the production, transmission and reception of programmes, and in the early years of 
radio and, later, television, all broadcasting was live and in real time. In such circumstances, 
what is effective talk on air? The pre-war BBC Talks Department came gradually to see that 
the talk it produced for transmission should try to be like ordinary conversation. It was 
understood that listeners did not want to hear sermons, or lectures or political speeches, the 
prevalent forms of talk-in-public at the time (Matheson 1933). In the course of the 1930s the 
Talks Department experimented with a variety of styles of talk that they hoped would 
encourage listeners to listen (Scannell and Cardiff 1991: 153-180). Listening to radio was a 
leisure activity, a pastime located in the contexts of ordinary, daily, domestic life. Radio talk, 
for it to become effective, had to learn to move from existing forms of public talk towards the 
usual forms of talk- in-private; conversation, chat, ordinary plain talk, the talk that goes on at 
home, on the buses or in the playground between families, friends or work colleagues. But 
the key difference between such talk and radio talk for the first twenty years or so of the 
speaking at the microphone. 
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BBC's activities is that all talk on radio was scripted in advance and read to air in live 
transmission. 
Not the least of the benefits of scripted talk, from the BBC's point of view, was that it 
allowed complete institutional control over what could be said at the microphone. In other 
words it was, potentially, a form of censorship. Offensive, libellous or politically dangerous 
remarks could be (and were) pencilled out of the scripts submitted in advance to the Talks 
Department by those invited to speak at the microphone. So long as speakers stuck to the 
script, and they invariably did, there was no danger of them saying the wrong thing. There is 
no doubt that the control of live talk on radio through the requirement that it be scripted 
served, in part, as a useful way of eliminating in advance the possibility of something 
untoward or unacceptable being said on air. So long as speakers stuck to the script, and they 
invariably did, there was no danger of them saying the wrong thing. But what if a speaker 
went off-script? It very seldom happened, but on one notorious occasion it did. In a twelve 
part Talks series broadcast in 1933 on The National Character a number of speakers from 
different walks of life came to the microphone to testify to the essential qualities of the true 
born Englishman. One of the speakers was William Ferrie, chosen to represent the English 
working man's point of view. There were difficulties with the script that he submitted to the 
Department. It made much of the economic exploitation of the working class (Ferrie was a 
Trades Union representative), it drew attention to the rise of fascism in Europe (a topic then 
studiously avoided by the BBC) and suggested that the workers were looking to Russia for a 
solution. Most of this was cut-on the grounds that it was not relevant to the topic-and 
Ferrie apparently accepted the changes to his manuscript. But on the night, when he came to 
the microphone, he abandoned his script, protested at the ways in which his talk had been 
censored and left the studio. Silence ensued for the next fifteen minutes, since there was 
nothing to replace him. It was the realization of the BBC's worst nightmare and the left-wing 
press (the Daily Herald and the Daily Worker) had a field day with the incident-it was 
proof of the censorship of left-wing political opinion by the BBC which they had long 
suspected (Scannell and Cardiff 1991: 290-1). 
But this will not suffice as a sufficient explanation of the BBC's initial preference for scripted 
talk at the microphone. There were other issues to do with the riskiness of live-to-air talk that 
had nothing to do with the dangers of politically unacceptable talk. Perhaps the primary 
problem posed by live broadcasting is negative. Any live situation is inherently fragile. There 
is always the possibility, at any moment, that things could go wrong and hence there is an 
ever-present imperative to avoid cock-ups, for if things do go wrong this is immediately and 
unavoidably visible to the audience. It can be a painfully embarrassing experience, for 
78 
instance, when actors forget their lines on stage. The hidden prompter, who is following the 
script of the play, is there to provide a cue and thus to rescue the situation, but even so this 
back-up system cannot disguise the momentary failure or break-down of the performance. 
For the pre-war BBC the script was safety-net that protected the performer, the production 
department, and the corporation itself. 
The decision to allow unscripted talk by the wartime BBC indicates a sharpened awareness of 
its listeners. And if we ask why this was not (as might be expected) a cardinal consideration 
from the start, two answers suggest themselves. First, there is the social composition of the 
broadcasters. From the beginning through to the present, the BBC has been predominantly 
staffed, in its senior levels of policy and programme making, by a middleclass, professional, 
male intelligentsia. Thus the ethos of public service, as it came to be articulated before the 
war, was one which presumed that the task of broadcasting was one of cultural enrichment 
and that, moreover, the broadcasters knew what that meant and required without needing to 
take its audiences into account. Whereas the logic of commercial broadcasting impels those 
concerned to consider what their audiences might want, the logic of public service 
broadcasting as a state regulated monopoly had no such inner compulsion. The 'brute force' 
of the monopoly was the second crucial factor that delayed the impact of audience needs upon 
the collective corporate consciousness of the BBC. 
I have indicated that the relationship between broadcasters and their audiences is an unforced 
one, because it is unenforceable (Scannell 1991: 2). Broadcasters cannot make their audience 
listen in the ways they would wish because, unlike performers in a church or theatre, they 
have no sanctions against them. But audiences do have one very powerful sanction against the 
broadcasters if they do not like what they are getting. They can immediately switch to another 
service. In monopoly conditions however, the only alternative was to switch off. Minimally, it 
could be argued, the BBC's services were better than nothing. The brute force of the 
monopoly gave the broadcasters the power to impose their vision of what broadcasting should 
be upon their audiences without consultation or consideration of what they might want, 
because there were no internal or external pressures to do so. What has propelled the BBC in 
the direction of popularising its services has often been linked to the 'threat' of competition, 
most notably when commercial television was introduced in 1954. In 1940 the exigencies of 
total war immediately compelled a quite new attention to listeners and a desire to involve 
them more in programmes. Audience participation, through the simple device of inviting 
listeners to send in questions, was as much a novelty as unscripted discussion. 
79 
All the key management decisions taken about the Brains Trust (including the recognition by 
the programme planners of the Forces Programme of the need for such a programme) must be 
understood as driven by the wartime imperative to connect with audiences in the interests of 
national morale, for that was the crucial mission of the BBC on the 'home front'. The Forces 
Programme reversed, at a stroke, the thinking of the pre-war BBC. It was, from the start, 
thought of from the point of view of its listeners (in the first place the troops and, after 
Dunkirk, the home-land audience of Britain) and what they might want, rather than from the 
point of view of the broadcasters and what they thought they should provide for listeners. 
From the beginning the programme planners of this radically new service took into account 
the circumstances of listening and what listeners might want to hear from it. 
The emphasis on entertainment is indicative of this changing attitude to listeners and 
prompted the key decision (unthinkable before the war) to give the task of developing the 
programme to Variety (responsible for entertainment) rather than Talks. The choice of 
Howard Thomas was equally extraordinary. Howard Thomas was not an insider. He did not 
share the corporate ethos, the values of the production culture of the BBC at that time. It is 
hard, indeed, to imagine someone like him being recruited into the BBC except in the 
exceptional circumstances of war. ' Thomas was a pioneer programme maker for commercial 
radio in the late 1930s. He worked in the London office of J. Walter Thompson, one of the 
largest American advertising agencies, and made variety programmes sponsored by the 
manufacturers of brand-name goods. His shows were recorded on disc in JWT's own radio 
studio, for transmission back to Britain from mainland Europe by Radio Luxembourg. The 
culture of commercial radio in the 1930s was very different from that of the BBC. It was 
populist and popular, and built round star performers-band leaders, singers and entertainers 
(Thomas 1977: 32-44). Before the war the BBC had tried at first to crush Radio Luxembourg 
and then grudgingly to compete with it (Scannell and Cardiff 1991: 230-2). When war broke 
out Luxembourg closed down immediately, and the BBC now recruited one of its leading 
producers. It is not surprising that two of the most successful wartime programmes-the 
Brains Trust and Sincerely Yours, Vera Lynn-were produced in the BBC by an outsider from 
commercial radio. 9 
9. He didn't last long, handing in his three months notice of resignation in November 1943 because of 
'irksome restrictions' on his work. His name was then immediately withdrawn from the billings of the 
Brains Trust even though he continued to produce it while he worked out his contract. At this Thomas 
went public, denouncing the petty mindedness of the BBC and declaring that he was the original and 
only begetter of the programme. Details in WAC Press Cuttings, Forces Programme 1944 (2): P200 
9 For a detailed discussion of the impact of Vera Lynn on wartime radio see Scannell 1996: 58-74 
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The management of liveness 
I have thus far considered the management of liveness in negative terms, as a problem that 
needs to be controlled in order to avoid technical failure and human error or deviation. But this 
does not begin to explain why the production of live talk at the microphone should be such a 
desirable thing, nor why, when done well it should meet with such instant acclaim as the Brains 
Trust did. For all its advantages in terms of control, the basic problem with scripted talk is that 
it is boring. Everyone can immediately hear the difference between scripted and unscripted 
talk. To our ears scripted talk sounds flat, dull, lacking in spontaneity and immediacy in 
comparison with what we take to be the real thing: spontaneous, natural, unscripted and, 
essentially, live talk. Pre-war talk on radio almost always meant a talk written and presented 
by an authority or expert of some sort; talk as monologue. Talk as discussion-a group of 
people talking on a range of given topics in the studio-scarcely existed. The programme's 
immediate impact testifies to the pleasure of hearing real live talk between people, live on 
radio. Let us see how it was managed, bearing in mind that the key design consideration is 
that this talk should be something that listeners would, in fact, want to listen to. This means 
that it must somehow show, in the design of the talk, that it is managed with listeners in 
mind; that listeners can recognize that the talk produced on radio is, in the first place, for 
them. The radio audience is not an overhearing audience. To overhear means to listen to 
something not meant or intended for the overhearer. If you tap into a crossed line on the 
phone you are eavesdropping on talk between two people producing talk with and for each 
other, but not for you, the absent third party. Is radio talk like that? And if not, must it not be 
the case that talk-on-radio should somehow be evidently and hearably meant to be listened to 
by listeners? 
In an essay on 'Conversation' written a decade or so before broadcasting began in Britain, A. 
C. Benson suggested that what was most needed in social gatherings was 'a kind of moderator 
of the talk, an informal president': 
The perfect moderator should have a large stock of subjects of general interest. 
He should, so to speak, kick off. And then he should either feel, or at least 
artfully simulate, an interest in other people's point of view. He should ask 
questions, reply to arguments, encourage, elicit expressions of opinions. He 
should not desire to steer his own course, but follow the line that the talk 
happens to take. (Benson undated, c. 1910: 67) 
Such was the role of the Brains Trust's Question Master, Donald McCullough, whose 
assigned task was to moderate the talk produced in the studio in the interests of absent 
listeners. McCullough, at all points in the broadcast, acted as the intennediary between the 
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live interaction in the studio and those for whom it was enacted. He introduced the 
programme and brought it to a close. He nominated the topics and who should speak to them 
and in what order. The rules of engagement were few but vital. When McCullough read out the 
question anyone who wished to speak could raise their hand but not speak until he had 
identified them by name. This served two purposes: it made it clear, for listeners, who was 
speaking and, at the same time, it prevented overlapping talk. In test trials of the programme, a 
laissez-faire speak-as-you-like policy was adopted. Such 'high involvement' talk may be 
exciting for participants but off-putting for audiences since it becomes hard to follow who is 
saying what or what is being said. The simple system of one-at-a-time was adopted in the 
interests of listeners, though at the possible expense, Thomas noted, of lively debate and 
discussion. It was a delicate task to find the right balance between encouraging spontaneity 
while, at the same time, ensuring that it did not become too spontaneous, with the speakers 
becoming so involved in the discussion that they forgot the primary consideration of absent 
listeners for whom, they were, first and last, performing. 
This was Howard Thomas's overriding concern. In attending to the voices of speakers, to 
how they sat at the table, to whether they spoke too quickly, or gesticulated too much, or 
talked too long (McCullough would be prompted to noiselessly signal that they should wrap 
up their turn); in considering the tempo of the talk as it unfolded, in occasionally changing the 
sequence of questions for greater balance and variety-in all these ways Thomas showed his 
practical understanding and mastery of what was at stake in the production of live-to-air 
discussion on radio as something whose communicative intention was that it should be found 
to be entertaining by its designated absent audience. If audiences did indeed find that it was 
an entertaining programme then, as I have tried it show, it was no accident. It was rather the 
meant and intended outcome of a wide ranging set of considerations and stratagems which, 
separately and together, combined to produce talk-on-radio as something to be listened to by 
absent others. For audiences, and indeed for most academic analysts of broadcast output, 
what was attended to in the first place by the programme's producer and, in the second place 
by this production-oriented account and analysis, has a 'seen but unnoticed' character. It is 
presumed, but seldom taken into account, in assessments and evaluations of programmes. The 
virtue of making explicit the underlying significance of practical considerations and decisions 
in the production process it that it begins to account for how programmes do, as a matter of 
fact, work as that which they are found to be by broadcast audiences. 
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Conclusions 
The data presented in the narrative of the production history of the Brains Trust have been 
interpreted in this way in order to account for the simple fact of its immediate popularity. 
Such an approach necessarily brackets alternative, more critical interpretative frames for 
thinking about what the data reveal. I will briefly mention three. It is a common concern of 
production studies, especially of the BBC, to show the hidden manipulations of programmes 
as indicative of the complicity of the broadcasters with its political masters (the government 
and departments of state) especially in the management of news. Something of this 
undoubtedly shows in my account-in the topics vetoed by Basil Nichols, the Controller of 
Programmes and the later interference by the BBC's highest authority, the Board of 
Governors. 10 Howard Thomas and the regular speakers rightly regarded this covert censorship 
as undermining the serious purposes of the programme. The topics discussed by the Brains 
Trust panellists in William's village, included the Beveridge Report and Post-War 
Reconstruction. ' 1 These were indeed the burning issues of the day, but they were not fully and 
openly available for discussion by the real, live panellists of the original, radio Brains Trust. 
It should not be too readily inferred from this however that because such matters could not be 
discussed in this particular programme they could not be discussed at all on air. Features 
made a thirty minute documentary about the Beveridge Report on its publication and the 
Talks Department dealt with post-war reconstruction in ponderous, worthy ways in 1944 after 
Listener Research had found it to be a concern that was uppermost in many people's minds. 
Thus the politics of what can and what cannot be talked about at any time-a key issue in any 
study of broadcasting-requires some nuancing. The question of what can be talked about (or 
not) is closely related, in the study of the BBC at least, to the question 'where? ' Serious 
matter must be dealt with seriously by serious departments whose business is to be serious, 
and The Brains Trust was produced by the Variety Department that dealt in light 
entertainment. That said, it is also true that unscripted discussion of political issues was a 
11. The production files contain detailed evidence of the problems caused by the programme. There 
were objections from the Anglican Church about it being irreligious (for details see Wolfe 1985: 207- 
212), and from the Ministry of Information about its 'left-wing bias' (Joad and Huxley were regarded 
in official quarters as 'avowed communists'). Such external pressures created trouble for senior 
management which got passed down the line in the form of increasing internal managerial intervention 
and control of the programme (see WAC R51/23/1 and 2). Were this a chapter about wartime 
propaganda and censorship I would have made much more of the politics of its production. 
12. These topics were aired, not without difficulty, by the BBC. For a summary review of wartime 
broadcasting on the home front, including the treatment of post-war reconstruction, see Cardiff and 
Scannell (1986). 
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bridge too far anywhere in broadcast output at that time. Unscripted political talk was some 
years away and when it came it was a right that would be reserved, in the first instance, for 
those most entitled freely to express their views on political matters-politicians. 
A second theme, there in the narrative, and touched upon but not fore-grounded in my 
analysis of the programme, concerns the uneven distribution of entitlements to opinions on 
radio at that time (and for many years subsequently). It is always worth noting, at any 
historical moment, who is entitled to speak at the microphone and who is not. It is not 
difficult to show that working class speakers did not have the same kind of access to the 
microphone as speakers such as Joad or Huxley. It is not that the wartime working class 
audience was unimportant. To the contrary it had achieved a quite new and urgent 
significance ever since the dramatic transition to a fully mobilised, state-controlled war 
economy in the summer of 1940. A new genre of 'factory programmes' for the workers 
mushroomed into existence almost immediately. Their opinions on these programmes were 
carefully monitored by Listener Research and when it was found that many workers regarded 
them as 'tosh' they were quietly dropped. Jobsfor All and Homesfor All-the two series on 
post-war reconstruction produced by Talks in 1944-ventriloquised the anxieties of working 
people through actors in the role of ordinary working men and women who earnestly asked 
the experts, planners and pundits in the studio what was being done to ensure that there would 
be no return to the hungry thirties when the war came to an end. But working people there, as 
in The Brains Trust, are constructed as questioners. It is people like Joad and Huxley who 
have the answers. 
A similar issue that shows up in the programme is the vexed 'problem' of women speakers at 
the microphone. It would be easy to interpret this, from the perspectives of today, as 
indicative of deeply sexist attitudes in a male dominated institution sixty years ago, and of 
course, it is true. But it is worth considering the larger social context of this problem for, 
although it shows up here in broadcasting, it does not, of course, originate in broadcasting. In 
his engaging essay called 'Notes for a social history of silence' Peter Burke remarks that it was a 
rule in many cultures - or at any rate a male assumption - that women should keep silent, at least 
in mixed company (Burke 1993: 125). A. C. Benson, in his reflections on the problems of 
conversation in his own day quite innocently observed that he found conversation with women 
more difficult than with men: 'there is a kind of simple openness, an equal comradeship, in talks 
with men, which I find difficult to attain in the case of women' (Benson 1920: 75). Is it 
surprising then that good women speakers for radio and other public contexts should be hard to 
find in a culture that in manifold ways disenfranchised them from speaking in mixed social 
gathenngs and on public occasions? What is it to be accustomed to speak in public; to be 
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listened to respectfully (indeed gratefully); to be allowed-to be expected-to have opinions; to 
be fluent, graceful and witty? For certain kinds of men the experience of being in public as an 
opportunity to express their views was such a 'second nature' that they appeared as naturals on 
radio, effortlessly displaying those attributes of warmth, geniality and friendliness that women, 
apparently lacked, at least in public. Such desiderata were frequently commended by the 
manuals as embodying the social and sociable attributes of an art of conversation (Burke 1992). 
But women, barred from any opportunity of acquiring such social skills, not unexpectedly, 
showed up as nervous, self-conscious and awkward when speaking in public. The awkwardness 
of women speakers on radio is the mark of their public invisibility. Thomas, at least, persisted in 
his efforts to overcome the 'women problem' on radio with notable success in a number of 
cases. 
These three themes-politics, class and gender-are undoubtedly there in the story of the 
programme and its production. If I have not focused on them it is not because they are 
unimportant. They are. In different ways all three themes show up in all the output of wartime 
broadcasting sixty years ago and indeed right through to and including the present. But they 
do not tell us anything particular about the particular programme in question and the 
particularities of its production which is the focal matter under consideration here. Given that 
the study of production can be studied from a number of perspectives with different 
objectives and outcomes, what is to be gained from the methodology pursued in this chapter 
compared with more critical approaches? 
I have been concerned to make visible and explicit the hidden labour of the production 
process. Marx famously observed that every product of labour is 'a social hieroglyphic'- 
things do not come to market with their meaning branded on their foreheads (Marx 1976: 
167). In his analysis, the secret of the commodity was the hidden exploitation of the labour 
that went into its making. My analysis discloses something else that is hidden in the end 
products of human labour. One thing that shows up clearly in the narrative of the production 
of the Brains Trust is all the thought, effort and concern, in short, the care that went into its 
making. What this historical account has disclosed is the care structure' 2 of a particular 
programme. My subsequent analysis attempted to show how that care is there in the 
programme-as-broadcast in heard-but-unnoticed ways such that listeners could find that the 
programme was indeed what it aspired to be for them, namely entertaining. Any human 
practice has a care-structure, which is formally indicative of all the involvements that come 
13. Heidegger 1962: 225-273. For a useful gloss on the care-structure, see Dreyfus 1991: 238-246. 
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together in the achieved, articulated and accomplished practice to deliver it as that which it is 
manifestly meant and intended to be for others. 13 
But why should care be hidden in things? Why does it not reveal itself? I have shown the 
crucial contribution of Howard Thomas to the working success of the Brains Trust. In all 
sorts of ways it was 'his' programme. Yet one of the most frequent questions sent in by 
listeners was 'Why, if the programme is spontaneous, does it need a producer? ' This back- 
handed compliment suggests that, for listeners, its producer had vanished so completely into 
the programme that it seemed to be a self-replicating phenomenon that stood on its own two 
feet as if it were the author of itself. Any practice is independent of those who make or 
produce it. The care-structure is impersonal and anonymous. To recover the individual 
human inputs into past broadcast programmes is of course, in part, to honour the dead, to 
redeem them from the silences of history. But it serves, fundamentally to underline the 
objective character of human practices which stand, uncoupled from their creators, in the 
common light of day for all to use and enjoy (or not) as they see fit. The non-reciprocity of 
practices is the mark of their disinterested generosity. They present themselves to others with 
no strings attached, and without soliciting acknowledgement or thanks. 14 
To analyse the care-structure of a practice is to make explicit the foregiven conditions of its 
recognition and reception. In broadcasting it is always the most obvious things that most need 
explaining. If a programme is found by audiences to be entertaining how are the conditions of 
its recognition as such there in the programme? It cannot be the case that the 
tentertainingness' of programmes amounts to no more than the subjective projections upon 
them of individual listeners or viewers. The disclosedness 15 of things, the ways in which they 
reveal themselves as what they are, in terms of what and who they are for (the Brains Trust is 
for the enjoyment of listeners), indicates that their meaning is immanently there in them in 
such ways as to be discoverable by anyone. But the immanent meaning of any humanly 
made thing (including radio programmes) is there only by virtue of all the fore-thought 
involved in its production, right the way through from the initial concept to the realised end- 
product. It is a distinctive feature of humanly made things considered as Pragmata (as things- 
for-use), that they by and large actually do work as that which they are meant and intended to 
be-otherwise they are not much use. If the exploitative aspects of labour are concealed in 
14. The BBC's Listener Research Department ran an annual check on audience reactions to the Brains 
Trust. Their findings confirm that the vast majority of listeners recognized 'that the essence of the 
Brains Trust is discussion, but it is also widely maintained that the occasional "matter of fact" question 
makes good listening'. WAC Listener Research Report, 'The Brains Trust 1944-5', LR/3657. 
14 On broadcasting considered as a disinterested, non-reciprocal communicative practice, see John 
Peters' discussion of the Parable of the Sower (Peters 1999: 51-62) 
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things, so too is the care and concern involved in their making. The one does not deny the 
other. 
Whenever we turn on the radio or television today we most likely will encounter, in any non- 
fictional programme, people in various situations producing unscripted, spontaneous talk of 
some kind or other. We are seldom aware, ordinarily, that this talk is something that has to be 
managed in ways that are specific to radio and television, because broadcast programmes do 
not, on the whole, reveal the conditions of their production. We are even less aware that 
broadcast practices have a history; that there was once a time (now long gone) when all 
broadcast talk was scripted. The particular value of an historical approach to broadcast 
production practices is that it can make explicit what is at stake in the actual discovery and 
working out of a practice at the point of its origination. Practices have their histories. Their 
recovery helps us understand that how broadcasting works is the outcome of accumulated 
knowledge and know-how, worked out as practical solutions to immediate issues at the time, 
and subsequently routinised and projected forward into a future, which in turn becomes the 
today that we, the living, inhabit. The management of liveness is not, of course, a matter of 
concern just for broadcasters or academics. Fundamentally it concerns the ways in which we 
the living, in any today, confront and cope with liveness, being alive, the management of the 
fore-given conditions of our existence. Something of this is the hidden pearl in any human 
practice. 
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Chapter Four 
The death of Diana and the meaning of media events 
I 
All sorrows can be bome if you put them into a story or tell a story about them. 
[Isak Dinesen, quoted in Arendt 1989: 1751 
Happening/event 
For a week at the end of August 1997 the British people - and many others throughout the world - 
were in the grip of what was, perhaps, the biggest news event of modem times, the death of 
Diana, Princess of Wales. Many at the time were surprised by their reactions to this event. It 
seemed to matter more than they knew how or why. And for those who felt unconnected with 
what was happening there was the sense of, somehow, being out of touch. Either way, it was an 
involuntary thing. It was not that people chose to be involved, or not. There was no choice. They 
were in the grip of an event which took hold of them and held them until, in the end, it let go and 
released them from its grip. That the event did this - that it took hold of a whole nation, and many 
throughout the world - indicates both its power and its strangeness. For a week there was no 
escape from it as people everywhere were caught up in the implications and consequences of the 
death of the princess. At the time and in retrospect many felt - and continue to feel - perplexed by 
the strange power of the death of Diana. What did it - does it - mean? 
To begin with I want to make a distinction between two kinds of event: those that happen to us 
and those that we make to happen. The former I will call happenings; the latter, events. 
Happenings are of two kinds: natural and human. In either case, an important class of happenings 
are disasters and their potentially disastrous consequences. Natural disasters include great storms, 
volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, hurricanes, drought and flood. Often these things come upon us 
suddenly, unexpectedly, overwhelmingly. We see, in the remains of Pompeii, an ancient city 
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forever caught in such a moment. Today, modem science tries to anticipate earthquakes and 
eruptions of the earth on behalf of, say, those living on the San Andreas fault line for whom the 
possibility of an earthquake is a permanent background possibility in daily life. Happenings then, 
have the character of coming upon us. They are unexpected. Or, to put it slightly differently, they 
are not meant or intended. Our efforts to anticipate such happenings - and thereby, if not to 
control them at least to escape their worst consequences - is the mark of our efforts to 'expect the 
unexpected'. 
Human disasters are similar in many ways. They include all 'accidental' happenings that are not 
meant or intended and which, to the contrary, are to be avoided at all costs. The going down of a 
ship at sea, a plane, train or car crash... these are human disasters with intrinsically newsworthy 
qualities. They are news because human lives matter; because the loss of life is a fateful thing for 
the living. In the case of human disasters or accidents, questions arise: 'Why did it happen? What 
went wrong? ' The politics of blaming is intrinsic to human disasters. It is not just that they were 
not meant. Very often, it is felt, they should not have happened. They should not have happened 
because human beings make such things as cars, ships and planes in the anticipation that they 
might go wrong and therefore try to prevent such an eventuality by reducing - as far as possible - 
'human error' and 'system failure'. So when something does go wrong it is often against the grain 
of expectations. The ship was meant to be safe, so why did it - The Titanic, The Herald of Free 
Enterprise - go down? The plane was meant to be safe, so why did it explode in mid-air? Was it 
engine failure, or a terrorist bomb? Such questions are part of the necessary politics of blaming 
which is based upon the premise that since the disaster was not meant to happen - because great 
human though and effort had been invested in forestalling that very possibility - the fact that it 
happened must be, in some way, a morally accountable matter. Blaming is partly fault-finding 
and partly the allocation of moral responsibility. Who can we blame for an earthquake or a 
hurricane? The weather? The gods? But human disasters with their human consequences are 
morally accountable matters because it may turn out that human beings were themselves 
responsible for what went wrong. 
Events that are meant to happen have an entirely different character from those that are not. To 
say something is meant to happen means, in effect, that it is made to happen. It is anticipated and 
planned for. It requires forethought and preparation. Intended events have a forestructure that is 
realised in the event as it unfolds, as it takes place as it is meant to take place. Of course between 
intention and realization there is many a slip. Things do not always go according to plan. But any 
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event that is meant and intended is invested with a set of expectations (however great or small) 
that must be met, whether it is a child's birthday party, a soccer match or a great ceremonial 
occasion. Any such event will be judged in terms of how far it succeeded or failed to realize the 
expectations invested in it. 
The difference, then, between happening and event is that the former is not meant or intended 
whereas the latter is. As such the former is strictly meaningless whereas the latter is strictly 
meaningful. In the case of happenings, we strive to make sense of them retrospectively. The 
politics of blaming is the essential focus of that process. But events are invested with significance 
even before they happen. Thus happenings have a retrospectively meaningful or significant 
character, while events have a prospective significance. In respect of happenings, we look back 
on them and wonder how or why they happened. In respect of events we look forward to them 
and wonder how they will turn out. Will they measure up to, or even surpass, our expectations? 
The meaning of the meaningless happening - it was not meant or intended - must be (can only 
be) found after it has happened. The meaning of the meant and intended event must be made 
meaningful in the moment of its realization, the moment in which it comes to life. 
The death of Diana encompassed both happening and event. It began as a happening: a car crash, 
an accidental death, a meaningless tragedy. It ended as a great and solemn event: her funeral 
service and burial. Between these two moments - happening and event - which mark the 
boundaries (the beginning and the end of the phenomenon) - there was a complex unfolding 
process, a process of resolution, a process of transforming a meaningless happening into a 
meaningful event. This process was absolutely and unavoidably necessary in order to release all 
concerned from the grip of the happening-event. Until this process was worked out there was no 
escape from the power of something that held us in its grip. The working out of the transition 
from happening to event brought it to an end and thereby freed us from it. Only when the 
happening was transformed into an event did it achieve what it cried out for - the articulation of 
its significance. When this was accomplished, all those concerned were released back into their 
ordinary daily lives and concerns. The dominant power of the event was at last relaxed. It no 
longer held all those concerned in its urgent, unrelenting, grip. Thus, the core dynamic of the 
event-as-a-whole (its movement from beginning to end) was the effort to articulate its 
significance and thereby realize its meaning. When and only when this was accomplished did the 
event come to an end and thereby set us free. In the extraordinarily complex sequence of things 
that took place between the crash and the funeral, this striving for significance and releasement 
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was worked out. 
Retrospectively it appears that the events surrounding the death of Diana fell into three distinct 
parts. If it is, as I will later suggest, intrinsic to events that they are storyable (narratable, tellable) 
things, then this event had the classic structure that makes something storyable: a beginning, 
middle and end. The beginning was the crash itself and the death of the Princess. The middle was 
the double process of letting go of the crash and its meaning and in so doing turning towards the 
end, namely the funeral and burial of Diana. The end was the funeral service itself and the 
journey of the hearse to Althorpe, the final resting place of Diana in a private grave on an island 
in the grounds of her childhood home. To begin to understand the event as a whole we must see 
how it journeyed, and with what difficulties, from the initial, gripping happening to the final, 
releasing event. 
11 
The crash 
When something truly extraordinary happens, people remember two things about their initial 
response: where they were when they heard the news and their disbelief on hearing it. The death 
of Kennedy - the first great public tragedy of the television age - was remembered in this way, 
and likewise the death of the Princess of Wales. Doubtless everyone remembers how, from whom 
and where they heard the unbelievable news. 'I don't believe it'. This means two things: 'I don't 
want to believe it. I do believe it'. ' 
The expression of disbelief marks the moment of acceptance of a truth that is hard to accept. 
From this moment onwards there begins the process of accepting the unacceptable. How one feels 
about something or someone - especially how one responds to loss or death - is not always 
immediately transparent. It may be that, when confronting the death of a close relative or family 
member, one is surprised to discover that one does not experience an immediate sense of deep 
I am grateful to Greg Myers for this point. 
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sorrow or loss. Contrariwise, in the case of the death of Diana, what came as a surprise to 
countless millions was the discovery that she seemed to mean a great deal to them. They 
experienced a sense of shock, loss and grief for someone who, to all intents and appearances, had 
nothing to do with them or their lives. How could it be that they apparently cared more for a 
seemingly distant unknown public figure than for those that were closest to them? This paradox 
had to be worked out, individually and collectively. 
In many societies mourning is a collective public process and grief is adequately and 
appropriately expressed in ritual, public ways. We in the West, however, have privatized 
property, religion and experience so that 'emotions' such as grief or sorrow are regarded as 
essentially private subjective matters. But subjective feelings have no meaning beyond their 
purely subjective significance. So that an essential difficulty, from the moment of the crash, 
would be the negotiation between private and public responses to what had happened. Only in the 
public domain could what had happened be transformed from meaningless happening and private 
grief into a common shared and significant meaningful event. The key agencies that negotiated 
between private and public, that gathered the event into its articulate significance were the press 
and broadcasting but especially, in this case, television. 
At the time and in retrospect some felt that the BBC's response to the news of the crash and death 
of Diana was excessive. Normal television and radio services were suspended and replaced by a 
rolling, continual news and discussion service that lasted throughout the week. For those who felt 
disconnected from the event this interruption of 'normal service' was part of the rude disruption of 
their routine daily life. Was it excessive, an instance of 'media overkill"? The answer very much 
depends on how you stood in relation to the whole affair. That the BBC responded in this way 
and sustained saturation coverage of the event throughout its duration tells us something about its 
institutional character. That Channel 4 was the first to revert to its normal schedule tells us 
something about Channel 4. But we must ask why such media 'overkill' seemed necessary and 
appropriate to the nature of the emerging event. 
On the Sunday morning and through that day, as people turned on to watch and find out what had 
happened and whether there was any news since then (the crash, the death) it seemed as if 
television was long on talk and short on information. There was a great hunger for news and that 
was a commodity in short supply in the first hours and through the day of the 'breaking' story. 
From the start there was a double process: a compulsion to talk about what had happened, and a 
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longing for information that might clarify what had happened - what had really happened. The 
compulsion to talk - there from the start and still with us now, months after the event - can 
doubtless be explained via some behavioural mechanism, via an appeal to some compulsive inner 
psychological 'need'. But such an 'explanation' entirely fails to see that the compulsion to speak 
had its origin not in individual subjectivities but in the compelling power of the event itself. It 
demanded that we speak of it. It urged us to articulate its significance. All the countless million 
words spoken, all the acres and acres of newsprint testify to the core necessity of utterance in 
order to begin to find out what the thing meant. It did not come with its meaning branded on its 
forehead plain and for all to see. To the contrary its meaning was, in the beginning, veiled, 
obscure and hidden. The transformation of happening into event was the effort of discovering the 
meaning of the thing. This journey of discovery had to - could only - begin in the effort of 
articulation. In and through this effort -a collective, interactive process whose key participants 
we must seek to identify - the meaning of the event appeared. It emerged into significance. When, 
and only when, it appeared - through the collective human efforts of all concerned - as an 
achieved and accomplished event, did it stand revealed at last - in the common light of day - as 
the thing that it aspired to be, as the thing that it truly was meant and intended to be. But to begin 
with no-one knew what that thing was. Nor could they unless they talked of it, over and over and 
over again. In this endlessly reiterative, gathering discourse - this enormously dispersed and 
gathered conversation in countless homes and public places; in newsprint and on radio and 
television - in going back over what had happened and in looking forward to what was to come, 
in this colossal discursive effort at understanding, the lineaments of the event and its significance 
would begin to emerge into the common light of day. 
Thus, at first, after the initial shock of the fact of the crash and death of the Princess, the 
immediate question that arose was, how did it happen? What caused the car crash? First accounts 
suggested that the car was trying to escape from the harassment of paparazzi on high-speed 
motorbikes in pursuit of a shot of Diana and Dodi. This story provided the basic material for the 
first cycle in the politics of blaming. The most immediate recipients of public blame were the 
photographers themselves, and lurid stories of their behaviour before and after the crash were 
quickly circulated. That there were no British photographers involved was doubtless a relief for 
British susceptibilities and permitted a more uninhibited denunciation of 'foreign' paparazzi. 
Questions soon arose about whether photographs of the crash - of the dying Princess, of the dead 
Dodi - would be published in newspapers in Britain and around the world. As attention shifted to 
this question, the focus moved away from the photographers themselves to the agencies for whom 
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they worked and thence to those who purchased from them - the tabloid press. Thus, if at first 
blame was laid at the door of those apparently most immediately responsible - the photographers 
- it soon shifted to those seen as ultimately responsible, the proprietors and editors of tabloid 
newspapers all of whom maintained a low profile throughout the week. The Sun ran an editorial 
the day after the crash protesting that the papers were not to blame for the death of the Princess. 
However the blame changed direction two days later when it was revealed from Paris, after an 
autopsy, that the driver of the Mercedes in which Dodi and Diana were travelling, had a very high 
level of alcohol in his blood. It seemed that the reason for the crash lay less with the paparazzi 
(doubts now arose as to whether they were actually in close pursuit at the time of the crash) and 
more with the fact that the driver was very drunk. Blame now shifted away from the press and 
towards Mohammed al Fayed, father of Dodi, and owner of The Ritz, whose staff were blamed 
for allowing a drunk to drive the car in which Dodi and Diana left the hotel. 
All this had a retrospective character. It was 'after the event', an attempt to get at what had really 
happened, to move beyond the mere facticity that it had happened. Intermingled with such 
concerns, from the start, were immediate responses to the death of the Princess and attempts to 
assess its significance. The Prime Minister, speaking before going into church on the Sunday 
morning appeared shocked and distraught. He seemed to speak with difficulty and with sincerity 
about the news of the death of the Princess. When he spoke of her as 'The people's Princess' this 
became the soundbite of the hour, the catch-phrase of the week. It would be a good week for 
Tony Blair and the new New Labour government, and a bad week for the Conservatives (who 
maintained a low profile throughout) and William Hague, their new leader, whose initial response 
to the news was widely and unfavourably compared with that of Tony Blair. Meantime, and also 
from the start - there in the television studios, in editorials and feature articles, in countless 
conversations up and down the land - the crucial question emerged as to the prospective impact 
and effect of the death of the Princess. And here attention focused, inevitably, on the royal 
family: especially on the Queen, Prince Charles and Diana's two sons, William and Harry. 
There is no need to sketch in the background here. It is known and familiar to every reader. But 
the key point is that all that background history - from the very beginning of the relationship 
between Charles and Diana, right the way through from wedding, children, divorce and its 
acrimonious aftermath - all this became immediately relevant to the interpretation of the 
consequences of Diana's death. It is a truth, universally acknowledged, that the British royal 
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family has become an engrossing soap opera for most of the British people and for millions 
around the world who follow royal goings-on on tv and in newspapers and magazines. The 
pleasures of soaps, as every addict knows, are cumulative. The more you know about the past 
biographies of the dramatis personae the more expert you become in assessing the implications 
and consequences for them of their current situation and circumstances. The more you know 
about the characters the more interesting it becomes to talk about them with others, equally 
knowledgeable, about what's happening and what might happen. Everyone in Britain was an 
expert when it came to evaluating and interpreting not only what Diana's death might mean for 
those most affected by it, but also the finest nuances of what they did and did not do in response 
to it. 
Thus it was noted that the morning following the crash it appeared to be business as usual at 
Balmoral, where the royal family was taking its annual summer holiday. Both the young princes 
attended Sunday morning service at the local church and - most significantly - no mention was 
made, no prayers were offered for the Princess during the service. This gave rise to intense 
speculation and comment. It was seen as indicative of the Queen's well-known dislike of Diana, 
and of her determination to maintain royal protocol. Diana, it was recalled, had been stripped of 
royal status when the divorce was formally ratified. The Queen was underlining that fact now, it 
seemed, by ignoring Diana's death in the morning service on the following day. 
The grieving 
Diana's death was brought home to the British public, literally, when her body was flown back 
from Paris to London accompanied by the Prince of Wales and her two older sisters. Now, as her 
body lay in private in Kensington Palace, her former home, the complex business of grieving for 
her death began. There were two interwoven aspects to this process, the public and the private. 
On the one hand there was, for millions, the process of coming to terms with their own personal 
feelings about the Princess and what she meant to them. On the other hand there was an emerging 
concern as to how her death should be commemorated publicly. A gathering concern developed, 
in this respect about the precise character of her funeral service. 
Joy and sorrow are things that, in the first instance, possess us. It is never that we choose these 
things, as if one could decide to be them: 'Today I think I'll be happy, tomorrow I'll be sad'. Grief 
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and joy overtake us, so that we find that we are these things: 'Surprised by joy'... as the poet says. 
Or grief Both can be overwhelming experiences, but the difference between them is - perhaps - 
that we might seek to prolong joy, but to escape from grief At all events, grieving demands to be 
expressed. It cannot be contained. It must be released. So that finding ways to express their 
sorrow was for millions an urgent imperative. The forms their expression took became part of the 
gathering power of the event as it moved towards its resolution. Messages and flowers - small 
tokens of remembrance - expressed the sorrow of countless ordinary people. Throughout the land 
books of remembrance were opened in city halls and civic centres, and flowers were laid at 
monuments and shrines. But the focal site of this extraordinary upwelling of sorrowful 
commemoration was Kensington Palace, where the body of the Princess lay. 
That people were drawn to the palace in their thousands, day after day, was ample testimony to 
the gathering power of the event which both gathered (drew) people to itself and, in so doing, 
gathered in intensity. So, again, it is not that people thought about it and chose to go to the palace. 
They were drawn there involuntarily by the invisible, palpable, magnetic power of the event, a 
power which gathered and increased as the week went on. Thus, the queues to sign in the books 
of remembrance at the Palace (one at first, thirteen by the end of the week) grew longer as the 
days passed and more and more people lined up and waited patiently hour by hour. The build up 
of flowers at the gates of the palace and in Kensington Gardens was one of the most memorable 
sights disclosed by television as each day passed. In the end there was a sea of flowers each with 
a small written token of remembrance, affection or love. It was later estimated, when the time 
came to clear them away, that maybe ten thousand tons of flowers were left near the palace. On 
the eve of the funeral service Kensington Palace Gardens were thronged with people. As dusk 
fell, all over the gardens, round every tree, small shrines were made, candles lit, flowers laid, and 
people sat or stood in little groups, silently or quietly talking of what and who had drawn them 
there. 
Meanwhile a very public debate began about how Diana should be publicly remembered in her 
funeral service. It was this focal issue - at the very heart of the transition from happening to event 
- that gathered in all the key participants in the unfolding drama: The royal family, the Spencer 
family, the government, the media, the people. At first it seemed that the funeral might be a 
purely private affair. That, apparently, was the wish of the Spencer family and particularly Earl 
Spencer, whose hostility to the media was well known. But the Prime Minister let it be known, 
discreetly but firmly, that the funeral must be public. The people had a right to say farewell to the 
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people's princess. A right of access to the funeral service was asserted by the government on 
behalf of the British public. The question then arose as to the form of the funeral service and here 
attention focused again on the Queen since it now appeared ultimately to be her decision. 
The response of the Queen to the death of Diana had been a matter of intense scrutiny from the 
start. But as the days passed it was not so much her response as her lack of response that was 
increasingly remarked on. There was firstly that she continued to remain with the family in 
Balmoral rather than returning to London, the focus and centre of the event for there the body of 
the Princess lay. The first royal schedule to be released indicated that the Queen and her 
immediate family would return only on the eve or on the morning of the funeral. Did this mean 
then that the Queen would not visit Kensington Palace to pay her last respects to Diana? It 
became a talking point that the Queen's ensign remained flying over Buckingham Palace in her 
absence. Why was it not at half-mast like flags all over the country? Was this not another slight to 
the dead princess? It was explained that no insult was intended. The royal ensign must always fly 
over Buckingham Palace as the visible emblem of the historic continuity of the monarchy. But 
public opinion - as evidenced in many a television vox pop and op. ed. piece in the papers - 
would have none of this, and the palace bowed to public opinion and the flag was lowered. 
But the key issue that emerged from these things was the silence of the Queen. It was not merely 
that she appeared to remain withdrawn and distant from the event up there in the Highlands of 
Scotland, but she had not spoken. Why did she not speak? Surely she must? The Queen's absence 
and silence rapidly became an urgent issue. By Wednesday the media were full of it. The 
tabloids begged her to return to London and speak to the people. 'Speak to us Ma'am' cried a 
banner headline in the Daily Mirror. There were hints of hidden fierce disagreements between 
Prince Charles and the Queen over the handling of the unfolding drama. Hints too of the behind- 
the-scenes role played by the Government in persuading the palace to abandon playing it by the 
book, according to protocol, and respond flexibly and imaginatively to the unique nature of the 
occasion. Thus, the Queen was persuaded that she should speak to the nation, and she did so with 
restraint and dignity. But it was widely noticed that while she spoke of Diana with respect and 
admiration, she did not speak of her with affection or love. 
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The funeral 
As the week wore on, attention turned more and more to the funeral service. This, after all would 
gather in all that preceded it and bring matters to a climax and resolution. If the event should 
succeed - if it could be the adequate focus and repository of people's hopes and expectations; if it 
could be a fitting expression of what was widely if not universally felt - then indeed the funeral 
service might be the consummation of the event, its final climactic resolution. And if it were all 
this, then all concerned would at last, and in the end be freed, because the event had at last found 
how it should end. Much was at stake in respect of the funeral and how it should be. 
It appeared that within the rules of royal protocol there were three grades of Royal Funeral: a 
Grade I funeral for a dead monarch, a Grade 2 funeral for immediate royal kin and a Grade 3 
funeral for the rest. It seemed that Diana would get a Grade 3 standard funeral. But this would not 
do at all. Public opinion demanded a unique service to commemorate the unique personality of 
the dead Princess who increasingly appeared as a potent indictment of the apparent rigidity and 
indifference of standard royal protocol. Now the accounts of her experiences at the hands of the 
House of Windsor, as described in Andrew Morton's book, were recalled. Her famous Panorama 
interview was remembered. A complex construction of Diana appeared that was, to a 
considerable extent defined against the perceived characteristics of the royal family and the 
Queen in particular. The Queen, and the older generation of the royal family, had very largely 
escaped criticism in the preceding years. It was the antics of the younger generation of Windsors - 
above all, the very public divorces of three of the Queen's four children - that attracted all the 
publicity and provoked most public criticism. But now, in death, Diana appeared - at least in part 
-a victim of a dull, stifling and unfeeling royal regime for which the Queen seemed personally 
responsible. It was she who turned out to be a stickler for protocol. It was her rigid inflexibility 
that appeared increasingly unresponsive to and out of touch with public opinion. 
Diana's personality seemed now to shine out more brightly against the perceived boringness and 
stuffiness of most members of the royal family. She, unlike them, was one of 'us'. She had 
brilliantly laid claim to this position in her Panorama interview in late 1995, an astonishing 
performance that merits a thesis in itself Here it will suffice to note that, as she presented the 
narrative of her life, she contrived as she did so to speak for women everywhere of the problems 
of men and marriage, of the in-laws, of bringing up children and family life. Her eating 
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disorders, her feelings of rejection, her self-mutilation, her lack of self-belief, her marital 
difficulties, her love affairs.... all this spoke powerfully (and was meant to) to the experiences of 
ordinary women everywhere. Diana-as-victim was a potent position that she had already pre- 
empted in her battles against her former husband and his family. Now it appeared again with 
renewed potency. But mingled with this were many other strands in the complex phenomenon of 
her perceived personality. There was her infonnality and friendliness. This showed, on the one 
hand, in her wide ranging, and well publicised friendships within the celebrity world of film-stars, 
show-business people and pop-stars. But it showed too in her attitude to ordinary people, many of 
whom now came forward to tell of ways in which they had met the Princess and how they 
warmed to her open, friendly manner; how, indeed, she had quietly maintained contact, in some 
cases, over and beyond the call of royal duty. 
Thus what began to emerge was the potent image of a caring Diana against an indifferent and 
uncaring royal household and its Head. Her charitable work was widely recalled and discussed; 
her work with children, with the sick and elderly, with the victims of AIDS. Her famous public 
embrace of an AIDS sufferer was pointed to as changing social attitudes towards them. Her plea, 
in a public speech, that every family should have a hugger was played and replayed on television. 
Above all her most recent, and controversial, campaign against anti-personnel mines was pointed 
to as transforming, single handed, this issue into a high profile international political concern. The 
beatification of Diana gathered pace. Mother Theresa (upon whom the odour of sanctity also 
dwelt) contrived to die, as if in sympathy, within days of the death of the Princess. 
All this was a potent cocktail of hopes and beliefs, of admiration, affection and love, of adoration 
and sanctification of someone who was now, beyond a doubt, the most famous woman in the 
world. And somehow, someway expectations had to be met in the arrangements for her funeral 
and the form and content of the service itself. It was thus a matter of exquisite diplomacy to 
negotiate and achieve the right and proper balance of the coming event. There were questions 
concerning the precise route and length of the funeral procession to Westminster Abbey. There 
were questions concerning how the body should be displayed in the procession. There were 
questions concerning who should walk behind it. There were questions concerning those invited 
to the Abbey itself for the service. There were questions concerning the nature of the service. And 
finally there was the question of where she should at last be put to rest. 
it is not necessary here to recall in detail the resolution of these issues, though each had indeed to 
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be resolved appropriately. And all of them had to be resolved within days. Plans for the 
Coronation of the Queen in 1953 began at least a year ahead of the event. Then the planning took 
place discreetly out of sight of the public gaze and with no public participation or consultation 
(Scannell 1996: 80-86). On this occasion however, the whole complex thing had to be resolved 
in under a week: all the implications had to be foreseen within the over-arching frame of 'what 
will people think if we do this, or don't do thatT This was unavoidably necessary because all the 
issues concerning preparations for the funeral were in the public domain, and matters of 
continuing discussion and concern. The court of public opinion came into its own as events 
gathered to their climax. 
In the event, and on the day, the final act in the drama surrounding the death of the Princess was a 
triumph. The weather gods looked kindly on the day and the sun shone. The anticipated millions 
foregathered in the parks of central London and along the route from Kensington Palace to the 
Abbey. Giant screens were set up, by government decree, so that the crowds could participate in 
the funeral procession and service. Both went off flawlessly. The funeral service itself, surpassed 
all expectations. The two key moments - Elton John singing Candle in the Wind and the ftineral 
oration for his dead sister from the Earl Spencer - marked the climactic resolution of all that had 
gone before. 
That Elton John was an invited to the funeral was not surprising. He was well-known as a show- 
biz friend of the Princess. They had, after all sat side by side at the funeral of the murdered 
Gianni Versace and on that occasion the Princess had famously shown herself as a hugger as she 
comforted the weeping pop-star during the service. The decision however to invite Elton John to 
sing on this occasion was an altogether riskier matter. It was, of course, in deference to the felt 
need to make the funeral service less formal and more expressive of the Princess's populist, 
popular appeal. But even so, the song was a re-tread of an original sung twenty years earlier in 
memory of the second most famous female icon of this century - Marilyn Monroe. It now 
received a hasty make-over from Elton John and the original lyricist, Bernie Taupin. The words 
teetered on the edge of tackiness... 'Goodbye England's Rose... ' etc. And there was some anxiety 
in the press as to whether Elton could actually do it. Would he retain his composure? Or would he 
break down as he had done at the Versace funeral. Singer and song both seemed on the brink of 
banality and bathos. Would it work, we all wondered. In the event it did. Elton John's 
performance was hailed as triumph, and he immediately retreated to the recording studios to put it 
on disc. It was released within days and became the fastest selling single of all time. 
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But the defining moment of the service was the oration of the youthful Earl Spencer, Diana's 
younger brother and childhood companion. In ancient epic, Hannah Arendt reminds us, 'The 
stature of the Homeric Achilles can be understood only if one sees him as "the doer of great deeds 
and the speaker of great words". ' It is not, she continues, that great words express great thoughts, 
for thought was considered secondary to speech. Rather speech and action were co-eval and co- 
equal for the Greeks. This meant originally 'not only that most political action, insofar as it 
remains outside the sphere of violence, is indeed transacted in words but, more fundamentally, 
that finding the right words at the right moment, quite apart from the information or 
communication they may convey, is action' (Arendt 1989: 25-6). Later the speech would be 
picked over minutely in conversations up and down the land, in the newspapers and on radio and 
television. Was it a direct attack on the Queen? What was he claiming on behalf of Diana's 'blood 
family'9 But what the speech undoubtedly did, more perhaps the Earl could ever know, was 
indeed to find the right words at the right moment. It seemed to say what all would have wished 
to have said. It said what was right for the occasion. And whatever it said, it was said from the 
heart. A heroic and imperishable moment.... When the Earl finished speaking there was a pause, 
a silence. And then a gathering wave of sound was heard, and the cameras cut to the crowds 
outside the Abbey and gathered before huge tv screens, standing and applauding the speech to the 
echo. As this applause rolled into the Abbey, through the open West door of the nave, it was 
taken up by the congregation - at first by those nearest the door - so that it rippled up through the 
Abbey to arrive at last where Earl Spencer himself stood alone. 
After the funeral it remained to say goodbye as the coffin, now placed in a funeral hearse, left the 
Abbey and moved away from central London, threading its way slowly at first through dense 
crowds who threw flowers and bouquets in its path of and on top of it, so that it looked as if the 
hearse might be submerged in a forest of flowers. Along the North Circular and its seedy suburbs 
the small procession passed until it reached the motorway. There it gathered speed as it drove 
straight down the centre of a strangely deserted MI, towards Northampton and the home of the 
Spencer family. On every bridge, at every junction crowds had gathered for one last glimpse. And 
finally the hearse arrived at the gates of Althorp where a knot of people had congregated for the 
very last sight of the coffin. The gates opened, the hearse passed smoothly through and vanished 
up the drive way out of sight of television cameras and the public gaze. She had gone home to her 
final resting place and all of us at last could say, 'It is finished. ' Over. And life once again could 
get back to normal. 
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III 
Event and story 
I have tried to bear in mind Lukacs's dictum and to narrate rather than describe. To describe is to 
write as an observer; to narrate is write as a participant (Lukacs 1978: 111). In an objective world 
of objective things that are observed, weighed and measured in order to determine their 
properties, description is the appropriate mode. But in a world of concern, in which things matter, 
narration is the only appropriate way to express their significance. We must now begin to reflect 
on the meaning of this narrative. An appropriate starting point is the connection between event 
and story. The death of Diana was, beyond any doubt the greatest news story of recent times. 
Why? What does that mean? 
We must first see how event and story are intrinsic to each other. It is not that there is the event 
and then, later, it is found that it has some storyable (ie tellable, narratable) properties. To the 
contrary, if it has no storyable properties, it is not an event. Its storyability is intrinsic to it. Not 
every happening is a tellable, storyable thing. This is easily shown by considering the nature of 
uneventful happenings (which turn out to be what happens in routine daily life). 'What did you do 
at the office/school/work todayT 'Nothing'. 'Anything on telly this evening? ''No, nothing'. It is a 
structural, intrinsic characteristic of ordinary daily life that it is uneventful. This means that there 
is - really and truly - nothing to say about it because all that happened has happened in the same 
places at the same times and in the same ways umpteen times before. And if you did try to make 
something of all this, as Harvey Sacks points out, you would be regarded as eccentric or worse 
(Sacks 1992, volume 2: 215 -22 1). So that events show up against a back-drop of uneventful life. 
That there is nothing to say about the latter discloses that there is, indeed, something to say about 
the former. 
But what exactly? Why is it that the sayable thing about events turns out to be a storyable thing? 
What is a story? Any child knows that a story has a beginning, a middle and an end. I tried to tell 
the story of the events surrounding the death of Diana in this way because that was the 
appropriate way to tell the tale. The triple structure of stories (beginning-middle-end) is not 
something that gets mapped onto them. They are stories by virtue of having such structures. 
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Deconstructive critics can huff and puff about the virtues of 'open' texts against the ideology of 
'closed' texts. But they don't really understand what stories are about or what they mean or why 
they matter. Stories start somewhere and end somewhere, and in between they go somewhere. 
This somewhere - the where of origin, the where of ending, the where of in-between (the 
narrative's journey) - is always a particular bounded somewhere. Stories articulate a particular 
kind of foregrounded spaciality, that stands out from the taken for granted environment. This out- 
standing, focused space, is the site upon which the story gathers and is gathered. Diana's death 
began somewhere. That it was a Paris expressway was, in the first instance, as accidental as the 
crash itself (assuming we discount conspiracy theories). But where it ended - Westminster Abbey, 
the grounds of Althorp - was by no means accidental. Indeed, the story could not have ended 
anywhere else (which begins to say that it could not have ended any other way). The dynamic of 
stories is the effort at an appropriate ending. 
I have distinguished between happening and event and suggested that Diana's death encompassed 
both. It is evident that news is oriented to both these things: the unexpected happening, the 
expected event. The organisational structure of newsrooms - whether for radio, tv or print - is 
expressly designed in anticipation of events that are known in advance and those that are not. In 
respect of the former - whether it is a major international political conference, or an important 
soccer match or a royal wedding - news reporting and commentaries are intrinsic to the build-up 
of the event, They contribute to the mood of anticipation, the expectations invested in the event- 
to-come. How will the game go? What are 'our' team's chances? What will be the consequences 
of winning? Or losing? What of the condition of key players? What are the threats from the 
opposing team's star players? And so on and so on. This kind of thing is the routine stuff of sports 
news in whatever medium. The anticipated event is talked up and written up in advance because 
it is an event that is fraught with expectations. In this discourse - this discursive ferment as 
Foucault calls it - what is revealed is that such events are intrinsically 'talkable-about', both 
before and after. They are not made so by media. They always already have such characteristics, 
to which media respond in common sense ways, because common sense has already invested 
them with significance. They stand out, in this way, from the routine backdrop of ordinary 
existence about which there is ordinarily little if anything to say. 
But the fundamental orientation of news professionals in whatever medium is towards the 
unexpected happening, the 'breaking' news story. Then the cry goes up 'Hold the front page' as 
there is a mad scramble to catch up with what's happening, to get there, to be there, to witness, to 
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report, to 'capture' the event-in-its unfolding. News is always deeply enmeshed in the complex 
web of the unfolding story. The efforts of news reporters - to establish what in fact has happened 
or is happening and to assess and evaluate the 'facts' as they emerge - is not (despite their own 
professional ideology) indicative of some disinterested 'objective' process. Rather, news is 
caught up in the event as it unfolds. The happening - the point of origin for news - is meaningless 
not because it is empty of meaning but because its meaning has not yet been found. Unexpected 
things do not come fully clad in their significance. That is what has to found and this finding, this 
discovering is the very business (the busyness, the concern) of news. News is not the happening, 
but the telling of the happening. This is again to underline the key point that story-event, event- 
and-story are inseparable. They presuppose each other. 
News is drawn to certain kinds of happening because they intrinsically newsworthy. This means 
they have a discursive worth: they are worth talking about. It would be a thorough 
misunderstanding of news values to suppose that their worth or value was essentially economic. 
Of course stories have a value in terms of price. Those 'in the news' can sell their stories to the 
highest bidder. Of course certain stories sell newspapers, or increase news-viewing. But'the 
profit-margin' of news-event-stories is a by-product of their intrinsic human interest, which is the 
very core and essence of the worthiness, ie the moral worthwhileness, of news. It is not capitalism 
that invented news, nor is it some kind of consumer compulsion that makes us buy newspapers. It 
is an altogether more fundamental kind of human phenomenon from which capitalism derives 
profit on the side. That phenomenon is exemplified in the whole Death-of-Diana story whose 
meaning and significance disclose the newsworthy essence of the news-story-event. Happenings 
as such have no significance. Their meaning is found, made and discovered in the discursive 
process whereby the brute facticity of happenings is transformed into the significant, meaningful 
event. At the heart of this process is a recognition, and expression of the moral worth of human 
beings both in respect of what happens to them and what they make to happen. 
The story of what happened in the week following the death of Diana, as told above, has a 
necessarily retrospective character. It was written 'after the event'. But the story of that week, as 
told at the time by daily media, was articulated in the event's phenomenal now, the time of its 
happening, the emergent moment of its unfolding. What is the difference between these two 
temporalities and how are they linked to story-telling and the medium in which the story is told? 
My narrative of the week, written from memory, is based entirely on what I heard, saw and read 
on radio, television and in newspapers. From these 'primary' sources' I have written a secondary 
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narrative of what happened 'then'. Irrespective of the 'truth' (the accuracy, the 'correctness') of 
my narrative, it has a sequential, a consequential structure that delivers the necessary coherence 
which a story must possess if it is to be recognizable as that which it lays claim to be. The act of 
writing the narrative was the discovery of the structure of the happening-event-becoming thing. 
This structure is, of necessity, only available in retrospect. At the time 1, along with everyone 
else, was in the grip of it. 
What does it mean to be 'in the grip' of an event? It means that experientially at the time, when 
we are caught up in the happening event, when we are folded into its unfolding momentum, we 
cannot grasp its significance, we cannot 'see' the contours of its meaning. We are in the midst of 
it, given over to it, perhaps lost in it. If we, in each case, experience this 'subjectively', it is by no 
means a subjective phenomenon. Rather it is testimony to the compelling power of the event and 
its dominance over us. We 'live' it and, later, try to catch up with what it means and meant. 
Everyone knows that you cannot write history in advance. The act of writing history reinforces its 
retrospective character and produces a receding past since the time of writing and the time of that 
which is written are always moving away from rather than towards each other -a paradox neatly 
exploited by Sterne's eponymous Tristram Shandy and his doomed attempt to write the story of 
his life. However, with modem media - and above all, radio and television - the separation 
between the time of the event and the time of its telling is collapsed. The live immediacy of radio 
and television means that even as things happen they are simultaneously narrativised. I would like 
to conclude by reflecting briefly on the phenomenal complexity of this process. 
We can distinguish three inter-connected components of the narrativisation of broadcast 
happenings/events. First, whenever possible, television seeks to 'show' the event in process - 
live, as it happens, from the 'scene' of the event. Second, both radio and television, describe and 
evaluate what's happening: they 'talk' about what's going on and this talk - which is in present 
time - has both a retrospective and a prospective character to it. It concerns what has happened, 
what is happening and what may happen and is (in respect of all three ternporalities) both 
descriptive and evaluative. Thirdly, and consequently, it is not the case that broadcasting 
'reflects' what is going on. It does not hold up a miffor to an 'external reality', whatever that is. 
In the complex interstices of showing, describing and evaluating it interacts with and, in so doing, 
contributes to the actual configuration of what's going on. It participates in the structuring of 
what's happening. While it is of cardinal importance to hold as separate the actual happening- 
events and their re-working into a narrative, the crucial role of modem media is that these two 
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processes now take place at the same time. Events and their articulation are both caught up in the 
same phenomenal 'now'. 
The phenomenal now of the event is the unfolding time of its being in which we are caught up 
from beginning to end. In a complex happening-event that stretches over days rather than hours 
and minutes, the mediating acts of showing, telling and discussing what is happening are 
interlocked. Thus, in respect of the crash there was a retrospective effort to establish what really 
happened and thereby to begin to establish the significance of the crash itself The politics of 
blaming is the process, after the event, in which the wisdom of hindsight is sought for. It was in 
this case and in all major disasters, a media-driven process in which media institutions and their 
news teams try to interpret what has happened with the assistance of reports from the scene of the 
disaster, eyewitness accounts, interviews with the relevant authorities and experts, and studio 
based discussion and assessments. 
Even as this backward looking task was being performed the evaluation of the consequences of 
the crash - its prospective significance - began to be addressed. This process - which stretched 
across the whole week - was the most complex element in the structural transformation of the 
initial happening into the culminating event. The receding past and the approaching future are 
dynamically linked to each other in the unfolding present as it moves away from what has 
happened and towards what is to come. This temporal dynamic - this tension in time, this 
necessity of resolution through time - is the coiled spring which gives momentum to the 
transformation of happening into event, of suffering into action. The processes of grieving and of 
commemorating were intertwined in ways that were at one and the same time intensely personal 
and intensely public and here the question of who drove this process - the media, politicians, the 
royal family or public opinion (if these are taken as the key 'players' in the process) - becomes 
much more hard to determine. Certainly those in the BBC to whom I have spoken all confirmed 
that they felt they spent their time trying to catch up with and respond to the shifting, emerging 
patterns of public opinion rather than trying to shape them. Though it may be the case that, at 
tinies5 the media are ahead of opinion they cannot be ahead of events. It is the essence of the live 
immediacy of electronic, media that they are in the phenomenal, happening now. That is the 
temporality in which and for which they exist, to which they give expression, to which they bear 
witness. They may bear false witness, they may not express it truly, but they are unavoidably 
given over to expressing and witnessing the eventful happening now. 
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In the week following the death of Diana that is what, retrospectively, showed up most clearly: 
the effort, the difficulty of adequate expression and witnessing, and the search for the meaning of 
what had happened. Out of this emerged, in the end, the final, releasing event that was adequate 
in all these respects. The funeral service, as a public event, was forged by all that preceded it, the 
bearer of immense expectations, and the articulation of the significance of a death and of a life 
whose meaning had been sought for in countless conversations, in acres of newsprint and in 
endless on-air talk in the days preceding it. On such occasions television comes into its own as it 
narrates the event, thereby displaying and articulating its significance. In the mobilization and 
deployment of their resources - camera placements, interviewers, reporters - the institutions are 
in place ahead of the event and ready to cover it from start to finish. As such the coverage not 
only creates the effect of 'being there' for absent viewers but, from moment to moment is always 
in anticipation of 'what comes next'. Thus television not only displays the event, but at the same 
time structures it as a temporally unfolding sequence with a sustained, consequential coherence. 
This double articulation discloses the emerging significance (the intentionality, or care-structure) 
of the event even as it happens. Whereas written narrative historicize events retrospectively along 
an axis that moves from present to past, broadcast narratives historicize events even as they are 
happening along an axis that moves from present to future. 
In today's television this process has a real phenomenal complexity. It is not just a question of the 
many perspectives or points of view from which the event can be presented nowadays. It is also 
the case that production and reception are folded into each other and interact upon each other. 
Classically we tend to think that the 'moment' of production is ontologically prior to the 
'moment' of reception and that there is, however minimally, a cause and effect relationship 
between these two moments. The moment of production acts upon the moment of reception with 
potential effects and consequences. This is widely thought of as a 'one-way' irreversible process 
that allows no feedback . Production can act upon and affect reception, 
but the latter cannot act 
upon nor affect the former. But today live television coverage itself has become a resource that 
feeds back upon itself with a potential to restructure the character and interpretation of the event 
in the course of its unfolding. Insofar as it does this television becomes more than an agency that 
displays and narrates what's going on. It becomes part of the event itself, an agent in the 
determination of how it happens as it happens. In this respect event and narrative become 
inextricably entwined in one another. 
A singular instance of this, widely noted the following day in media commentaries on the 
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funeral, occurred immediately after Earl Spencer's oration which met with applause from the 
congregation in the Abbey: 
In fact this clapping did not originate in the Abbey but from the crowds watching 
relayed TV. It arose outside and drifted into the Abbey where it ripples from the 
back of the West end up the nave towards the choir... In one way it symbolized the 
presence, outside, of the crowd whose constitution the service was trying to appease, 
the people. They intervened not in the historic mode of breaking in, but through a 
loop, as feedback made possible by television. It was in this sense that the television 
was important, no longer in producing a split between the event and viewers as in a 
spectacle, but in mediating the very space of the event. (Cousins 1998: 85-6) 
The crowds watching the service on giant TV screens outside the Abbey, whose behaviours were 
not under the constraints of the congregation at the sacred event taking place inside the Abbey 
were able to express their immediate response to Earl Spencer's speech by giving it a standing 
ovation. As the sound of this response entered the Abbey it moved those inside to violate the 
behavioural norms of a church congregation by echoing the response of the crowds outside and 
applauding the oration. Thus, through television two separate but intimately linked situated 
occasions - what was happening in the Abbey, and what was simultaneously happening as 
crowds outside watched on TV what was happening in the Abbey - interacted upon each other. 
The primary occasion (in the Abbey) was modified by the secondary occasion (the crowds 
outside who were watching it). This interaction was displayed for an absent third party, namely tv 
viewers in countless dispersed domestic and other contexts throughout the world. Although it is 
impossible to work out this sequence from television's actual coverage of this moment (you 
cannot tell that the applause starts outside the Abbey), nevertheless both BBC and ITV noticed 
and displayed for tv viewers the response of the crowds outside. In so doing they responded, on 
behalf of the tertiary audience to the responses of the primary audience (in the Abbey) who were 
responding to the responses of the secondary audience (the crowds outside). Narration was thus 
folded into the fabric of what was happening and became part of the event itself. 
The underlying concern of this article has been with the phenomenal complexity of events and, 
more particularly, with a specific sub-set of events, namely human (as distinct from natural) 
disasters. What shows in the structural transformation of disasters from happenings to events is 
the dialectic of suffering and action, necessity and freedom. Human beings uniquely act upon that 
which they must endure and so transform meaningless fate into meaningful action. In so doing 
they release themselves from the grip of existence and move from the realm of necessity (which 
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we endure) to the realm of freedom (which we ourselves create). It is this Process that I have 
tried to catch in my description and discussion of what took place following the 'meaningless' 
accident that killed Diana, Princess of Wales. What I think it discloses is that speech (narration) 
and action are inextricably linked in the process of finding and creating significance and 
meaning. Action is not historically significant without its articulation as such. These two 
processes have hitherto appeared as temporally distinct because, in written history, the act of 
narration has always necessarily lagged behind the actions and events that it narrates. In media 
events, however, narration and action are not merely at the same time. They can, and sometimes 
do interact with and upon each other so that narration and action appear as different aspects of the 
same phenomenon; the self-explicating significant historical event. It is in this sense that we 
might say that radio and television truly do participate in the making of history. 
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Chapter five 
Big Brother as a television event 
Introduction 
A simplest taxonomy of events distinguishes between those that happen to us, and those that 
we make to happen. The former I have called 'happenings' reserving the ten-n 'event' for 
those things that we ourselves make to happen (Scannell 1999). The key difference between 
happenings and events is that happenings have an unintended character while events are 
precisely meant and intended. Each has a fundamentally different temporal character. 
Happenings-an earthquake, a plane crash- have a retrospective temporal structure. They 
are in the first place strictly meaningless (they were not meant to happen) and their 
significance is something that is sought for after the event itself. Why did it happen? Whose 
fault was it? How can we ensure it doesn't happen again? Such questions-which look back 
on the event in an effort to account for it and thereby render it mean ingful-indicate that 
unintended events have a retrospective meaning which is found and determined with the 
wisdom of hindsight. 
Events that we make to happen have a prospective meaningful character. They are meant and 
intended to happen in a particular way, with particular effects for participants and a particular 
end in mind. As such they require, from the those responsible for making it happen, much 
forethought, effort and planning. Events, unlike happenings, are known in advance. They are 
forward looking and looked forward to. For those who will participate in the event-that-is-to- 
come (performers and audiences) the occasion, from its very beginning, is invested with 
expectations. Thus events have a fore-structure and, intimately linked to this, a structure of 
anticipation. What will it be like? Will it 'work'9 Will it come off-on the day-as that which 
it is meant and intended to be? 
In a non-trivial way we make things happen in order to give ourselves experiences. We long 
for the event that is to come in order to experience being in it. Beyond that we invest in the 
prospective event so that, when we get to the other side of it, we can look back and remember 
it as that which we had earlier hoped it might be. Yes, it was a good day. It was a great game, 
a memorable occasion. Events before, during and after generate talk about them. And this talk 
is not some contingent thing, not some bit of 'added value', but an intrinsic feature of the 
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event, part of its very being. To talk of the event ahead of its happening is to anticipate how it 
will be. As such it is the talk that generates a structure of expectations and hopes that must be 
met. The talk after the event is the retrospective process of assessment and evaluation. Did it 
measure up? If not, why not? Where did it go wrong? During the event, as it unfolds in the 
live, phenomenal now of concern we talk it through, looking forwards and backwards-as, 
for instance, in half-time talk during a soccer match. Thus events have a before-during-after 
structure. This temporal structure (past-present-future: beginning-middle-end) is the structure 
of human existence (the structure of our life-span). It is the structure of all events and stories. 
All three are intrinsically linked in the live and living moment of the event itself, the 
phenomenal now of concern. I will try to show how and in what ways these matters all came 
together in the temporally unfolding event-and-story that now retrospectively was Big 
Brother. ' 
The time of the event 
The time-span of Big Brother was unusually long for a television event. It stretched over nine 
weeks, and as such generated a number of design problems about how to sustain its 
eventfulness across this extended span of time. The meaning of events (and stories) is 
realised in their ending. The temporal movement of Big Brother from its first day was its 
progress towards its last. The Last Day-the Day of Judgement and Revelation-was, from 
the start, the time-horizon towards which the program and its audiences journeyed. The 
programme's structure of expectation would be met when the last person in the house 
emerged in the last hour of the last day as the ultimate winner. Thus the programme had, from 
the start, a powerful drive towards a climactic moment of resolution. Its time-line was linear 
and irreversible. Ten people went in at the start. One would come out in the end. But how did 
the programme maintain interest in this process? How did it build a momentum towards the 
end, while 
maintaining interest from day to day? 
1 The analysis that follows deals only with the first British transmission of the show in the summer of 
2000. Moreover it treats it as primarily a television phenomenon and focuses on its reception as such. 
The online presentation of Big Brother was a very important, and novel, aspect of its success. The 
climactic day when Nick's perfidy was discovered and discussed by the other inmates was probably 
the first major on-line tv event in Britain. But it should be noted that Big Brother on-line served as a 
support and extension of Big Brother on tv, and not the other way round. Research on the reception of 
the second British run of the programme, in the summer of 2001, supports this view. Subscribers to 
the digital Channel E4 has access to BB2 24 hours a day, and tended to use it rather like radio, having it 
on in the background or checking in for updates on the housernates. At such, it complemented, rather 
than displaced, the programme as a television event. 
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For us, in each case, time is the time of my being. Time is, in each case, mine: I am my time 
(Heidegger 1992: 22E). How though, does time become available; that is, how does it exist as 
an accessible public phenomenon? How does my time join up with the time of others 
(Heidegger 1988: 264ff)? And what kind of time is it-the time of my being with others? How 
can I get into such a time? Natural temporalities (day and night) and abstract ternporalities 
(seconds, minutes, hours) are used to create the spanned now in which supra-individual 
temporalities become available as social time, the time of societies, worldly time. Radio and 
television are powerful bridging media which span the times of societies and the times of 
individual existences, bringing them into an available, public, worldly now-of-concern. A 
range of different time spans and horizons were cleverly utilized by the designers of Big 
Brother to build momentum, to create involvement and to gather countless my-times into the 
time of the programme-as-event as it moved in time towards its resolution. 
Thus, if the fundamental time-line of the programme was an irreversible journey to its end, 
this was masked by the more immediate event-horizon of each week; namely the moment 
when the participants nominated their two candidates for eviction. This was the moment when 
viewers were called upon to exercise their judgement and vote for who should go and who 
should stay. And how could one do this without having watched what had been going on in 
the house in the preceding days? And if one did vote would one not be concerned with the 
outcome of this act and watch the declaration of the result? Thus the days of the week were 
thematized as a time/event horizon in which something was resolved in such a way as to 
generate, by that resolution, a momentum that carried forward into the next week's event 
horizon. 
The week, as a time-span, has a historically determined structure. In today's world it is 
thematized as the working week that goes from Monday to Friday with the week-end as that 
towards which the working week is oriented. Thus the week has a defined temporality, an 
internal structure that generates a certain momentum, a set of expectations, which gathers 
pace as the days progress towards the work-ending week end. During the working week a 
common conversational resource concerns plans for the weekend whose aura-however 
faint-marks it out as something 'to be looked forward to' and, in this way, talkable-about. 
To 'look forward' is to have hope. Hope is an investment in the future as somehow or other 
worthwhile. The petits bonheurs of everyday existence are marked by small anticipations and 
everyday hopes which, as they are met, make day to day life worthwhile. This ontology of 
expectations was unobtrusively exploited in the design of Big Brother to generate interest 
within each week and to build momenturnfrom week to week. If the pivotal time in the week 
is Friday evening, as that which is most looked forward to, then using that night as the 
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weekly program-climax meshed perfectly with the time structures of daily life 'out there' in 
the real world. Friday night was the moment at which two different temporalities encountered 
each other: time-in-the-house and time-in-the-world. 
These two 'times' ran in parallel for the duration of the event, but had radically different 
textures of relevance. For the inmates the time-structure of the week is well described by Jean 
Ritchie: 
It is the rhythm of the nominations that has given highs and lows to every week 
in the house, with the air-punching delight of the survivor providing a contrast to 
the shock (and sometimes relief) of the contestant who was given their marching 
orders on Friday evening. Afterwards, came the slump of all the housemates, as 
another empty bed appeared in one of the bedrooms, followed by the relative 
calm of Sunday when the task and shopping dominated the day. Then there was 
tension on Monday, when names had to be named, and more stress on Tuesday 
until the results were announced. Wednesday and Thursday were relatively quiet 
days, although at least two of the residents knew that their fate was being decides 
by the viewers votes. Friday was the most difficult day of all, with the high 
emotion of saying farewell and the excitement of the crowd outside spilling into 
the house as the surviving contestants got glimpses of family and friends 
cheering from a hundred yards away. This was followed by the realization that 
they were, for another week at least, back in the Big Brother loop. (Ritchie 2000; 
246-7). 
Although this time-structure maps on to the time of the world and its weekly rhythms, time 
in the house was radically uncoupled from the time of the world outside. This perhaps was not 
so apparent to viewers, but shows up pervasively in Jean Ritchie's useful account of 'the 
official unseen story' of the programme. What was unseen for viewers, however regular, was 
what it was like living inside the house. And perhaps the most remarkable thing was the 
collapse of the structured character of worldly time as it goes on each day through the day, 
and from day to day through the week. The inmates were not allowed to take watches, clocks 
or any other kind of time-piece into the house. Inside the house itself there were only two 
time-keepers: a clock on the cooker, and one alarm clock for the household. Moreover, the 
natural division between night and day was undone because the lights all over the house (with 
the exception of the two dormitories) were kept on day and night. Thus, what very quickly 
disappeared were the time-routines of the world outside and, more pervasively, any sense of 
structured time. The inmates rapidly lost touch with any sense of 'the time of day'. 'Your 
body loses track of time' Sada noted, looking back on her time inside. 'I got up one morning 
and thought I'd have a shower, then found it was 4 am' (Ritchie 2000: 76). On another 
occasion, they completely lost track of time, having managed somehow to re-set incorrectly 
the two time-pieces in the house. Nicola had to go into the diary room to ask Big Brother 
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what the correct time was (Ritchie 2000: 104). Even the chickens became disoriented (ibid: 
150). 
This collapse of structured, worldly time impacted on the inmates in various ways, but most 
obviously in the destruction of their normal sleeping patterns. The cycle of sleep and waking 
life was derailed for all of them and this was because there was nothing for any of them to 
do. Craig, for instance soon established a reputation as 'The Incredible Sleeping Man' and all, 
with the exception of Nick, took to napping in the afternoons (Ritchie 2000: 55). Ritchie 
notes that in the Dutch version of the programme the inmates slept all day and were up all 
night and this tended to happen in the British version too. With the lights on all the time, it 
was impossible just to switch off and go to bed. People stayed up until exhaustion overtook 
them. Mostly they stayed up all night talking. They toyed with the idea of setting times to go 
to bed and times to get up, but not everyone agreed. For all of them adjusting to the collapse 
of structured worldly workaday time proved very difficult in the first week or so and some of 
those who, as it turned out, were there to the end, nearly quit: 'All we've got is one boring 
Thursday, an exciting Friday because someone's getting kicked out, a dull Saturday, Sunday 
food, and the rest is crap. I will be so pleased to get out of here (Darren [Ritchie 2000: 72] ). 
Time in the household, then, was experientially, existentially empty. As such, it had, 
somehow to be filled, and finding ways of filling time from day to day for the inmates was a 
key task of the production team. Insofar as there was a routine in the house, beyond the 
weekly cycle of nominations and evictions, it was established by the various tasks set for the 
household by Big Brother. The most important of these was given to the group each 
Saturday, to take their minds off the previous night's eviction. The task might be to learn 
semaphore, or to make their own crockery, or to cycle from Land's End to John o'Groats. 
They were given three days in which to prepare for the test or complete the challenge and 
could bet a percentage of their weekly food allowance on whether they would succeed. Since 
the maximum weekly spend was not very much, success or failure in the task really mattered 
and demanded the participation of all. The other regular smaller task was on Tuesdays, again 
to provide a distraction from the other main stress-point in the week, the announcements of 
the two nominated for eviction. These along with the Saturday morning ritual of agreeing the 
weekly food spend constituted the main activities of the week. Now and again, when the 
production team felt the inmates needed a morale booster, they would be rewarded by small 
extra tasks with prizes for success. Place in order of expense three bottles of red wine sent in 
by Big Brother and if you succeed you get five of the best. Other small rewards might be a 
video chosen by the inmates, or pizza or ice cream sent in to the house as an occasional small 
luxury. The garden and the hens provided some occupation, and there were meals to be 
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cooked (mainly by Darren, universally acknowledged as the best in that department), but on 
the whole there was simply nothing to do. There was no television, no radio, no music. Some 
brought in books but found reading impossible. Reading is a solitary activity and the one 
thing denied everyone was solitude. It was quite impossible-except in sleep (and even then 
they dreamt about each other! )-to escape the presence of others. Time passed in trivial 
pursuits. The boys drove the girls mad for the first week or so by playing all the time with 
Andy's birthday present, a Scalectrix set. Marathon card sessions passed away the nights. 
And if all else failed, there was talk. 
The relevance of talk 
The mantra of the inhabitants of the Big Brother house, invoked more frequently as time 
dragged on, was 'It's only a game show! ' I have suggested that the fundamental 
communicative character of radio and television is sociability-being sociable-and that this 
shows up most clearly in the design structure of all broadcast talk programmes, quizzes and 
game shows, particularly those that draw upon ordinary people rather than professional 
entertainers. Such programmes have no raison d'etre other than fun, entertainment 'having a 
good time' (Scannell 1996: 22-57). They are experiments in the 'merely' sociable: being with 
others for no other reason than the pleasure, interest, excitement, tension and laughter that this 
might produce. As such the merely sociable appears to us as essentially ambivalent. It is not a 
necessary thing. It serves no useful purpose. It is not serious. It is trivial and pointless or, at 
least, beside the point. It is a 'waste' of time that might otherwise be spent to some purpose. 
Wasting time gives rise to existential anxiety, and is part of the essential worry about 
watching television. One could-perhaps should-be doing something better (more useful) 
with one's time. 
What then, was 'the point' of Big Brother? It was a game, a pastime, a device for passing 
time. The members of the household were pervasively aware of being there for the sake of 
being looked at by an absent television audience. They had voluntarily and willingly made 
themselves into a spectacle. They were permanently on display for the duration of their time 
in the house. The question, 'Why would they do this? ', however is not separable from the 
question, 'Why would we watch them? '. In other words, speculation on the motives of the 
participants-were they just a bunch of wannabes in pursuit of fame and fortune? -should 
not be uncoupled from our motives for watching. Were we, the viewers, no more than a 
dubiously motivated collection of voyeurs or nosey-parkers, as some press comments 
suggested in the early days of the show? 
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We should, perhaps, as viewers, acknowledge the ruthless underpinnings of the programme. 
In Erving Goffman's brilliant study of 'total institutions' he describes the destruction of the 
civil self of everyday existence and its replacement by an institutionalised self. the model 
prisoner, schoolboy, soldier or nun (Goffman 1968). In total institutions the inmates cannot 
escape (there is no 'time out') and are under constant surveillance by the authorities who run 
the place. The 'territories of the self' (p. 32) are remorselessly stripped away and the 
inhabitants lead a 'batch' existence (p. 17) There are no spaces wherein you can be your self 
by yourself, and nothing that you can claim as you own, as part of your self. The inmates 
sleep in dormitories. Bathrooms and lavatories are monitored. Privacy is impossible. You 
have no possessions, or very few. This leads to such behaviours as jealously guarding the few 
possessions that belong to you and to hoarding for its own sake. Mildly neurotic versions of 
these behavioural disorders showed up quite soon in the household, with individuals marking 
out their food stashes, hoarding things like chocolate and cigarettes for exchange and barter 
and, in Mel's case, squirreling away, for no apparent reason, electric batteries (Ritchie: 114). 
In fact, as Ritchie's account makes plain, the first few weeks were very stressful for everyone. 
The only escape from being in the presence of others was on those rare moments when all 
were asleep, and someone could 'escape' into the living area for a good cry, or by going into 
the diary room and letting off steam into the invisible ear of Big Brother. For those who felt 
truly desperate, counselling was available in the privacy of the diary room and this was the 
one thing that, for the inmates, was guaranteed as completely off-air and confidential. 
However, in this particular total institution, the object of the exercise was not the 
mortification of the self of everyday life. The play of the game demanded of the inmates not 
so much that they be or deny themselves, but that they put themselves in play with others to 
test their interactions. Stripped of the props and routines of ordinary daily life something else 
was enforced in the house: not so much the 'merely' as the purely sociable. Big Brother was a 
forcing house in sociability in which 'getting on with others' (or not) was the programme's 
wager and prize. The one who emerged from the house last would be the one deemed to be, 
by both the other inmates and the television audience, the one who had got on best, somehow 
or other, with all the rest over the nine week span of the programme. 
Everyone knows that for a time in the summer of 2000 the only thing that anyone talked about 
was Big Brother. The amount of comment, discussion and evaluation that it elicited at the 
time, in the press, in pubs and buses and households up and down the land was enormous. 
This talk was not accidental but a structural feature of the show's relational totality of 
involvements. Involvement showed in talk so that to consider what it was that elicited such a 
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'discursive ferment' is to get at the heart of the programme's care-structure as an event 
invented for television. The programme invited, indeed, demanded that not only should it be 
watched on a daily basis but that it should be talked about. Talk was necessary in order to 
formulate your views about who should go and for that decision to have some validity claims 
it needed to be grounded in assessments of the performances of the inmates of the house. 
Such assessments had a cumulative weight. The more you watched the programme, the more 
you knew about all the inmates, their personal traits and the ways they interacted with each 
other. Just as in soap operas, the more you watched, the more expert you became in 
evaluating character and behaviour as time went by. As the programme moved through time it 
did not jettison its past, but rather carried it forward as a texture of relevances to be invoked in 
each weekly cycle of nominations and voting. The programme's past, at any now-point, had a 
prospective bearing on what was to come. The end, though endlessly deferred, was always 
present. 
'It's good to talk! ', and doubtless there is a moral dimension to 'good' conversation. But the 
talk that Big Brother generated shared the ambivalence of the programme itself and, indeed, 
television. Wasn't it, yet again, a trivial waste of time-no more than 'mere' gossip, the stuff 
of soaps and tabloids? Yet gossip-like the everyday world in which it circulates--deserves 
to be defended against those who, like Heidegger, dismiss it as mere 'idle talk' and indicative 
of 'inauthentic being' (Heidegger 1962: 211-214). It is a good but not sufficient point in its 
favour to invoke the pleasure of gossipý--the enjoyment of talking about others and what 
they're up to, even while acknowledging the potential for harm of such talk (cf Spacks 1986). 
More to the point is that gossip (talk about others) is in itself indicative of the unavoidably 
social character of human life. In any society all members are, and know that they are, open to 
the scrutiny and assessments of others. Whatever you do (or don't do) others will take notice, 
remark upon and talk about it. This knowledge serves to modify and regulate behaviours 
within the discursively circulating norms of any society. Positively and negatively gossip is a 
policing, or self-monitoring mechanism. Jane Austen famously described England, two 
hundred years ago, as a country 'where every man is surrounded by a neighbourhood of 
voluntary spies, and where roads and newspapers lay every thing open' (Northanger Abbey, 
ch. 34). All societies are gossip communities or have gossip-networks embedded in them. 
A gossip community is a knowable community-one in which the members are known and 
available to each other in a particular place and in time. Gossip has no meaning (significance) 
without cumulative knowledge of the lives and circumstances of those who are the focus of 
talk. Then indeed the relevance of past events and relationships come into play in assessments 
of 'the present situation' wherein the interplay of character and action is under scrutiny. Big 
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Brother created its own gossip community through the daily and weekly routines embedded 
within the stretched time span of the programme and through the ruthless paring away of the 
personal routines and paraphernalia of ordinary life. Everyone in the house was not just there 
to be looked at, but there to be talked about. This of course, the inmates all understood but it 
came as a revelation to each one of them, nonetheless, to discover when they left the house 
just how much talk they had generated. 
The Sun printed raunchy pictures of Caroline dancing. Craig and Andy were the subjects of 
kiss-'n-tell stories by ex-girlfriends. And the Nasty Nick campaign got going very quickly, 
led by the Sun whose reporters hired a helicopter to drop Vote Nick Out leaflets over the 
household's garden-a stunt which caused a brief state of emergency in the house as the 
production team locked up the inmates in the diary room until the garden was cleared of this 
unsolicited litter. They then ran a story-pure rumour-that Nick had smuggled in a mobile 
phone and, in the dead of night, was contacting a friend on the outside for feedback on public 
reaction to the show. Again, the inmates were rounded up while the house was searched, but 
nothing was found. When Claire left the house in week seven she was a front-page photo- 
story in The Times and, by the end of the show, Anna was the most famous lesbian in Britain. 
Inside the house there was much talk about sex but little, if any, action. All were acutely 
aware of the eyes of the world upon them. Mel, who clearly attracted Andy and Tom, was 
asked, when she left, whether she had considered either of them 'romantically'. She declared 
she had not even entertained the thought: 'Nothing was going to happen on national TV, 
absolutely no way ... It was naYve and 
ignorant of anyone if they thought it would happen. I 
wasn't trying to form any kind of sexual relationship. I was just trying to get on with them. 
(Ritchie 2000: 217). There were no sex scandals in the programme. 2 
Insofar as there was any scandal it centred on the machinations of Nick whose reputation in 
the house was dramatically at odds with his perception in the eyes of the watching, gossiping 
world. Those who departed from the house in the first weeks were, one by one, astonished to 
discover his duplicity as it was enthusiastically revealed to them by Davina McCall. Nick 
himself was, in Ritchie's account, the one most aware of the unceasing hidden presence of 
the cameras and most obsessed with how he would appear to the outside world. But his evil 
deeds turned out to be, in the end, of the pantomime villain variety. It was only a game, after 
2 The absence of sex in the first series of BB may be indicative of the peculiarities of the British. In 
other European countries (France and Germany for instance) the producers actually had to ask the 
inmates to stop having sex all the time. There was a love interest in BB2 when Paul and Helen 
famously fell for each other, but it was the process of the relationship-the flirting, and the sexual 
tensions it generated-that roused audience interest in the programme and boosted its ratings, rather 
than live sex on telly (which did not happen). 
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all. Nick knew this better than most for he, alone, tried to treat it as a game, and paid the 
price. No-one, however, was really hurt by his plotting and in the end, everyone forgave him. 
Nick was the one whom those left in the house in the last two weeks most wanted back to 
liven the place up a little. The gossip generated by Big Brother was of the harmless, not 
hannful, variety. 
Conclusion 
What more is there to say? Have I not already said more than enough about what was, as 
everyone agreed, only a television game show? It was good fun at the time, but shouldn't we 
leave it at that and not try to make more of it than it, in fact, warrants? The fundamental 
enigma of ordinary, everyday existence is its apparent triviality and insignificance. There is 
not much, if anything, to say of it. It doesn't mean or matter all that much. This is the crux of 
the ontological structure of everyday life. It is, at one and the same time, the source of all 
meaning and significance and yet no big deal in itself, not much to write home about. As such 
it powerfully resists being taken seriously, since it cannily generates resistance to the very 
idea of any 'depth' analysis undertaken to unmask its secrets. 
Yet I would like finally to offer a serious thought about the things I have discussed in relation 
to Big Brother, namely the connections between the temporality of the event and the talk it 
generated. Events and stories have the same structure as human existence; the span of life 
that stretches between the moment of birth and the moment of death. The structure of 
existence, like the structure of events and stories, has a beginning, middle and end. Most 
fundamentally, in each case, this is a temporal structure. But there is a difference between the 
temporality of stories, events and life itself. The meaningfulness of events and stories is 
realised in and by their ending and this is something that is readily available to us all. But 
what is not available to any of us, is the meaning of our own existence because, in every case, 
we do not get to see (except in fictions) beyond our own ending. That is something that is 
only available for others to see who live after us. Furthermore, while it is of course the case 
that all of us make our lives meaningful in and by the things that concern us-our families 
and friends, our work, our various 'life' projects-what again we cannot do is lay claim to the 
evaluation of their significance. That is always, and of necessity, determined by others and 
often retrospectively. This is perhaps, the serious point of gossip. Gossip is always about 
others and what it is always concerned with are moral evaluations of the character and actions 
of others, as any regular broadcast soap fan knows. Gossip is a profoundly involving worldly 
thing, an essential part of the way of the world. None of us escapes it. 
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Perhaps then, we owe a debt of gratitude to all those who entered the Big Brother household. 
They willingly, knowingly put themselves on display, and thereby at risk. They mostly found 
it, by their own accounts, a worthwhile experience. But in submitting to the gaze and gossip 
of the world they fumished us, the viewers, with convincing evidence that, while we own our 
lives (they are our own and no-one else's) we do not own the story of our lives and how it 
will be, in the end, assessed. Life is a waiting game and all of us are in it to the death. But 
none of us can stand outside our own life and see it as others see it. That stands in the 
common light of publicness for the World in its wisdom to judge. Well might the inmates of 
the Big Brother household say to us, their audience: Quid rides? Mutato nomine de tefabula 
narratur (Horace, Satires bk. 1). Why do you laugh? Change the name, and the story that is 
told is yours. 
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Chapter Six 
What reality has misfortune? 
When disaster strikes it seldom comes with its meaning branded on its forehead. ' An immediate 
issue for broadcasters is to establish, as quickly as possible, what in fact has happened and what 
in fact it means. News coverage, ordinarily, has a retrospective character. The original event has 
already taken place 'off-stage' and the resources and narrative strategies of television newsrooms 
are committed in the first place to catching up both with what has happened and the immediate 
consequences for those most nearly and fatefully caught up in it. On September II th 2001 the 
original event-the first plane crashing into the north tower of the World Trade Centre--did 
indeed take place 'off-stage' from television but it was, within minutes, brought live into morning 
news programs in the United States. It instantly became a catastrophe that unfolded 'live-to-air' 
on television screens around the world. At first it was utterly incomprehensible but, by the end of 
the day, the situation had been accurately analysed and correctly understood. Immediate action 
had been taken and future courses of action predicted and assessed. 
In what follows I attend to both these moments-the breaking news story at the beginning of the 
day as shown on CNN, and retrospective accounts and analyses at the end of the day, in the 
BBC's main nightly news programme at 10 pm. These two moments have different ternporalities; 
the immediate present of live-and-in-real-time coverage and, on the other hand, the historic 
presentý of nightly news as it looks back on the events of the day. Summary accounts of CNN and 
BBC news coverage are followed by a brief discussion of what they reveal about the role of 
1A shorter version of this article was first published as 'Quelle r6alit6 du malheur? ' in Dossiers de 
l'Audiovisuel no 104: July-August, 2002.1 am grateful to its editor, Daniel Dayan, for pen-nission to 
publish this revised essay, ahead of its appearance in a forthcoming book, based on the special issue of their 
journal, to be published by L'Institut National de I'Audiovisuel. I have made some minor alterations and 
additions to this English version. 
2 For more on the immediate present, the future present and the historic present as integrally related 
dimensions of the phenomenal now of daily broadcasting, see the discussion of prospective and 
retrospective narratives in Scannell (2004) 
122 
broadcast news when disaster strikes. 
I 
CNN live coverage 
It is a normal day on CNN's rolling early mornings news program, Live at Daybreak. 3 At 8.45 
am, Eastern Time, the studio has a live-to-studio report on a New York fashion show of clothing 
for pregnant women. It is a light hearted piece with the CNN reporter at the venue interviewing 
three very pregnant models and the designer of the outfits they are wearing. There is playful 
banter between the female studio anchor, the reporter and the interviewees. As the item is 
wrapped, the programme cuts out to advertisements and then back to a short report on business 
news followed by promotional ads for the Station's corporate business sponsors. Coming out of 
the ads, what is displayed next is a shot of a skyscraper with smoke billowing from its upper 
storeys against the backdrop of a clear, blue morning sky. Chromakeyed across the bottom of the 
screen is a double strapline: 
BREAKING NEWS CNN 
WORLD TRADE CENTER DISASTER LIVE 
For the next fifty minutes CNN continues to hold on screen static shots of the World Trade 
Center, nearly all from the same camera position, about two miles away from the buildings and 
showing only their upper section. Advertisements are scrapped and coverage is continuous. Over 
images of the towers (and it is not easy to distinguish one from the other) there is what has, in 
effect, become a voiced-over radio commentary from the news program's two anchors, Leon 
Harris and Carol Lin: 
CNN: 11.09.01: 8.50 aM4 
Lin: Yes (. ) This just in () 
You are looking at obviously a very disturbing live shot there. 
That is the World Trade Center and we have unconfirmed reports this morning 
3 The following account of CNN news coverage is deeply indebted to Paul Pheasey's undergraduate 
dissertation, 'Convention in Chaos. CNN's Search for Meaning on September II 1h, 200 1'. 1 have drawn 
extensively on his videotape and superb transcription of the first fifty minutes of CNN's live coverage of 
the breaking story, from 8.50 am onwards (Pheasey 2002). 
4 All times given are for Eastern Time (ET), the time in New York. 
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that a plane has crashed into one of the towers of the World Trade Center 
CNN center right now is just beginning to work on this story 
obviously our sources and trying to figure out exactly what happened 
But clearly something relatively devastating happening this morning 
there at the south end of the island of Manhattan. 
That is once again one of the towers of the World Trade Center 
Harris: Well you can see these pictures 
It's obviously something devastating has happened 
and again unconfirmed reports that a plane has crashed into one of the towers there 
We are efforting more information on this subject as it becomes available to you 
In retrospective news stories, the newsroom informs its uninformed audiences of what it knows. 
There is an asymmetry of knowledge between the producers and tellers of the news and those for 
whom it is produced and to whom it is told. But in this breaking story the CNN news team knows 
no more than viewers about what they are looking at on screen. Moreover in retrospective news 
coverage the boundaries of the event are apparent, precisely because it has already happened and 
is now over. It is available as a whole and, as such, can be narrated, discussed and assessed. But 
again, at this moment and for the next few hours, the boundaries of what is happening cannot be 
foreseen. Indeed, at a certain point (when the newsroom is trying to cope with the attack on the 
Pentagon as well as the World Trade Center and then the collapse of the two towers) the most 
terrifying aspect of the unfolding chain of events is that there is no apparent limit to it. It seems to 
be a spiralling disaster without end. 
Throughout all this the two CNN presenters fronting the live coverage maintain their professional 
focus. The disaster is treated, without hesitation, as a story right from the start. Everything that 
follows is work on discovering what the story is, done live-to-air. There is no panic. A coherent 
flow of news-talk is maintained. Lin and Harris make clear, at all times, the status of what they 
say; whether or not it is confirmed, and by whom. They refuse to speculate. Even in the direst 
moments the situational proprieties of news routines are maintained. The overriding concern is to 
establish what, precisely, is happening and, beyond that, how it could have happened. Desk- 
bound in the newsroom, as viewers are bound to their TV sets, the production team searches 
continuously for witnesses who can testify to what has happened and what is now going on. Thus 
the most immediate thing to establish, as a matter of fact, is that it was indeed a plane that crashed 
into the building (and which one) and this is confirmed within seconds by the first over-the-phone 
witness (a senior manager of CNN) who actually saw the plane go into the World Trade Center. 
In the next ten minutes or so CNN, while always holding on screen shots of the smoking towers, 
cuts away to live reports from two of its affiliates, WNYW and WABC. Both stations provide 
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live to air interviews with a succession of eye-witnesses who establish that it is the north tower 
that has been hit at around the 80th floor. At 9.02 am the WABC anchorman is talking, from the 
studio, to a downtown eyewitness, Winston Mitchell, who confirms that the plane went 'totally 
into the building' and lodged in it. He is then asked if there is a lot of debris: 
CNN 9.11.2001: 9.02 am 
Static shot of the top half of the north tower from a WABC traffic-monitoring helicopter 
Winston: No because it looked like it inverted with the impact everything went into the 
building. The only bit that came out was a little bit of the outside awning, but I'd say the hole 
is 
(. ) just let me get a better look right now 
WABC: OK go ahead 
Winston: The umm (. ) I'd say the hole takes about six or seven floors were taken out 
A plane comes into frame for a split second and disappears behind the tower. The image 
cuts out for a moment and then returns to show a fireball mushrooming out of the side of 
the building 
And there's more explosions hold on people are running hold on 
WABC: hold on just a moment we've got an explosion inside the 
Winston: The building's exploded! You've got people running up the street! I don't know 
what's going on 
WABC: OK just put Winston on pause there for just a moment 
Winston: The whole building just exploded the whole top part the building's still intact 
people are running up the street.... Am I still connected? 
Another full screen shot of the north tower 
WABC: Winston this would support what Libb Y5 and you both said 
that perhaps the fuselage was in the building that would cause a second explosion such as that 
Winston: Well that's just what's happened then 
WABC: That would certainly (background sounds of shouting in the studio) 
We are getting word that perhaps 
Winston: OK hold on the people here are everybody's panicking 
Zoom to close-up of the tower. Shot obscured by helicopter boom 
WABC: Alright (. ) you know Winston let me put Winston on hold for just a moment 
Winston: I dunno how long I'm gonna be here I'm inside of a diner right now 
WABC: Well Winston you know what if you could give us a call back (. ) I just don't want 
panic here on the air (. ) Let's just take some of our pictures from our news chopper 7 
Cut to long distance shot 
Now one of our producers said perhaps a second plane was involved let's not let's not even 
speculate to that point but at least put it out there that perhaps that may have happened (0.2) 
en, nmm (. ) the second explosion which certainly backed the theory from a couple of 
eyewitnesses that the plane fuselage perhaps stayed in those upper buildings 
Cut to close-up shot in which both towers can now clearly be seen with smoke and flames 
coming out of them 
5 An earlier interviewed eye-witness 
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Now if you look at the second building there are two both twin towers are on fire now this was 
not the case-am I correct? -a couple of moments ago. This is the second twin tower now on fire () and we're gonna check on the second flight if perhaps this happened. 
This all began at about 8.48 this morning. 
Again, what we know, in case you're just joining us. A small plane not a Cesna type 
Cut to full-screen shot that focuses on flames coming from the second tower 
or 5 or 6 seater but instead perhaps a passenger flight ran into the north side of the World 
Trade Center 
As you can see the second explosion that you're looking at now, the second twin tower has 
spread much debris, much more debris than the first explosion or accident 
Aah if there is, is Winston still on the line with us? (0.2) OK he's not there 
Do we have-I'll just talk to my producer-do we have an eyewitness that perhaps sees better 
than we do from these pictures? 
Again you can see that there is debris falling off 
OK we actually have an eyewitness news reporter Dr Jay Adelberg who was downtown at the 
time and he is on the phone with us live. 
Dr Jay what can you tell us? 
At the moment that the second plane crashes into the south tower, the ABC anchor, focused on 
his live-to-air eyewitness interview, fails to see what is clearly, but only for an instant, visible; a 
plane coming in low from the right hand side of the television screen and disappearing behind the 
north tower. It is not immediately obvious that it has, in fact, crashed into the south tower. 
Winston responds immediately: 'The building's exploded... the whole building just exploded. ' 
The anchor interprets this to support the point that Winston and an earlier witness have 
established; that the first plane is embedded in the north tower and hence may have caused a 
secondary explosion-an assessment accepted by the eyewitness. What is in vision on screen is 
hard to interpret because the two towers are not clearly distinguishable from each other. Now, as 
in all the early minutes of the unfolding catastrophe, there is a continuing demand for 'an 
eyewitness that Perhaps sees better than we do from these pictures'. The instantly upcoming 
interviewee, Dr Jay Adelberg, confirms that a second plane came in, moments ago, at a low 
altitude and appeared to crash into the World Trade Center. This is followed by a sequence of 
replays of the plane going behind the north tower and, after a fraction of a second, a spectacular 
fireball exploding from the side of the barely visible south tower. 
Thus far, all interviews have been with ordinary people who are on air simply because they have 
either a better line of vision on what is happening than the newsroom (and viewers) or else 
actually saw the planes going into the buildings. Next up is the first expert witness, Ira Furman, a 
former National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) spokesman. In the course of a lengthy 
discussion Furman makes it plain that it is inconceivable that two planes could accidentally crash 
into the towers given the perfect flying conditions and that, in the case of the second plane, the 
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smoke billowing from the first stricken tower marks it out as a visible disaster area to be avoided. 
Harris concludes the phone interview with a thanks and the observation that 'the longer we talk 
the less convinced many will become that this was an accident'. 
From now on there is an incremental accumulation of information from varied sources, including 
the major press agencies-Associated Press and Reuters-that begins to flesh in the background 
to the thus far inexplicable disaster that fills the television screen. An AP report talks of 'a 
possible plane hijacking'. An FBI official tells CNN that the possibility of terrorist acts is being 
investigated. Rescue operations are under way. A further AP report describes the plane crashes as 
acts of terrorism. Reports come in that President Bush will shortly make a news statement from 
Saratosa where he is visiting an elementary school. At 9.29 am, fifty minutes into the breaking 
story, the President's brief press statement is chromakeyed on screen in a small framed box but 
with the stricken towers still the dominant visual image. Bush speaks of 'a national tragedy' and 
can apparent terrorist attack on our country'. 
At 9.40 the strapline across the bottom of the screen changes to 'reports of fire at Pentagon'. The 
newsroom catches up with this new headline within a minute via a phone interview with CNN's 
Chris Plante in a car near the Pentagon. Reports are coming in that the White House is being 
evacuated. At 9.50, for the first time, the smoking towers in Manhattan are displaced by a shot 
from Washington of a huge plume of smoke behind government buildings in the foreground. 
Again the initial on-screen picture is far from clear and there is an immediate off-screen search 
for clarification of what is happening. The flow of background information increases as the 
volume of separate incidents rises. The Federal Aviation Authority has grounded all flights in the 
USA. John King, CNN's senior White House correspondent in Washington, reports from there 
that everything that's happening is being treated as a terrorist attack and that the initial 
assumption, according to an unnamed official source 'was that this had something to do or at least 
they were looking into any possible connection with Osama bin Laden. The administration 
recently released a warning that they thought Osama bin Laden might strike out against American 
targets'. 
CNN now has a third anchor, Aaron Brown, established in the open air on a rooftop with a clear 
and unimpeded panoramic view of the two smoking towers standing high above the Manhattan 
skyline. He continues the commentary live to camera against this backdrop. At 9.58 CNN cuts to 
a full-screen shot of what is clearly the Pentagon engulfed in a huge black cloud of smoke. 
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Voiced over this is a down-the-line report to Brown from Jamie McIntyre, CNN's senior Military 
Affairs Correspondent at the Pentagon: 
CNN 11.09.20019.58 am 
Full screen shot of Pentagon from WUSA 
Maclntyre: Again it appears that an aircraft of some sort did hit the side 
of the Pentagon. The west part which faces sort of towards Arlington National Cemetary. It's a 
corridor where a lot of army officers are located 
Brown: Wow! Jamie Jamie I need you to stop for a second. There has just been a huge 
explosion 
Cut to tight close-up of a side of the still standing north tower and behind it a great cloud 
of smoke. The camera begins to pull back 
We can see a billowing smoke rising and I'll 
there was a cascade of sparks and fire 
tell you that I can't see that second tower. But 
Cut to Brown on rooftop against the Manhattan skyline 
And now this it almost looks like a mushroom cloud an explosion. 
This huge billowing smoke in the second tower this was the second of the two towers hit. 
And I you know I cannot see behind that smoke 
Cut to panoramic shot of Manhattan, smoke rising high above and behind the north 
tower and rising below and all around it, enveloping all buildings in the area 
Obviously as you can't either (background sound of sirens) the first tower in front has not 
changed and we see this extraordinary and kightening scene behind us of the second tower 
now just encased in smoke 
What is behind it.. II cannot tell you 
But just look at that. 
That is about as frightening a scene as you will ever see 
Again this is going on in two cities. 
We have a report that there is a fire at the State Department as well and that is being evacuated 
So we've got fires at the Pentagon () evacuated 
The State Department () evacuated 
The White House () evacuated on the basis of what the secret service described as a as a 
credible terrorist threat 
We have two explosions () we have two planes hitting the World Trade Center here in New 
York 
And what this second explosion was that took place about 
A part of that would be the south tower has apparently collapsed 
In the live coverage of breaking news, as time moves on implacably, the newsroom is journeying 
forwards into the unknown, while looking back over its shoulder in a continuing effort to catch up 
with and make sense of what has just-now happened. Continuously aware that, from moment to 
moment, new viewers are joining the program, the presenters regularly re-cap and summarise 
what has thus far happened and what is thus far known about what has happened. Along the way 
incoming bits of information are added to the snow-balling narrative. But even so, fragments of 
data, which will later turn out to be hugely important may, in the first instance, appear to be no 
more than straws in the wind. Barely an hour after the first plane crash into the World Trade 
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Center the name of Osama bin Laden has been mentioned by CNN's Washington correspondent 
in connection with what is happening. But at this moment it appears to be no more than an 
incidental detail, a passing conjecture that is instantly blown away and lost in the onrushing 
whirlwind of events. 
11 
BBC end of day news coverage 
In the UK ten o'clock at night has long been the time-slot preferred by the national broadcasters, 
the BBC and ITN, for their main end of day news program precisely because by then the events 
of the day have 'settled' and there has been time for the newsroom to gather, assess and organise 
data from all available wide and varied sources. Breaking news, urgently seeking information 
from moment to moment, accesses incoming data along the way, and transmits it with hedges 
and cautions precisely because there is no time to check and confirm its evidential status. 
Retrospective news, by contrast, enjoys the benefit of hindsight that only time can give. There has 
been time to sort and sift, to check and cross-check, to pick the most telling moments and the 
most incisive quotes. Above all there has been time to sort out the events and its telling and 
present it within an interpretative frame and a story-format: the frame is 'terrorism', the story- 
format is 'disaster', the narration is direct, authoritative and without qualification: 
BBC News, 11.09.01: 10.00 PM 
Peter Sissons, BBC news anchor: 
Sissons, in studio, direct to camera 
Terrorists attack the heart of America with catastrophic loss of life 
The second plane crashes into the south tower 
Hijacked planes smash into and destroy New York's tallest buildings 
Close-up of the top of the north tower as it begins to collapse 
Both towers of the World Trade Centre collapse with thousands trapped 
The Pentagon wreathed in clouds of smoke 
Another plane explodes on the Pentagon, mocking America's defensive might 
Crowds in Manhattan fleeing an approaching dust cloud 
In the streets panic, and the certainty that casualties are horrendous 
Prime Minister Blair about to make a press statement 
Tonight Britain imposes drastic security measures as Blair condemns the terrorist barbarism 
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These are the top-of-the-news headlines, read out before the signature music and captions that 
lead in, each night, to the ten o'clock news. The first and last headlines set the overall frame of 
'terrorism' within which the catastrophe flagged in the four intermediate headlines is to be 
understood. The overall frame is political. The disaster is not. Those most immediately caught up 
in the disaster, those who suffer-the dead and dying, the injured, their relatives and friends- 
demand immediate attention because of their suffering, irrespective of any question of their 
causes. 6 The narrative format of news disaster stories has a structure whose logic is determined by 
a hierarchy of relevance in which the imperative issue is always the nature and scale of the 
disaster and its fateful impact on human life. Thus the first half of the BBC news program on the 
night of September II th recapitulates the sequence of events, assesses the scale of their impact in 
terms of human suffering and attends to the rescue efforts in their immediate aftermath. Only 
after this has been dealt with, does the news turn to the wider political implications of the disaster 
as a deliberate act of terrorism. 
First the precise chronology of events is set out under the banner headline: AMERICA UNDER 
ATTACK. The first detailed report 'on the day that terrorism struck at the heart of the world's 
most powerful nation' is from the BBC's diplomatic correspondent, James Robins. It is a 
brilliantly edited sequence that draws on the most powerful visual images and most telling 
eyewitness accounts taken from the huge stock of footage available hours later to the news room. 
The live-and-as-it-happened images available to CNN as the story broke were visually of poor 
quality, static and low in information; the visuals in the end-of-day report are riveting. There are 
spectacular shots of the second plane going into the south tower both in close-up and from a 
distant panoramic shot (an amateur video clip) across the bay with the whole of Manhattan in 
view. The shots of the towers going down are simply heart-stopping as are the images, moments 
beforehand, of the doomed souls trapped in them, hanging out of windows, waving in vain for 
help. Intercut with shots of the buildings are sequences from hand-held, mobile cameras at ground 
level, that graphically capture the panic on the streets as the police try to control and direct the 
fleeing crowds. The ambient sound of running footsteps, of shrieks and cries powerfully evokes 
6 For a detailed discussion of this point see Boltanski (1999: 7-11) who links it to the parable of the Good 
Samaritan. The parable has a direct political significance in present day France where individuals have a 
legal responsibility to come to the assistance of anyone in distress or danger. A key point of the parable is 
the provision of immediate aid irrespective of the identity and status of the victim and the wider politics 
of the situation. That is, immediate help should not depend on who the suffering individual is, nor wait 
upon clarification of the circumstances that caused the injury. All considerations of the factors that may 
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what it was to be there caught up in the disaster zone. None of this was available in the first hour 
of CNN's morning coverage. The eye-witness interviews again are in sharp contrast with those 
used in the breaking story. Those consisted largely of people looking out of their windows at the 
World Trade Centre and describing, over the phone, what they saw. The interviewees were in the 
same position as the newsroom and the television viewers: observers, onlookers at a distance. The 
straight-to-camera interviews with men and women on the streets in the disaster zone have a 
direct and compelling character: 
BBC News, 11.09.01: 10.04 pm 
Eyewitness, New York: 
I wuz just standing here watching the World Trade Centre after the first after the first plane hit 
(. ) I just saw a second plane come in from the south and hit the whuh south (. ) tower half way 
between the bottom and the top of the tower its gotta be a terrorist attack I can't tellya 
anything more th'n that (. ) I saw the plane hit the building 
To re-live a moment such as this testifies to the pain of witnessing. The anguish in the face and 
voice, in the whole body of this anonymous 'man in the street' as he tells what he just saw is all 
caught in the recording. His assessment of what he saw is immediate, certain and precise. It has to 
be a terrorist attack. It is the only interpretation that makes any sense of what, no matter how 
many times one watches it, is simply unbelievable-a plane flying into a world famous landmark 
out of a clear blue sky. The final shot in the report, from across the broad and shining expanse of 
the bay, of the Manhattan skyline in the early evening, the towers gone and the whole area 
involved in a drifting shroud of smoke, is unforgettable. 
Robins' report, towards the end, touches briefly on the rescue efforts in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the second tower. This is the focal concern of a follow-on report from Niall Dickson. 
The numbers of the dead are beyond calculation, but they will be 'more than any of us can bear' 
says Mayor Guliani of New York, leading the rescue response, in a hastily organised press 
conference. The hospitals are stretched to breaking point, dealing with more than 2,000 injured. A 
call for blood goes out as the hospitals are running out, and improvised centres take donations 
from a host of volunteers. The scenes of the rescue services picking their way through the dust 
and rubble of the ruined heart of the city are eerily quiet. The report attends to the fatalities at the 
Pentagon, and the support for the wounded. Again no precise figures can be given. The one exact 
figure, at the end of the report, is that 266 people died in the four aircraft; the two that went into 
have led to an attack on the injured, and any questions as to whether or not such an attack may have been 
justified or not must be set aside and immediate assistance given. 
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the World Trade Centre, the one that went into the Pentagon and the one that came down later in 
a field near Philadelphia. 
The scale of a disaster is always measured in terms of its fateful impact on the lives of human 
beings. In ten-ns of this event its immediate impact and consequences were immeasurable, and 
initial responses registered stunned shock, astonishment and disbelief. A middle aged man talks 
to camera of how he escaped: 
BBC News, 11.09.01: 10.07 pm 
Eyewitness, New York: 
. uhh big boom () come down the steps. Everything fine till we get to the basement then 
everything just fell in () I wuz got trapped under there with another guy () crawled out 
kept getting hit on the head () bashed all around finally we crawled our way out over the 
rubble () we did alright 
It is not what he says but the sight of him standing there, in the debris-his head and face covered 
in blood and dust, his clothes in tatters-that confirms the enormity of what has just happened to 
him. For the victim himself the significance of what has happened, at this point in time, is 
beyond the reach of words. 
What is not beyond the reach of words is the strategic significance of what has happened, to 
which the news now turns, having dealt with the events and their immediate aften-nath. 
'Terrorists attack the heart of America with catastrophic loss of life' were the first words of the 
whole programme, but who the terrorists might be is neither mentioned nor dealt with until half 
way through the programme: 
BBC News, 11.09.01: 10.20 pm 
George Eakin, BBC reporter: 
And it's this wealthy Arab fundamentalist the Americans are already naming as an immediate 
suspect. Osarna bin Laden. He controls and finances al Qaeda, an umbrella network of Islamic 
militants and he's vowed to destroy the United States. 
The report gives further details of bin Laden's activities against the US. It notes that while the 
possibility is not excluded, no-one is suggesting that it could be [like the Oklahoma bombing] an 
act of domestic terrorism. It further considers the possibility of a 'rogue state' being behind the 
attack but reports that initial US responses think this unlikely. Following on from this Peter 
Sissons goes to a live interview with the BBC's World Affairs Editor, John Simpson, in 
Islamabad, who was in Afghanistan the previous week. He is asked whether bin Laden could 
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have done it, and replies that he certainly could: 'he's got the fanaticism, he's got the followers, 
he's got the money and he's frankly got the imagination'. Sissons then asks, if the United States 
wanted to go after bin Laden, how difficult would that be? 
BBC News, 11.09.01: 10.24 pm 
John Simpson: 
Well it's easy enough to hit at Afghanistan and I do think it important to draw the distinction 
between the Taliban government in Afghanistan who are bin Laden's hosts, not perhaps all 
that willingly his host, and the man himself I think frankly it's going to be extraordinarily 
difficult for the Americans to hit him. He's got his own peculiarly difficult and complex 
system of communications which they simply can't break into () er I think frankly they'll 
they'll if they're going to attack if they decide that the attacker came from there they'll hit 
Afghanistan very hard. They'll hit the hosts but frankly I doubt if they'll get the guest. 
Towards the very end of the program in a studio interview, the BBC's Diplomatic Correspondent, 
James Robins (who compiled the lead story on the events of the day) confirms the assumption 
that there will be retaliation on a massive scale from the Americans against bin Laden. He is then 
asked whether heads will roll in America's intelligence community who failed to see this coming: 
BBC News, 11.09.01: 10.40 pm 
James Robins: 
I think that's also a very distinct possibility. It is extraordinary that both the CIA and the FBI 
failed to detect a threat and failed to prevent four separate concerted and synchronised 
attacks ... [.. ] It's very hard to believe that the American 
intelligence establishment can escape 
the blame. 
Now, four years later and with the wisdom of hindsight we know that Simpson has been proved 
right. The Americans did, indeed, hit the host but missed the guest. And it did begin to emerge, 
months later, that American intelligence had picked up on the imminent possibility of terrorist hi- 
jacks in the USA in the weeks before September I Ith. That, in turn, gave rise to questions as to 
why the Bush administration apparently did nothing about such reports in the weeks before 
September II th. 
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III 
The politics of the present 
In his splendid study of Distant Suffering Luc Boltanski asks 'What reality has misfortuneT 
(Boltanski 1999: 149-169). How can 'the moral spectator" believe the accounts of human 
suffering that he or she reads about in newspapers or sees on television? At the heart of this 
question is the problem of witnessing (Peters 2001). To be a witness is to be present at an event 
of some sort and thereby to have direct and immediate access to what is taking place. A witness 
'has' (owns) the experience of 'being there' and thereby has moral and communicative 
entitlements. Witnesses have the moral entitlement to evaluate and pass judgement on what they 
witnessed (they are entitled to their opinions on the matter), whereas others who were not there 
have no such rights. Arising from this moral right, witnesses have further communicative 
entitlements. In particular they have the right (indeed the duty) 'to bear witness'. They can, and 
must, speak to others of what they saw. Such speech, no matter how banal, has a compelling truth 
for those who were not there. 
We, television viewers, were not there on New York's dies irae. The structures and routines of 
news are designed to produce effects of truth in such ways that we can believe what we are told 
and shown. It is precisely because mediated narratives, told in the third person by a news 
presenter, lack the force of first-person narratives by those who are there, that broadcasting 
institutions invest such high-cost technical and human resources in order to establish first-person 
accounts and evaluations of 'news'. The camera crews who are 'there', the reporters who are 
'there', the eye-witnesses who are 'there', the correspondents and analysts who are 'there' all 
combine to furnish compelling evidence as to the primary facticity of what has happened and is 
still happening. All of them, in their different roles, act as witnesses to the truth of the event, not 
on their own behalf, but for the sake of absent audiences for whom they show and speak of what 
is happening. They do this so that anyone and everyone who watches will 'own' the experience 
and thereby be entitled to have and to speak their opinions on the matter. 
7 Boltanski derives this term from that 18th literary taste public discussed by Habermas (1962) as the 
precursor of the critical opinion forming public of the late 18'hcentury. Both note the significance of two 
key early English magazines, The Tatler and The Spectator; the former constituting the reader as a gossip 
and the latter as one who gazes on the social scene. Boltanski stresses the importance of Adam Smith's 
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Boltanski criticises the hermeneutics of suspicion directed against the humanitarian movement. 
He wishes to defend a politics of direct and immediate response to disasters. While others sit at 
home in their armchairs and criticise, humanitarian aid, at least, is there trying to do something, 
dealing with the situation, bringing relief and comfort to the suffering. 'Ultimately what justifies 
the humanitarian movement is that its members are on the spot. Presence on the ground is the 
only guarantee of effectiveness and even of truth' (183). There has to be room for a politics of the 
present, one that is responsive to what is happening now: 'to be concerned with the present is no 
small matter. For over the past, ever gone by, and over the future, still non-existent, the present 
has an overwhelming privilege: that of being real' (192). 
And this applies, with equal force, to broadcasting. It is part of the familiar critique of 'the media' 
not merely that they are parasitic on events, but that their presence distorts them and their 
accounts misrepresent them. Dayan and Katz's pioneering study of media events began to correct 
that view (Dayan and Katz 1992) as do the foregoing brief accounts. Television coverage on the 
day established the truth of what was happening and of what was being done. It came up with 
explanations and anticipated future courses of action that remain unchallenged to this day. There 
would be no politics of the present without the presence and participation of broadcast media. In 
the responses of the day, on II th September 2001, the whole world witnessed, through the 
mediations of television, the immediate, instinctive repair work to the torn and damaged fabric of 
everyday existence. In such rare moments the politics of the present achieve a transcendent 
character. And this is something that we get to see and understand through the power of live 
broadcasting, whose ordinary, worldly news routines shore up, on behalf of us all, the meaningful 
character of existence even as it appears to be collapsing in ruins before our disbelieving eyes. 
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Chapter Seven 
For-anyone-as-someone structures 
The communicative structures of everyday existence 
Radio, tv and newspapers are part of anyone's life in a post-traditional society. In a country 
like Britain everyone without exception makes use of them on a daily basis. An obvious 
conclusion to draw from this is that the media must be organised in such ways that anyone 
and everyone can use and understand them. This does not necessarily mean that everyone will 
like them (will want to read this or that newspaper, watch this or that programme). But it must 
mean that newspapers, radio and tv programmes are so designed as to be intelligible to just 
about everyone. To whom then, do the media 'speak'? Who do they address, and how? If , 
say, a tv programme is watched by thirteen million people, how is watching that programme 
experienced by all those millions? Do they find that they are addressed as a multitude? As all 
those millions? As 'the masses'? The answer is surely, no. Each viewer finds that what they 
see and hear seems to speak to them directly and individually. ' If this is so, then broadcast 
programmes and daily newspaper appear to have a peculiar communicative structure. They 
are heard, seen or read by millions (by anyone and everyone) and yet, in each case, it seems, 
they speak to listeners, viewers or readers personally, as individuals. They are, it could be 
said, for me or anyone. I will call this a for-anyone-as-someone structure. We will get a 
clearer picture of this communicative structure if we begin by considering the two other such 
structures that are implicated in it, namely for-anyone structures and for-someone 
2 
structures . 
1 It might be objected that many people find the opposite; that they are not spoken to by this or that 
programme or, indeed, by programmes in general on mainstream radio and television. Such claims 
have been raised about the unrepresentative character of output by a range of social or cultural 
minorities. Nevertheless, in the very act of making such claims, they all take it for granted that they 
personally should be addressed as the persons that they are by radio and television. The 'politics of 
recognition' (Taylor 1994) presupposes what is here being argued 
for. 
2 These three structures are introduced in Scannell 1996, but are not considered in any detail. Cf pp. 
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For-anyone structures 
A for-anyone structure is something which, in its organisation and design, presents itself as 
useable and useful for anyone (no matter who). What we call mass-produced goods have 
such a structure. The critics of mass culture condemned mass produced good for their 
standardized, uniform character. They imposed the stamp of sameness on everything and 
this, they argued, tended to the liquidation of individuality and difference (Adorno and 
Horkheimer 1979). Well, maybe. But suppose we turn this round and see that this uniform 
and standardized character is a very useful feature of many kinds of manufactured thing. I 
want, say, a toaster that toasts. It doesn't have to do this for me personally. It does have to be 
designed in such a way that anyone can figure out what it is for and how to use it and in fact 
do so easily and quickly. It will also be important that the toaster works every time it is used - 
not just now and again. Given that a toaster, to do its job, must have certain basic design 
features, it is not surprising that toasters (when you go to choose one) turn out to be pretty 
similar. There will be some differences (can they cope with muffins and crumpets as well as 
sliced bread? How many slices can it toast? ) but not much. It simply doesn't matter whether 
or not the toaster is 'for me' personally. Personally I don't care what kind of toaster it is so 
long as does its job every time and doesn't bum the toast (which mine, as a matter of fact, 
invariably does). 
Mass produced goods may be anonymous, impersonal things. But why should they be 
anything other than this? Their standard, uniform, repeatable character is precisely the mark 
of their usefulness for anyone and everyone, any time any where. 3 What of for-anyone 
communicative structures? Or,, to put it in a more familiar way, what of mass 
communication? Is it appropriate to call newspapers, radio and tv, the mass media? In one 
obvious way it does seem so. When people all over the world watch the same movies or tv 
programmes, they can surely be described as mass media. But the crucial question is, 'How 
are these countless millions spoken toT Our experience of newspapers, radio and tv 
programmes is that they speak to us as personS4 not as members of a crowd or mass. 
11-15,174. 
3 It is clear that everyday "equipment", as discussed in Chapter 3 of Being and Time (Heidegger 
1962), has a for-anyone structure. Heidegger's well-known example of equipment is a hammer which 
is evidently an impersonal tool, designed for use 
by anyone. 
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In the early days of mass communication research, the communicative model that was 
favoured as an explanation of how the process worked was the notion of getting a message 
across. This simple definition - which was seldom interrogated or analysed (it simply 
seemed obvious that that was what the mass media did) - had fateful consequences for the 
understanding (or misunderstanding) of the media and how they worked. The idea of getting 
a message across suggested three things simultaneously: that the communicative process was 
essentially manipulative, that the communicator was powerful, active and in control of the 
process (of getting across the message) and that those on the receiving end (the 'mass 
audience') were powerless, passive and not in control of the process. Much early research 
and debate focused around these three issues: the manipulative (or propagandist) character of 
media messages, their organisation and their effect on audiences (Hardt 1992). 
It is not difficult to see that most forms of public communication that preceded the 'mass' 
media were rather like this. They were mostly propagandist or persuasive in character, 
concerned with getting a specific message across: the political or religious message, or'the 
knowledge' contained in the lecture. In each case the speaker controlled the situation and the 
range of possible responses of the audience were severely constrained. It is tempting to 
suggest that the ways in which new media were thought of at first defined them in terms of 
the characteristics of older forms of public address which they appeared to displace. McLuhan 
called it 'the rear view' image of media and attempted to show, historically, that new media 
always appeared at first in the guise of the medium which they displaced. Only gradually did 
they 'free' themselves from the restraints of the older medium and begin to discover their own 
particular characteristics and potentials. Early thinking about new media of communication 
thought of them as mass communication, attributing to them the characteristics of existing 
dominant forms of public address which set aside the individual face needs of audience 
members, and treated them impersonally as anonymous (faceless) members of a crowd (or 
mass). Such a definition is appropriate to the communicative practices of public oratory at the 
historical moment when film, radio, mass circulation daily news papers and television 
became part of the social fabric of western twentieth century societies. But it is not 
appropriate to those media themselves and their communicative practices. A concern with the 
communicative processes and practices of modem media is central to their understanding. 
But they are not to be thought of as forms of mass communication that speak to multitudes as 
the masses. 
The category of 'the person' is the theme of Section Two below. 
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For-someone structures 
By contrast with for-anyone structures, for-someone structures are designed for personal use 
only. Mazdas, Fords, Peugeots etc are mass-produced for mass use all over the world. But 
Michael Schumacher's Formula I car is tailor-made for him and no-one else. More 
mundanely, things like glasses and dentures are still made-to-measure on an individual basis 
for most people, though hand-made shoes, shirts and suits are nowadays only for the rich. A 
manufactured thing that has a for-someone structure is, by definition, really only useful to and 
useable by the person for whom it is made. 
What of for-someone communicative structures? Such a structure is not so much useful as 
meaningful only for a particular person. Others can 'see' what it is or says, but it doesn't 
mean anything - anything in particular that is. It is not that it is unintelligible. Rather, it is not 
significant. For-someone communicative structures have a purely personal significance. 
Familiar examples of things with a for-someone communicative structure are hand written 
letters, photographs (more exactly, snap-shots) and home videos. We no longer live in a 
letter-writing culture in which we write each other personal letters. Its conventions linger on. 
We still begin 'Dear so-and-so' and sign off with a profession of sincerity or love. But mostly 
we don't long for certain letters from a special someone as people used to do. The telephone 
has to a great extent displaced the intimate function of letters. 
We can best see the significance of for-someone structures when we think of snapshots. A 
snap-shot is what you or I take with a camera and almost always as a matter of personal 
record: of babies and children as they grow up, of holidays or of significant family events: - 
birthdays, weddings, graduation day and so on. These are purely personal things and are quite 
distinct from 'photographs' by professionals as 'art' or for advertising or whatever. 
Photographs have a public significance, and they proclaim their 'publicness' (as art or 
advertising or social comment) in their form and content. Likewise a snapshot in its content 
and form (its lack of composition, its fuzziness etc) proclaims its 'privateness'. We have all 
had the boring experience of going round to friends or family and being shown the holiday 
snaps (or video) or the recent pictures (or video) of the toddler. We look and comment 
politely and shuffle through them as quickly as we can without seeming impolite. We have, 
of course, seen them all before. They have that unmistakable air of 
deja-vu about them. All 
holiday photos are the same, as are all photos of children, family or special occasions. 
In a beautiful essay on photography Roland 
Barthes describes looking through some old 
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family photos shortly after the death of his mother. He is looking for one that will bring to life 
for him the spirit and being of his mother: the one in which he recognizes 'the truth of the 
face I had loved'. At last he finds it: 
The photograph was very old. the comers were blunted from having been 
pasted into an album, the sepia print had faded, and the picture just managed 
to show two children standing together at the end of a little wooden bridge in 
a glassed-in conservatory, what was called a Winter Garden in those days. 
My mother was five at the time (1898), her brother seven. He was leaning 
against the bridge railing, along which he had extended one arm; she, shorter 
than he, was standing a little back, facing the camera; you could tell that the 
photographer had said, "Step forward a little so we can see you"; she was 
holding one finger in the other hand as children often do, in an awkward 
gesture. The brother and sister, united, as I knew, by the discord of their 
parents, who were soon to be divorced, had posed side by side, alone, under 
the palms of the Winter Garden (it was the house where my mother was 
bom, in Chennevieres-sur-Mame). I studied the little girl and at last 
rediscovered my mother.... In this little girl's image I saw the kindness which 
had formed her being immediately and forever, without her having inherited 
it from anyone.... (Barthes 1984: 68-9) 
This is something of what Barthes sees in the faded old photograph of his mother. He can 
tell us what he sees in it, what it means to him. But you or I can not, nor ever could, see it as 
he sees it. The photograph is not reproduced in the book. For Barthes himself it is 
everything. 'For you, it would be nothing but an indifferent picture, one of the thousand 
manifestations of the "ordinary". ' (Barthes 1984: 73) For-someone structures point to the 
incommunicable self and the incommunicableness of experience. Each one of has an inner (an 
ownmost) self that is inexpressable to others. This inexpressable self is a cumulative thing 
that is formed by the gradually extending narrative of a life as lived, of cherished and 
cherishable moments, people and places. At most this self is shareable with an intimate other 
(a partner, a child). It finds objective expression in great art and literature. But ordinarily and 
for the most part it is not sayable or shareable. I understand what Barthes sees in the 
photograph of his mother. I understand it because I know what it is to feel such things. There 
are people in my life who have such significance for me. But to understand and accept the 
truth of what he sees in this particular photograph is not to share it. All I would see was 
something that said 'History' (that's an old photo) and 'Culture' (what funny clothes she's 
wearing, and what's that conservatory thing she's standing in? ). The Winter Garden 
photograph is meaningful for Roland Barthes and no-one else. Thus, for-someone structures 
point to the inwardness of a personal life as experienced by someone with the attributes of a 
person. 
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For-anyone-as-someone structures 
For-anyone-as-someone structures show up mostly in the field of culture. Novels and 
popular songs have such a communicative structure, and I suspect that its history coincides 
with the formation of the modem 'self (cf. Taylor 1989). To understand this structure we 
must constantly keep in mind its double character that operates at two levels simultaneously: 
it is always, at one and the same time, for me and for anyone. It thus is an intermediary 
structure that mediates between the impersonal for-anyone structure and the personal for- 
someone structure. As such the for-anyone-as-someone structure expresses and embodies 
that which is between the impersonal Third person and the personal First person, namely the 
Second person (the me-and-you). The for-anyone-as-someone structure expresses 'we-ness'. 
It articulates human social. sociable life. One pervasive way in which this structure shows up 
on radio and television is in the mode of address they routinely employ. The mode of address 
of radio and television shows in two interconnected ways. Most basically it is manifest in 
ways of saying. To this is added, in television, ways of showing. Saying and showing - 
letting things be heard and seen - these are the two fundamental communicative acts of 
broadcasting. 
How to speak to its unknown, invisible absent listeners and viewers was and remains the 
fundamental communicative dilemma for broadcasters. David Cardiff (1986) has shown how 
this problem was encountered by the BBC Talks Department in the formative years of British 
broadcasting. As a national radio service began to settle in the late 1920s the inescapable 
questions arose: 'Who are we talking to"? 'How should we talk to them (whoever they are)"? 
The first head of BBC Talks, Hilda Matheson, was keenly aware of the inadequacies of 
existing forms of public address for the new medium of radio (Matheson 1933). She realised 
two things: first that the unknown audience should not be thought of as a mass but as a 
constellation of individuals, with individual interests, needs, tastes and opinions. It became an 
article of faith, in BBC Radio Staff Training, that radio spoke to 'an audience of one'. Second, 
that the design of talk for absent listeners should take into account the contexts within which 
listening took place. Matheson realised that the broadcaster must consider where listeners 
were situated as they listened, and adapt what was said to those circumstances. In short, radio 
adopted a conversational mode of address that spoke to listeners as if each was a person in his 
or her own right. At the same time, the spaces within which listening took place were 
implicitly acknowledged in the design of radio talk. The key point to note - in the British case 
at least - is that how to talk to absent audiences was something 
that had actually to be 
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discovered and learnt. If. today it seems natural and obvious that the experience of radio and 
television is, in each case, that I am spoken to as a person in my own right this is the outcome 
of a complex, historical process in which the manner and style of broadcasting has changed 
and adapted to changing times since the early decades of this century. 
Television's mode of address is underpinned by the way in which its constructs its 'look', how 
its speakers are presented to viewers, how they appear to us when we turn on the set. It is, for 
instance, an entirely unremarkable, taken-for-granted thing that when I watch the news on tv 
it seems that the newreader in the studio is speaking directly to me, as I watch. ' I know, of 
course, that the news reader is in fact reading the news. I don't suppose that he is an 
accomplished actor who has leamt a script by heart and produces a word-perfect performance 
each night. Nor does it appear that the newscaster 'ad-libs' the news. It is not a brilliant, 
spontaneous improvisation that is routinely produced for tv viewers. Given that news is read, 
why do we not see the newsreader reading the news from a script in front of her or him? Why 
should it matter that he or she appears to be addressing the viewer (who turns out, in every 
case, to be 'rne) directly? Why, indeed, bother to have a visible newsreader at all? It makes no 
difference to the actual content of what is being said. But it does make a difference to my 
attitude to what is being said. 
A basic thing about news, for it to be news, is that it must be - really and truly - believable. 
The conditions of the believability of news are not simply in the factical nature of its content, 
but are very much a consequence of the ways in which news is told and, of course, crucially, 
who is telling it. Suppose there were a different newscaster every night of the week. Suppose 
the newscaster was never the same - always someone different. Would that make a 
difference? Not to the content of the news of course, but surely to my attitude to it. The 
believability of what is being said rests in part on the reliability of who is saying it, and that 
is something that is built up over time. It matters that news is read at the same time by the 
same person day in day out, year in year out. For many years Walter Cronkite was the 
acceptable face of network news in the USA, just as Trevor MacDonald of ITN is regarded by 
millions of British people as the reliable, trustworthy believable face of Independent 
Television News (ITN). News is not just some impersonal, factical thing that exists 
5 This 'look' has a history. Its discovery and invention was linked to the need, in the early years of tv 
news (the late 1950s), to make it both watchable and believable. To this end special techniques were 
invented in order to deliver a direct look-to-camera for the newsreader (the tele-prompter or auto-cue). 
Thus this look must be understood as a consciously sought for, technically achieved and humanly 
accomplished device that contributes to the production of news as a real-world interactive occasion 
between the institutions of broadcasting and each and every viewer, whose deliberate intention is to 
secure the effect, for each and every one of them, of 'I am being told' (for ftirther details see Scannell 
1996: 14) 
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independently of who tells it, and this was something that broadcasters in the UK had actually 
to leam. 
The direct look-to-camera of the newsreader is directed 'out' of the studio. It implicates a 
someone someplace to receive it who turns out, in each case, to be 'me'. This look and the talk 
that goes with it is in real time - which turns out to be the same time that I am watching (nine 
pm if I'm watching the 9 O'Clock News from the BBC). And all this begins to establish 
what's happening (namely the newscaster reading the news) as a realtime realworld event of 
which I am a part. This does not yet or necessarily mean that the news of which the 
newscaster speaks is thereby established as a realtime realworld thing, but rather that a 
relationship between the newscaster and every viewer is established as a realtime realworld 
communicative event and interaction. On such a basis broadcast news can begin to establish 
its factical, worldly significance. 
Thus I find, when I turn on the news, that I am spoken to while knowing that millions of 
others are watching at exactly the same time and seeing and hearing exactly the same things. 
In each case the experience is the same. In each case it is 'for me'. This is the characteristic 
effect of a for-anyone-as-someone structure. The news is, in each case, appropriated by me 
as an aspect of my experience 6 and yet at the same time this experience is shared by countless 
others. It is thus an experience that I share with others and as such is, in principle and in fact, 
talkable about by me with anyone else who has watched the same news programme. And so 
it is more generally in respect of the daily output of radio and television. For-anyone-as- 
someone structures in principle create the possibilities of, and in practice express, a public, 
shared and sociable world-in-common between human beings. 
11 
The available self 
I have attempted to distinguish three different kinds of human practice and to indicate in 
each case their particular communicative structure. Together they point to different aspects of 
61 have discussed in detail whether or not watching a tv programme can be claimed as 'an experience' 
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the self Each one of us takes for granted that the self in question is, in each case, mine. Each 
one of us holds it to be the case that there is an I-myself and this I-myself is 'me'. What or 
who is this me? Whenever I claim to be 'me', I mean something like 'the person that I am', a 
particular someone. - 'me'. It is this that is invoked by the first person. T think, T feel, T 
believe... meaning 'I personally think, feel, believe that... ' (whatever that may be). 
Whenever I say something like this I am laying claim to an entitlement to be heard as a 
someone with the right to such personal thoughts, feelings and beliefs. This right is not in any 
primary sense some subjective (internal) thing. It is definitionally public; a right of seýf 
expression. Self expression is not directed back at oneself. It is of no consequence if I simply 
internalize my thoughts feelings and beliefs (as if I was required to keep them to myself, as if 
I was debarred from saying what I think or feel or believe). A person is someone whose 
personal views matter in some public, articulate, expressable sense. 
Being a person is a socially sanctioned matter. To be treated as a person is to be allowed to 
be someone in particular (and not a mere cipher, a slave, an 'unperson'). For that to be 
meaningful it must have practical, recognizable attributes. Amongst the attributes of a person 
are the entitlements to the tastes, preferences, interests, views, beliefs and opinions that all go 
to constitute you as the particular person that you are. And it must be the case that all these 
attributes count (must be taken into account by others when dealing with you). Entitlements 
are nothing (are meaningless) unless they matter in ways that go beyond being matters of 
purely personal or subjective satisfaction, conviction or whatever. The entitlements of a 
person are essentially public matters that require public recognition and public guarantees. It 
is an essential characteristic of a democratic society that it protects the right of all its members 
to be treated as particular someones, that is, as persons in their own right. 
Those whose beliefs, thoughts and feelings are publicly denied or suppressed or ignored are 
not persons: they are not allowed to be them-selves. If they have no right to self expression 
they have no public self. The self is experienced, in each case, as in the first instance a 
personal matter (the me that I am). But the me that I am is not an essence - not some natural, 
eternal given; not something we are always and everywhere born with or into. It is a historical 
phenomenon in a double sense. In the first place only certain historical societies have 
recognized and guaranteed 'the category of the person'. 7 And secondly, and even so, within 
such societies the person is not simply a given. It is something that, in each case, I become. It 
is not so much a question of 'being me' but of 'becoming me' - the person that I am - in the 
course of a lifetime. The self is something that I grow into, that I develop, that I lay claim to. 
that gives rise to communicative entitlements (Scannell 1996: 93-116) 
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It is not a given or fixed essence. It has the attributes of a retrospectively tellable story (a 
biography). 
What then is the self that I become? In Being and Time the question of the 'who' of everyday 
existence is raised in the pivotal fourth chapter (Heidegger 1962: 149-168). It is evidently the 
case that dasein's situated being- in-the-world belongs to the entity that is, in each case, me: 
'the subject', 'the self, the'l myself. 8 But Heidegger is in haste to claim that 'proximally and 
for the most part, dasein (human being) is not itseýf (15 1). Who then is ordinary dasein if not 
me? It is the 'they self, the average self, the anonymous self. It is anyone. It thus 
corresponds to the for-anyone structure discussed above. But what, for Heidegger then, is 
one's own dasein? This is not discussed and is only taken up later, in Division Two, where 
the ownmost self emerges as a significant (a defining) aspect of Authentic dasein (312-348). 
The ownmost self is me in my radical particularity. It is the I myself alone, and it shows up in 
my being-towards-death. The mortality of dasein - the ineluctable and inescapable facticity of 
-death - appears as a grand and universal fact. All men are mortal. But the mortality of others 
is, in each case, of secondary significance. It is the fact of my death - its radically 
indeterminate certainty - that impinges on every aspect of my life. No matter what I do I can 
neither take away from others their death (though my actions may prolong or shorten their 
time on earth), nor escape from the inevitability of my death. Death is, in each case, mine. It is 
what I face, what I must own up to. It is the one thing that I most certainly and intimately 
own and is thus the clearest indication of my ownmost being. What shows in death is the 
finiteness not of Life, but my life. Thus, lifetime - the span of life in each and every case - 
has a for-someone structure. It is always the one sure and certain thing that is particular, in 
each case, to me alone. 
The they self and the ownmost self are roughly in correspondence with the anyone and the 
somone structures discussed above. But what of the anyone-as-someone structure in Being 
and Time? It is there in the phrase that is used so often that it is something of a Heideggerian 
mantra: 'being is, in each case, mine'. What is the force of 'in each case', if not to say that 
being (dasein) is what I or anyone have. It is - in every case - constitutive of me. Dasein is 
recognizable (is manifest) in me or anyone. The kind of being that shows up in me is, in each 
case and at one and the same time, formally indicative both of someone in particular ('rne') 
and of anyone in general ('they'). Dasein has a for-anyone-as-someone structure. There is a 
7 See Carrithers, Collins and Lukes (1985) for a debate on this issue. 
8 Dasein is Heidegger's term for human existence, by which is meant, more exactly, the aliveness of 
being. Each one of has dasein. But it is not the case that 'I am dasein', for dasein is not a subject. It does 
not have its source and origin in me. 
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triple structure of the self in Being and Time -- the theyself; the myself, the ownself -- that 
corresponds with the three communicative structures traced above. The theyself has a for- 
anyone structure; the myself has a for anyone-as-someone structure, and the ownself has a 
for-someone structure. The myself - with its mediating for-anyone-as-someone 
communicative structure - interacts between the impersonal theyself and the purely personal 
ownself. These aspects of the self are indications of phenomenal realities that show up in 
how ordinarily we speak of and orient ourselves towards ourselves and others and the world. 
All three structures must be understood as equiprimordial. Each presupposes the others. None 
can be privileged over and above the others 
'The they' is the way that Heidegger's English translators render the sense of das Man. It does 
not translate directly, comfortably, into English. Its close equivalent in Franch is On (On dit, 
one says). Hubert Dreyfus, in his excellent commentary on Division One of Being and Time, 
prefers to render das Man as 'the One' (the oneself) which - like the French - captures the 
idiomatic use of the impersonal in English: 'it's what one does', 'it's the way one does things' 
(Dreyfus 1991: 151-2). There is then, in idiomatic English a'oneself - an impersonal self - 
that does 'the done thing' and that can think and talk of itself impersonally, as if it were 
someone else. But such a fon-nulation misses the force of 'the They' as an anonymous 
collectivity of which 'one' is a part. Heidegger's key perception is that the possibility of 
individual 'subjectivities' is always already given by the play of anonymous prior and public 
social processes. The problem is that, rather than exploring the ontology of 'the They', 
Heidegger leaps ahead to his own exitentialist interpretation of the phenomenon: 
In utilizing public transport and in reading newspapers, every Other is like 
the next. The Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely 
into the kind of Being of the Others, in such a way, indeed, that the others, as 
distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this 
inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the 'they' is 
unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we 
read, see, and judge about literature and art as the see and judge; likewise Y 
we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find shocking 
what they find shocking. The 'they', which is nothing definite, and which all 
are, though not the sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness. 
(Heidegger 1962: 164) 
In this passage the lineaments of a 'mass society' are described. The masses travel by public 
transport, read newspapers, share the same enjoyments and have the same opinions about 
everything. Each of us is one of the masses, while not recognizing that we are: 'we shrink 
back from "the masses" as they shrink back; we find shocking what they find shocking'. But 
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rather than analysing the significance of this, it is simply judged and condemned. The tyranny 
of the They is thought of as a form of domination over the Authentic self It is 'a falling', a 
'disburdening of one's Being' a 'surrendering' to 'distantiality, averageness, levelling down, 
publicness' (166). It is the mark of 'inauthenticity and failure to stand by one's Self (166). It is 
a way of being that 'misses itself and covers itself up' (167). But what Heidegger misses - and 
it is essential to his whole thesis - is anything like an adequate analysis of the necessarily 
anonymous character of social life as that into which any individual is thrown and in which 
individuality is formed. The ontology of being-with as such is simply not undertaken. 9 The 
nature of the social - which is what is at issue in the phenomenology of being-with - remains 
underexamined in Heidegger's analysis. 
It is, of course, quite beyond the scope of this article to begin to deal adequately with that 
fundamental question, but I will try, at least, to open it up via the issues raised in the passage 
cited above. What Heidegger describes is the playlo of that essentially modem phenomenon, 
'public opinion'. It does indeed usually turn out to be the case that the opinions that I have 
about what I see or read or hear about what's going on in the world happen to be pretty much 
like what anybody else thinks. But what does that indicate? The usual interpretation is one 
that points to the dire consequences of mass society and mass culture in particular. Habermas 
(1988) has lamented the demise of critical opinion publics (formed in the 18th century) and 
their supercession by uncritical mass opinion publics in the 20th century. Habermas thinks of 
the formation of public opinion as a decisionistic process; the coming together of individuals 
into a shared, intersubjective, reflective view on some matter of general concern (the 
expression of the general will) via processes of public, collective discussion and debate. 
But opinions are, for the most part, not the outcome of individual or collective acts of 
cognition, deliberation and self-reflection. Rather each one of us 'finds' that we have opinions 
that are responses to something like the prevailing public mood. The phenomenology of mood 
(a theme taken up immediately after the discussion of 'the They') is one of Heidegger's most 
brilliant insights. " The prevailing public mood is a primary indication of the nature of 
9 This is in sharp contrast with the brilliant and sustained analysis of being-in as such, the theme of 
Chapter 5 which runs to 55 pages compared with 20 for Chapter Four. The ontology of being-with is 
discussed in a ten page subsection: The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-with (pp. 153- 
163). 
10 In Truth and Method Gadamer discusses the nature of play: 'namely that the player's actions should 
not be considered subjective actions, since it is, rather, the game itself that plays, for it draws the 
players into itself and thus itself become the actual subjecturn of the playing' (490). His discussion 
focuses on the play of language itself, 'which addresses us, proposes and withdraws, asks and fulfils 
itself in the answer'. Here I try to grasp, in this hermeneutic sense, the play of social-historical 
processes.. 
Heidegger 1962: 172-182. It should be noted that mood is very largely interpreted as a subjective 
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historicality - the play, the process of history. In finding that we have an opinion -- in 
expressing it (each one of us) and in seeking to act upon it -- the dialectic (the play) of the 
social is revealed. Historical mood is a primary phenomenon to which historians attend and 
which they try to capture as 'the spirit of the age'-- the Dark Ages, The Age of Enlightenment, 
Romanticism, Capitalism, The Age of Extremes, etc. etc. Historical mood is not a theoretical 
concept. It is not an essence that hovers over society. It is always manifest as what it is - the 
texture of lived experience, the 'structure of feeling, the 'climate' of the times. It is always 
felt, without necessarily being articulated as what it is. You might 'feel' it, but not be able to 
put your finger on it, to express it. Such a mood showed up in the 1950s when American 
women sought to clarify 'the problem without a name' (the thing that was felt but unsayable), 
the sources of their veiled sense of oppression. 12 In giving expression to this thing, in finding 
and naming it as patriarchy or sexism it entered into publicness as a historical phenomenon. It 
thus became available for scrutiny, reflection, criticism etc and as a basis for individual and 
collective action. Opinion was already there-to-be-found, but nevertheless it had actually to 
befound. In being discovered it became available as opinion. This is the play of the social, 
the articulation of the historical. Upon the basis of this play, the process of collective will- 
formation depends and proceeds. 
Heidegger's analysis of the They - freed of his own historically situated preconceptions, 
prejudices and opinions - indicates the horizon of social significance. 13 This horizon - always 
spatially and temporally specific -'gives' the scale and scope of what is available as 
experience at any time any where. It is mood determined and determining. It is always prior 
to individual experience. The historical horizon 'gives' a determinate set of thrown 
possibilities, always sometime somewhere, as any determinate someone's resources for self- 
becoming. The horizon of the historical-social is necessarily, in the first place, a silent and 
anonymous given. In this respect it is like language. It is 'there' for each and all. The question 
phenomenon (fear and anxiety are the concrete examples that Heidegger considers in some detail). The 
subjectivist account of the phenomenology of mood is part of the general confusion in Heidegger's 
account of the structure of the self (the 'who' of everyday existence). It must be the case that for 
individual daseins to have moods, mood must be (and in the first instance) a historical phenomenon 
with a for-anyone structure. If Heidegger is right (and I think he is) that mood is a fundamental 
indication of the openness of being (which 'gives' the possibility of being-in-concern) then mood as 
such is necessarily an historical a priori: it is always already there in the world as an anonymous, 
public, social phenomenon that is available for anyone to have and experience. Historical mood is 
ontologically foundational for ontic, individual moods. 
12 'The problem without a name' is the theme of Betty Friedan's book, The Feminine Mystique 
(Friedan 1963), the pioneering feminist work which opened up the question of American women's 
felt but, at that time, indefinable sense of dissatisfaction and unhappiness. Later writers identified the 
source of this unhappiness as male oppression and named it 'patriarchy' (Millet 1972). For a critical 
account of the development of feminist writing and theory, starting with Friedan, see Spender 1985. 
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remains however, as to how anonymous social processes become activated as history. How 
does the background get to be foregrounded? How do phenomena go through the essentially 
historical process of articulation, expression and recognition? I have tried to indicate this 
through the transitions of historical mood into public opinion into collective decision making 
processes. Public opinion is the expressive register of historical mood. Historical mood, at 
any time, is something like'the climate of the times', the'how it is'. Whatever'it'is, it is never 
the decisionistic outcome of agreed public norms. These are rather found (or not) as 
embedded in the normal, the natural, the usual... 'the way things are'. 
For-anyone-as- someone structures register the play of the social, the dialectic of the 
impersonal and personal, collective and individual historical processes. What is 'at play' in 
the discovery and disclosure of, say, 'racism' or 'sexism' is the movement of history itself as 
individuals, responding to the times in which they find themselves, seek to recognize, 
articulate and express the ways in which the times impinge and impact upon themselves and 
their lives. What shows here is the encounter between for anyone structures (the anonymous 
givenness of existence) and for someone structures (our personal experience of existence). 
These two incommensurate orders of reality are mediated by for-anyone-as-someone 
structures through which they interact with and upon each other. In Being and Time what 
remains unclarified is any adequate recognition and discussion of the life-world of individuals 
and the common public world in which countless my-worlds are situated. What remains 
unexamined, because unrecognized, in Division One, is the great world of public affairs 
through which history is expressed. The world that is under consideration is always the 
immediate life-world, the surrounding, roundabout-me-world, the umwelt of everydayness. 
Here is a description of it in a lecture course given at Freiburg in the summer of 1923, a few 
year before the publication of Being and Time: 
In the room stands the table (not 'a' table alongside many others in other 
rooms and houses) at which one sits in order to write, eat, sew, play.... Its 
standing there in the room means: it plays a role for such and such a use; this 
or that is impractical, unsuited for it.... here and there it shows lines--- the 
boys made themselves busy at the table; these lines are not just occasional 
interruptions of its colouring, but rather [it means]: the boys have been here, 
and still are. This side is not the easterly side, the small side is not so many 
centimetres shorter than the other, but rather this is the side at which my wife 
sits if she wishes to read; earlier we had this or that discussion at the table; 
here a decision was made with afriend; there a certain work written; that 
holiday celebrated (Quoted by Caputo 1994: 333) 
13 On 'the horizon', cf Gadamer 1993: 302-7. 
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In Being and Time Heidegger gives formal accounts of two different ontologies that are 
concretely indicated in this description. Ontology A is an object world of object-Things. 
Ontology B is a meaningful world of significant things. The fundamental difference between 
them shows here in the difference between the indefinite and the definite article. A table... any 
table, a table Thing. Any table (as a universal) can be objectively described and defined in 
terms of its objective observable and determinable properties. It (any table) is made of such 
and such materials. It stands so high. It is x centimetres long and y centimetres wide and it 
weighs so much. On the other hand the table (this table) is a particular thing. Heidegger 
clarifies the significance of the table (what it means as distinct from what objectively it is) as 
part of a world for those for whom it matters. Its significance lies in the ways that it matters. 
It is significant because it is put to significant use. This is what we do at the table, Heidegger 
says: I write, my wife reads or sews, my scallywag sons play and (literally) leave their mark 
upon it. They have scored its surface with their coloured pencils, so that whenever he see 
those marks Heidegger is reminded of their presence (perhaps with affection, perhaps with 
irritation, perhaps a mixture of both). The table is marked with their being. They have 
impressed themselves upon it in their own small way. Such are the structures of significance 
in which and of which the table is a part. 
Everyday things - even impersonal things (like the table) - are everywhere imbued with the 
presence of particular someones. Anything can be transformed to appear as something: a 
transformation brought about by someone impressing upon the thing the mark of their 
presence. You can tell that a room bears the mark of the people that live in it. You see this 
without noticing it really in the things that show as theirs - mementoes, keepsakes, ornaments 
and souvenirs - in all the bric-a-bric, the seen but unnoticed clutter in the room. A room 
stripped of such stuff is not a homely (lived in) room. It may have an aesthetic purity. It may 
be technically efficient. It may be a good place in which to meditate or cook, for instance. But 
it is strictly impersonal, as so many public, institutional rooms are... lecture and seminar 
rooms for instance. 
At the centre of everyday existence, is the everyday available seýf; the self that is, in each 
case, mine but that discloses itself, that is reciprocally available to anyone else; that displays 
itself in the things it owns and the ways it impresses itself on everyday things. The realest 
who of everyday existence is not, as Heidegger supposes, the Theyself (not an average, de- 
personalized self that is just the same as everyone else). 
14 Nor is it the Ownself (me myself 
14 v If we "see" it [the "they"] with an unprejudiced eye, it reveals itself as the "Realest subject" of 
everydayness. ' ( 166) 
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alone, an incommunicable, inexpressible self). The realest who of everyday existence is 
neither of these, although it possesses both as aspects of its more or less openly displayed, 
shown and shareable, always potentially publicly available self. It is this self that Heidegger is 
talking about in his discussion of the table in the family living room. It is this self that is 
indicated by the recurring refrain, 'being is in each case mine'. The Myself that I or anyone 
has, is a sociable, public communicable phenomenon in which difference and sameness 
show up. The particular (the ownself) and the general (the oneself) are derived possibilities 
of entities that always already possess both characteristics. Thus for- anyone- as-someone 
structures are primary communicative structures that mediate between for-anyone and for- 
someone structures; and the available self is the prime locus of the self with the theyself and 
the ownself as aspects of the sociable my-self that I or anyone am. 
III 
Available time 
For Heidegger the kind of being that humans have is most fundamentally linked to the kind of 
temporality that they have. " Human being is being temporal. The finiteness of human 
existence is constitutive of our being (of what and how we are). All finite things have 
boundaries. The finitude of dasein shows up as lifetime. Death does not so much diminish 
life as throw it into sharp relief. life as, in each case, the time of my being in the world. In an 
object world of object things, things exist (endure, 'go on') in time indefinitely. But the time 
of my life is the time of my being. Being temporal, for us, is not being-in-time but the time- 
of-being. Since life is, in each case mine (the unique time of my being in the world) it 
follows that, in each case, lifetime has an ownmost (for-someone) temporal structure. But the 
time of my being in the world is the time of my being in the world with others. It is something 
like generational time. 16 In generational time I am, in each case, in the midst of and in touch 
with others everywhere. It gathers us into its common, shared temporality as being together 
15 Division One of Being and Time is very largely preoccupied with Dasein's spaciality (its being in the 
world), and the temporality of Dasein is taken up only in the last three chapters of Division Two (383- 
488). For a succinct statement of the interconnectedness of 'being' and 'time', cf. Heidegger (1992). 
16 There is only a glancing mention of this essentially historical order of temporality in Being and 
Time (p. 486) which deserves a much ftiller thernatization than it receives here. For a useful, brief 
discussion cf Ricoeur (Volume 3: 109-112). 
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now. A common world must have a common time as the basic means whereby co-ordination 
for whatever common public purposes becomes available for human beings. As available time 
it again indicates a for-anyone-as- someone structure. 
One of the most obvious and overlooked aspects of broadcasting is that it runs to a time-table. 
No matter where in the world, no matter whether we're talking of commercial or public 
service, national or local services, radio and tv will be delivered as a daily schedule, not now 
and then but continuously, uninterruptedly and indefinitely (as far as we can tell they will go 
on for ever). This dailiness yields the sense we all have of the ordinariness, the familiarity and 
obviousness of radio and television. It establishes their taken for granted, 'seen but unnoticed' 
character. Underlying the structure of everydayness, in the modem world, is an intentionality 
that shows itself in what we think of as standardisation and uniformity which, I have argued, 
are indicative of for-anyone structures. Standardised uniform time has such a structure. It has 
a diachronic and synchronic dimension, yielding simultaneously a punctual 'now' as a 
coordinating point for whatever social action and a calibrated continuum that yields an 
always manipulable sequence of 'befores' and 'afters'. This structure yields the timetables of 
modem daily life and is fundamental to the ways in which broadcasting appears daily as part 
of and as for each and every day. 
The specific character of the publicness of today's media lies in the kind of temporality that 
they have; their dailiness. It is this characteristic that marks the particular structure of 
significance (or care structure) of the press and broadcasting. This temporality has a for- 
anyone-as- someone structure. Readers, listeners and viewers are invested with the attributes 
and entitlements of Particular someones. Each one of us experiences what we read or hear or 
see as if it spoke to each one of us personally. But that does not mean as if it spoke only to 
me. Each one of us knows that just as it speaks to me it speaks to millions of others at the 
same time, now. We do not treat what we read and see and hear every day as if it were a 
purely personal matter. I do not internalize the output of the media as I might a well-loved 
song or poem which I commit to heart in order to own it for my ownmost self. To the 
contrary. One of the commonest findings reported by reception studies is that daily output is 
an inexhaustible topical resource for everyday conversations. That anyone and everyone can 
talk with each other about last night's news, or what happened in the latest episode of a 
favourite soap is not an accidental or contingent feature of daily media, but a revelatory 
aspect of their fundamental structures. It is precisely indicative of the common world that they 
create. A common public world, for it to be such and not otherwise, must be talkable-about 
as an essentially unproblematic, seen but unnoticed thing whose understandability (whose 
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intelligibility) is taken as given by each and all. 
This does not mean, of course, that it will be assessed and evaluated in the same way by all 
concerned. If that were the case there would be nothing to talk about. The endless 
disagreements that daily media generate are indicative of the involvements, engagements and 
concerns that they elicit. They indicate, in an essential way, that the everyday things that they 
disclose do indeed matter and are of concern at least to the extent that people care enough to 
disagree, to debate and discuss their differing tastes, interests, convictions, attitudes and so 
on. And in talking about media output in the ways that we do, we disclose quite 
unselfconsciously a recognition that we have indeed treated that output as if it spoke to us as 
having the attributes and entitlements of persons whose opinions, tastes and interests are 
taken into account as if they mattered in some essential way. We are confirmed as persons in 
such ways and in conversations with others we reciprocally re-confirm each other as such. 
All this - which is entirely unremarkable - is nevertheless indicative of a kind of engagement 
(of being-in-concem) into which we are gathered on a scale without historical precedent. The 
double articulation of the temporal now of media discloses their daily services as the time of 
our being with one another in a common, shared world. This is what is meant by generational 
time. The peculiar accessibility of daily media - the structure of their openness - is that they 
are, for each and all in the very same here and now, continuously available as a matter of 
common concern for me or anyone anywhere. 
This now of concern is doubled, and it is this doubled spaciality and temporality that yields 
the specific for-anyone-as-somone structure of daily media as a new kind of available-now. 
There is the now of the broadcast event or occasion and at the same time the now of listening 
and viewing. Each of these nows is distinct (each has a different location: the now of 
broadcasting is situtated in the studio, say: the now of listening or viewing is elsewhere; in the 
car, at home etc). But the broadcast now isfor the situated now of reception. The broadcast 
now gathers us - in millions - into a shared now of concern (Scannell 1996: 75-92). But it is 
not so much the singular moment of a particular event, but the structure of daily schedules 
that discloses the doubled phenomenal now of broadcasting, for the structure of the schedules 
is articulated to (indeed articulates) the structure of our days. It is this articulation that gives 
expression to our particular historicized sense of days, that realizes routinely for us the two 
worlds of concern that we each inhabit: my-world and its concerns and beyond that the great 
world (the common public world) that broadcasting articulates routinely day by day. 
Through daily media each day shows up for us as the day today, this day in particular; this 
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day with its own particular concerns and involvements. What this means is that each day is 
significant because it is full of significant matters. That is what the schedules - in all their 
parts and as a whole - disclose, and what shows up in the sum of the contents of daily 
newspapers. There is always something going on. The most basic phenomenal aspect of what 
we think of as news is that it accomplishes the routinization, day by day and every day, of 
history. History is no longer something apart from my-world and in its concerns. It enters 
into my world, it becomes part of my concerns. And so it is for everyone. History is no longer 
a post hoc narrative that gets written, of necessity, after the event. Such history always 
encounter the Tristram Shandy paradox: the more you write about it the more it recedes. The 
time of the narrative and the time of its writing necessarily move away from rather than 
towards each other. Thus written history, in the very act of writing, creates a receding past. 
For us, however, and by virtue of the specific temporality of media (their doubled spacio- 
temporality which constitutes the phenomenal here-and-now of their dailiness), history is 
essentially an unfolding narrative. History is relocated: it is no longerthen', but'now', no 
longer 'there' but 'here'. And the unfolding now must mean that it is structured for and towards 
that which is to come. The historicality of days, for us, is structured in expectancy. The 
historical now is future-facing. The future facing present is disclosed, again by the structures 
of dailiness articulated and expressed by daily media. For, although it is the case that the 
institutions of the press and broadcasting are so organized as to deliver daily services on the 
day, each day, it is also necessarily case that the institutions are always already ahead of the 
particular day (this day, the day today) that we are and the newspapers and the broadcast 
schedules are actually in. This is the mark of their institutional temporality. They arefor the 
future, the generations that come after us when we are gone. It is in this sense that the past is 
the future. Institutions, whose care-structure is inter-generational, are inherited by each living 
generation as a gift from the dead generations for dealing with the present in anticipation of 
the future. Our now, structured in anticipation of what is to come, is always already 
forestructured by the heritage of the past. 
Three distinct aspects of human temporality are routinely implicated in the phenomenal now 
of daily media. Institutional time is futural, always ahead of itself, structured in anticipation 
of the generations to come. Without such temporal fore-structures the phenomenal now - the 
now of concern - cannot appear. The great human world that goes on from generation to 
generation is underpinned by temporal structures whose role is precisely that of re-generation. 
This world is necessarily anonymous and impersonal. It is the they-world, with a for-anyone 
structure. On the other hand, and quite distinct from this, there is my-world, whose 
temporality is bounded by the span of my life. Day in day out radio, television and 
newspapers link these two incommensurate human temporalities: the historical life of 
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societies and the lifetimes of individual social members. Routinely they bring together the 
they-world and, in each case, my-world, which now are gathered into our-world, the common, 
public life-and-times of the generations of the present. In our time-the shared generational 
time that is articulated day by day in daily media-we are routinely gathered into a common 
shared world of concern that is manifestly available for all in a particular way. The common 
public available time of broadcasting is for me and anyone as someone. In this respect it can 
be said to have a for-anyone-as-someone temporal structure. 
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Chapter Eight 
Television and history 
Studying television 
'What', asks Charlotte Brunsdon, 'is the "television" of Television Studies? ' She raises this 
question in a collection put together by Christine Geraghty and David Lusted to annunciate 
Television Studies which, they claim, 'now has a body of knowledge and history of how that 
knowledge developed which can form the basis of debates' (1-2). The book then, is not about 
television but about the ways in which it is and has been studied, and Brunsdon shows how 
this has come about. She examines the contents page of six academic readers on television 
and the mass media in order to establish the central concerns of the disciplines which have 
combined to produce what is coming to be called Television Studies. In short we are 
witnessing the invention of a new academic discursive formation' whose self-validating task 
is to produce the object of which it speaks. Television Studies begins as a discourse about 
itself, not about television. There is nothing particularly unusual about this. It is more or less 
how new academic territories are carved out these days in an increasingly competitive 
2 
environment. It does indicate however something of the difficulties that arise in trying to 
think about 'television' if we want to resist the temptation (the fallacy) of seeing it in thefirst 
place as an academic object. Whatever it is it is certainly not that, and I can't help feeling 
that, at the end of the working day, when the theorists of Television Studies have returned 
home from their university departments, they stop thinking about television as a-thing-to-be- 
theorised and deal with it in the same way as everyone else; ie as a seen but unnoticed, taken 
for granted aspect of their daily life. To say that that is where one wants to begin an enquiry 
into television is to indicate an alternative approach that I will explore here. John Ellis puts it 
well. He notes the universality of television 'which has gained the currency of everyday life 
1 Foucault (1974: 31-40). For a useful discussion of the concept, see Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 58- 
78. 
2 It's a fertile fissile process. Television Studies is begotten from Film Studies, Cultural Studies and 
Media Studies and is now in turn generating Radio Studies. Likewise Visual Culture (Jenks 1995y-an 
omnium gatherurn of film, photography, television, advertising and painting) has inevitably hatched 
Auditory Culture as its counterpoint (Bull and Black 2003). 
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itself To ensure significance in the developed world today, any new phenomenon has to be 
touched and is touched by television. That is, it must be touched by the dominant form that 
television takes in modem society: the form of broadcast television programmes supplied into 
people's homes. ' (Ellis 2004: 275). 
A first recommendation: to begin to understand what 'television' is, look at how it occurs in 
ordinary language usage. Such a move is in tune with J. L. Austin's concern, as Stanley 
Cavell puts it, that 'we try to take a view of words free of philosophical preoccupations' 
(Cavell 1976: 238). Here I try to take a view of television free of preconceptions mapped 
onto it by academics. Brunsdon points out that 'much innovatory work in television studies 
has been focused on [ ... ] the television text' (Brunsdon 1998: 105]. But no-one, apart from 
academics, talks about television texts. 'Did you see that interesting text on television last 
night? ' is an implausible conversational gambit. Rather, ordinarily, we talk about television 
and its programmes as Ellis does. What is this television? It is not this or that television 
(French, American, whatever). It is all over the world. It touches on every aspect of life today. 
It has major production centers, to be sure, and certain American products (mainly drama) 
dominate many national markets elsewhere in the world. But American product is not the 
same as 'American television' whose peculiarities mark it out as significantly different from 
most other countries and their televisions. Television now flourishes in parts of the world 
where twenty years ago it was introduced as a development medium for educating peasant 
farmers. India is a notable case in point. If television lacks the penetration that radio has as the 
dominant medium in large parts of Africa and South America it is, along with its parent 
medium, global in its reach. Broadcasting-radio and television-underpins our sense of the 
world today. All this hints at the worldliness of contemporary television. On the one hand it is 
routinely experienced everywhere as part of the ordinary life-world of members of modem 
societies (watching TV is just one of those things that most of us do in the course of an 
3 
ordinary day). On the other hand, and just as routinely, in daily news services the world over 
audiences experience, as a commonplace thing, their situated connectedness with what's 
going on elsewhere in the world. In exceptional moments people the whole world over are 
glued to their television sets as witnesses of celebratory or catastrophic events. In all this 
broadcasting has accomplished something quite unprecedented; the routinisation of history on 
a world wide basis. In this chapter I explore, in a preliminary way, the world-historical 
character of television, what this means and how it has come about. 
3 On the ordinariness of television see Bonner 2003. 
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I start with the facticity of a common world4made visible as such by broadcast television the 
world over. This world is the ultimate outcome of those historical processes gathered under 
the sign of 'modemity', that revolution which took off in Europe over three centuries ago and 
which transformed the ways in which we, as human beings, understood and thought about 
ourselves and the world we live in. Scientific and technological innovation, the formation of 
modem states, the capitalist mode of production, the transport and communication 
infrastructure are all the achieved historical outcomes of a revolution which looked to this 
world and our situation in it as humanity's most fundamental concern. That is what television 
now makes visible as the historical process. Through it we now see the manifest truth of the 
claim that human beings do indeed make history; their own histories, the history of the 
country in which they live, the history of the world. But what is much harder to see is how to 
account for and understand these interlocking historical processes which are all embedded in 
each other. I have argued that the history of the world (world history) is an impossible 
narrative. 5 There is no point of view, no point of rest, from which it could be written by 
human beings. And the same is true, I think, for television. As a world-historical phenomenon 
it paradoxically appears as an impossible historical narrative. So in order to broach the world- 
historical character of broadcast television 61 begin with the perplexities of historiographies of 
broadcasting, communication and media technologies. 
Broadcasting histories 
What is broadcasting history's natural subject matter? In the mid 1950s the British historian, 
Asa Briggs, embarked on the history of broadcasting in the United Kingdom which turned out 
to be the history of the British Broadcasting Corporation who commissioned him (Briggs 
1961-1994). Fifty years and five volumes later this is a still continuing history with Jean 
Seaton taking over from Lord Briggs to produce Volume 6 (1974-1986). This, the earliest 
scholarly history of broadcasting, was immensely influential and set the benchmark standard 
for subsequent histories of broadcasting in other countries. Briggs produced a meticulously 
researched history, based primarily on the BBC's huge written archive, that offered a rolling 
4 On 'the hen-neneutics of facticity' (how we encounter and deal with worldly things) see Heidegger 
1999: 54-8. It is the theme of Chapter 3 (Division One), of Being and Time (Heidegger 1962: 91-148). 
5 Scannell 2004b. This history was, in the West, originally the Judeo-Christian narrative of humanity's 
fall and ultimate redemption. It was revised in the Enlightenment as the historical struggle for the 
kingdom of heaven on earth in the form of the perfectly free and just society. Postmodernism has 
proclaimed its incredulity towards such 'grand narratives' (Lyotard 1986). 
6 'Given the overall mapping of the globe that today is taken for granted, the unitary past is one which 
is worldwide; time and space are recombined to form a genuinely world-historical framework of action 
and experience. (Giddens 1990: 2 1, my emphasis). I follow Giddens in thinking of 'globalisation' as 
the-world-as-a-whole experienced by each and all of us 'embedded' in our own time and place. 
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narrative of the development of the BBC as its activities grew and expanded in time. It was 
largely concerned with the internal history of the institution; its administrative structure, its 
hierarchy of policy and decision making, program production and delivery. At the same time 
it looked outwards to the external pressures that constantly impinged on the operational 
activities of the broadcasters from its two masters; the state on one hand, the audiences on the 
other. These pressures bore down on different aspects of the work of broadcasting but 
together they helped to shape and define its universe of discourse, the limits of permissibility, 
of what could and could not be said or shown on radio or television, at any time. Radio 
broadcasting began everywhere on a local basis and sooner or later a process of consolidation 
and centralisation took place that set in dominance a national system of broadcasting that 
remains intact today. This convergence took place very quickly in the UK, partly because of 
its small size, partly because of the rapid domestic uptake of radio by the population and 
partly because so much of British economic, political and cultural power was already 
concentrated in the metropolitan capital, London. In other parts of the world, with much 
larger territories, with different socio-political geographies and a slower rate of uptake, the 
centralisation of broadcasting took place more gradually and the central broadcasting 
authorities had less power over regional and local broadcasters. 7 
Briggs established a 'first generation' history that put in place a narrative of the institutions of 
broadcasting. It served to generate further 'social' and 'cultural' histories. These focused on 
the output of broadcasting and its impact and so were moved to consider their reception. 
Susan Douglas's engagingly readable history of 'listening-in' to the radio in America is 
exemplary (Douglas 1999). 8 Such histories however do not run in parallel with histories of the 
broadcasters. They are separate narratives whose concerns are with daily existence, the place 
of the radio or tv set in the spaces of domestic, family life, and their role (along with the 
movies and other elements of popular culture) in the lives of, say, girls growing up in 
America in the 1960s (Douglas 1994). These histories have no necessary connection with the 
histories of the broadcasters because, as mass communication sociologists gradually learnt 
and as Stuart Hall (1980) argued, there is no direct correspondence between the outputs of 
broadcasting and their impact and effect on audiences. 9 
7 Australia, France and the USA may serve as exemplary case studies. See, respectively, Johnson 1988, 
Meadel 1994, Smulyan 1994. 
8 Douglas has that rare ability to write as an academic (observing academic norms of scholarship, 
research etc) for a non-academic readership and her books are widely reviewed and read outside 
academia. It is partly a matter of style but it is, more exactly, the narrative point of view that she 
assumes. She writes of radio in the way that it matters for listeners as part of their own lives and 
experience. 
9 Except on very rare occasions. The Ors 
i 
on Welles' War of the Worlds scare in 1938 is an early and 
classic case of a single program with an immediate, dramatic effect on audience behaviour. 
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All these histories are embedded in national histories, for the nation-state remains the 
containing frame within which historiography operates, the world over, today. The possibility 
of comparative, international or global histories has exercised historians for centuries. 'O It is 
an increasingly pressing issue today since all of us know that we are living in a single, 
common world. Broadcasting history, in response to this pressure, has tried to transcend its 
national boundaries. A comparative study of Nordic television brought together condensed 
histories of developments in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, each drawing on its 
own, more comprehensive national history of broadcasting (Bono and BondebJerg 1994). 
Kate Lacey has made comparative studies of broadcasting in Germany, Britain and the USA 
(Lacey 2002). Michelle Hilmes has argued the need for larger comparative broadcasting 
histories (Hilmes and Lovigho 2002: 1-19) and has brought together British and American 
broadcasting in The Television History Book (Hilmes 2004). All these works proceed by 
setting national accounts alongside each other and noting their points of convergence and 
divergence. But what do we learn from them beyond the structural similarities of 
broadcasting's organisation, mode of production and program service which are subject, 
inevitably, to national variations and differences determined by the size of available native 
audiences, and indigenous economic, political and cultural factors? The comparative study of 
national broadcasting certainly illuminates their idiosyncratic character-the Japaneseness of 
Japanese broadcasting, the Americannes of American broadcasting etc-in a supranational 
historical context. But it does not bring us closer to the global character or impact of the 
spread of broadcasting in the 20thcentury. 
What of the history of world broadcasting? The case of the BBC is exemplary. In the 1930s 
the BBC began overseas broadcasting first to white settler audiences in Britain's imperial 
outposts and then, in the late 1930s with a European war imminent, to countries that the 
British government wished to influence. In the course of World War 2 the BBC developed a 
truly global broadcasting service that transmitted British versions of events, suitably inflected 
for reception in different parts of the world depending on their part in the global convulsion. 
Coming out of the war the BBC's now established World Service, funded by a grant-in-aid 
from the Foreign Office, played an important part in the cold war, backed up by the 
govemment-funded Monitoring Service which eavesdropped on broadcasting transmissions 
from within the Soviet bloc and from many other parts of the world. It might be thought that 
this service, born out of raison d'etat, should have begun to disintegrate as Britain gave up its 
Empire in the decade after the war and to have disappeared completely with the fall of the 
10 Breisach 1983. See especially his discussion of 'The enigma of world history,: 319-322,395-411. 
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Berlin wall at the end of the 1980s. It is remarkable then that, at present, the World Service's 
audiences continues to grow each year and not only for its English language services. The 
audiences for the Brazilian service, in Portuguese, have grown since September 112001 and 
the number of those working in it has doubled since then. 11 
The continuing existence and growth of the World Service indicates, I think, not only the 
overlooked global importance of radio as the parent broadcasting medium, but the existence 
of a growing felt need around the world for reliable, authoritative news of the world that 
comes from one of its centres, from where the action is. 12 But what would the history of this 
service consist oV It is, inevitably, a history of the centre; of the growth of the scale of its 
operations and of key historical moments such as Suez and Hungary in 1956 (Mansell 1982). 
What it cannot be is a history of its reception the world over, for that is historically 
irretrievable beyond the most fragmentary indications to be found in newspapers, magazines 
and other sources in particular countries throughout the world. Thus broadcasting 
historiography's natural limits are set by the situational geographies in which, and for which, 
broadcasting institutions exist-the territorial boundaries of nation states. Moreover, it seems 
to be a one-sided history. Either you write about the institutional side, or you write about the 
reception side but between them there is a wall over which it is hard to see the other side. The 
narratives of institutions and their activities and the narratives of the social uptake of those 
activities are invisible to each other for good reasons, as we shall see. 
Technological histories 
Broadcasting histories belong within the more encompassing history of the extraordinary 
growth in mediated forms of communication that underpin the modem, electronically wired- 
up and wireless world. Radio broadcasting is after all a by-product of an earlier technology 
(wireless telegraphy) conceived for different purposes and use. The same is true of the 
Internet and world wide web. Both were later applications of technologies that had, at first, a 
restricted military use as outcomes of earlier histories of scientific exploration and discovery. 
Communication technologies reach beyond national borders and their histories are not 
11 In the early 1990s the Brazilian service was on the point of closure. It now has 40 staff, and is the 
one of the largest sectors in the BBC's foreign language transmissions. See bbc. co. uk/brazil. I am 
grateful to Lorena Barbier of CBN (Central Brasilieras de Noticias) Recife, for this information. 
12 The hegemony of English as the world's language is crucially important to the position of the World 
Service as the dominant global broadcaster today. In many countries people listen to improve their 
understanding of the English language. 
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constrained within them. Brian Winston has produced a sophisticated model of the complex 
transition from 'pure' scientific experimentation, through the recognition of possible practical 
applications and the development of prototypes, to the invention of a new technology with a 
strong potential for use and profit (Winston 1998). His magisterial narrative of developments 
from the early 19thcentury telegraph to the late 20thcentury Internet is, throughout, a 
technical history of scientific discovery and commercial application. The same is true of 
Pawley's important history of the BBC's engineering division (Pawley 1976). In both books 
the concern is only with the scientific, technical process and its richly complex historical 
unfolding. The boundaries of technological histories are set by the moment of transition when 
the technology in question moves out of the laboratory, so to speak, and achieves social 
recognition and uptake. At that point different histories take over; the histories of their social 
application and use as discussed above, in the case of broadcasting. 
It is important to note how this transition comes about. A technical thing comes out of the 
R&D laboratory and enters into the world. It ceases to be a technical thing and becomes a 
worldly thing. For this to happen it must present itself-if it is to be an ordinary, worldly 
thing-not as a complicated technological object but as a simple piece of equipment such 
that anyone can use. The development of the radio set illustrates the point. In the aftermath of 
World War I radio had become a popular 'scientific' hobby even before the British 
Broadcasting Company began to transmit a program service in November 1922. In garden 
sheds up and down the land men and boys (it was very much a male thing) were building two- 
way radio transmitter-receivers or one-way receiving sets to scour the ether for sound signals. 
In either case the results were a naked display of valves, knobs, wires and amplifiers. The 
scientific innards had yet to be encased and its operation required endless fiddling and 
twiddling. It was not yet a domestic object fit for family living rooms. 13 Adrian Forty 
describes three stages in the evolution of the first truly modem, mass-produced radio set in 
Britain; the Ekco AD65 receiver designed and manufactured by the E. K. Cole company and in 
the shops by 1934 (Forty 1986: 200-206. Scannell and Cardiff 1991: 356-62). The mediating 
stage in the transition from technology to domestic equipment is design. It is a basic mistake 
to think of design as style and aesthetics applied to mass produced goods, as if it were some 
kind of value-added. Design is essential to the transformation of user-unfriendly technologies 
that only trained experts can use into simple user-friendly things that anyone can use. The 
famous Ekco set was designed by a leading architect of the time. Its scientific innards were 
concealed in a circular moulded plastic case made of bakelite, with a chromium plated grille 
and just three knobs for volume, wavelength and tuning. It was not a piece of furniture, but a 
13 For an account of this history in the United States see Douglas 1999: 55-82. See plate 1, opposite 
p. 192, for a photograph that vividly captures this moment. 
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thoroughly new and modem piece of equipment suitable for any household with electricity, 
and any child could use it. 
The point is perhaps obvious enough; you do not need to know how a thing is made in order 
to understand how to use it. Nor do you need to know how programs are made in order to like 
or dislike or be bored by them. The labyrinthine complexities of the scientific-technical 
development of radio and television broadcasting and the production processes that lie behind 
their transmitted output are equally invisible in the design of the receiving equipment and in 
the design of programs. We are not aware of the manufactured character of either except 
when they break down. And yet it must be the case that the design of television sets and of 
television programs are, in different ways, disclosive of how they are to be understood and 
used. How else would we know what to do with them? To study the hidden labor processes of 
technological innovation and application and of broadcasting institutions and their program 
making, is to begin to uncover the care-structures that are concealed and yet immanent in 
humanly made things. 14 More particularly to attend to the design of receiving equipment and 
to the communicative design (or intentionality) of the programs they disclose is to begin to 
find answers to the question as to how something such as 'television' appears in the world as 
a worldly thing; as an ordinary, available thing for use by each and all, anyplace, anytime. 
Media histories 
A third approach to the historical study of communication was pioneered by the Canadian 
economic historian, Harold Innis, whose ideas were taken up and popularised by Marshall 
McLuhan. 15 McLuhan's fame has overshadowed and distorted the significance of Innis's late 
work which today needs some contextualising in order to rescue it from the condescension of 
contemporary media historians (eg Curran 2002: 51-4). Outside Canada Innis is known for 
two books written at the end of his life: Empire and Communication and The Bias of 
Communication. In them Innis developed what was then a startlingly original thesis about the 
media of communication; the material forms (and their technologies) through or upon which 
human communication is registered and moved. Today, via their diffusion in McLuhan's 
writings, these ideas have become commonplace. They include the periodisation of historical 
14 Scannell 2003 for a discussion of the broadcasting production process as a care-structure. 
15 Notably in The Gutenberg Galaxy which McLuhan describes, in the preface as 'a footnote to the 
observations of Innis on the subject of the psychic and social consequences, 
first of writing and then of 
printing' (McLuhan 1964: ix). 
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epochs according to their dominant form of communication (oral, manuscript and print 
cultures); the distinction between speech and writing (emphasising the role of the latter in the 
management and maintenance of religious and political power); the communicative bias of 
different media of communication towards either time or space. Throughout the emphasis is 
on the material forms of communication and not their particular content. 
Innis's late work is hard to read today. It is written in an assertive, oracular style with a vast 
historical sweep and a high degree of abstraction: 'Minerva's owl', the first chapter of The 
Bias of Communication, gets from ancient Babylon and Mesopotamia to the industrial 
revolution and the Communist Manifesto in just over twenty pages. This kind of writing was 
more acceptable fifty years ago and in fact represented probably the last and certainly the 
most original attempt to write 'world history', a genre which, even as Innis wrote, was in 
decline and has fallen out of favour ever since for reasons hinted at above. World history took 
its inspiration from Hegel's Phanomenologie des Geistes 
(The Phenomenology of the Spirit) in which the enlightenment narrative of progress found its 
ultimate expression as the story of the Spirit of Humanity's long journey to self- 
understanding and reconciliation. The challenge to translate this from a philosophy of history 
into an actual historical narrative was taken up by historians in the I 9th and early 20thcentury. 
The most influential of these, in Innis's day, was Arnold Toynbee's multi-volume Study of 
History which started by tracing the history of the world first in terms of the rise and fall of 
civilisations and, later, of world-religions. 
Innis's Empire and Communication took the same broad canvas as earlier world histories but 
painted a very different picture. The transcendental narrative of the movement of Geist in 
history via the rise and fall of civilisations was replaced by the movement and circulation of 
people, goods and information. To see how Innis got to this we must return to his early 
historical work on the Canadian economy. In his detailed, empirical studies of Canada's 
export staples (fur, timber and fish) Innis came to see them as key components of a front tier 
(frontier) economy heavily dependent on the 'back tier' economies of Europe and its 
dominant American neighbour. More exactly he found that his work was, in a fundamental 
way, a study of the movement and circulation of people and goods underpinned by available 
fon-ns of transport and communication and all of which came up against the material 
exigencies of time and space. If his later work seems to operate at a high altitude it is 
grounded in the earthy, practical realities of his early empirical work. As part of his definitive 
study of the fur trade Innis bought himself a canoe and paddled down the remote McKenzie 
River to the Hudson Bay (the route taken by 1 9th century trappers ) in order to understand 
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how the pelts started on their long j ourney to the shops of London and Paris where they were 
sold as fashionable beaver hats. 
It is customary to read 'medium theory' 16 as flawed by technological determinism; the view 
that technological innovation causes social change. The difficulties lie, to a considerable 
extent in the way that the question is posed in terms of technology and its social effect. That 
formulation presupposes a dichotomy between the hidden processes of technical discovery, 
invention, application, manufacture and distribution all on one side with 'society' on the other 
side of the wall. It is as if human inventions are discovered outside society and then are 
suddenly parachuted into it. Furthermore the question is posed in terms of a cause-effect 
relationship as if one could isolate and specify the particular change(s) that could be attributed 
to the technology itself and nothing else. Moreover what is almost completely overlooked is 
that what begins, at the point of social uptake of modem technologies of communication, is 
the process of working out what can be done with them, the discovery of what in fact they are 
(good) for. Technologies do not arrive in the world with what Ian Hutchby calls their 
'communicative affordances' known and understood. Hutchby places this concept at the heart 
of his penetrating review of current approaches, in the sociology of science, to the question of 
technologies and their impact (Hutchby 2001: 13-33). The traditional deterministic 
interpretations of technology were largely negative. Technologies were the product of 
instrumental reason that exploited the natural environment and were instruments of social 
exploitation and domination. Recent sociology has challenged that view but, Hutchby 
argues, ends up by rejecting determinism completely. His own more nuanced position allows 
that technologies do indeed have constraining effects but these should be thought of as 
enabling rather than disabling. The question now becomes, what affordances do new 
communicative technologies open up. What are they good for? What difference, for instance, 
does television make to our lives? What does it do with us and what can we do with it? 
The historicality of television 
The historiographies of communication and media, with which I have thus far been concerned 
all point to the difficulty of grasping the historicality of media and particularly the world- 
historical character of television. Histories of broadcasting, in which television's history is 
situated, turn out to have a one-sided institutional and national character which it is difficult 
to transcend. Social and cultural histories are written on the other side of the wall. Narratives 
16 The label attached to the approach of Innis and McLuhan by Joshua Meyrowtiz (1994) 
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of the development of technologies of communication are similarly one-sided and stop at the 
point of social uptake. Finally, efforts to write the history of the world in terms of 
communication media appear today as discredited by our incredulity towards grand 
narratives. The wider question of the historical impact of communication technologies 
presents major hermeneutic difficulties. At the heart of these problems is an issue that 
medium theory highlights. Historiography is about history but points in a different temporal 
direction.. Historiography operates on the temporal axis of present and past while history 
operates on the axis of present and future. History's subject matter is the history making 
process. Both are situated in the present, the phenomenal 'now'. Historiography looks back to 
the past as a clue to the present situation. Meanwhile however, the history-making process, in 
the very same phenomenal now, is moving forward into the future, is giving the world its 
future through its actions in the present. The writing of history and the making of history 
inevitably diverge. Broadcast television is part of the history-making process. That is what its 
historicality (its being historical) indicates. That is why historiography can never catch up 
with, can never quite grasp, its object of enquiry. As historiography looks back history itself 
is moving forwards and away from it. 
Historiography is about the writing of history. A much debated crux in a number of 
disciplines is the status, in historiography, of the event. The influential Annales School (Burke 
1994) was deeply dismissive of histoire evenementielle whose time was that daily life and 
whose concern was with the kinds of event that show up in newspapers (Braudel 1980: 27- 
29). A preoccupation with historical actors (monarchs, statesmen and military leaders) and 
with great events (politics and war) produced surface narratives, it was argued, which 
overlooked the underlying structural factors that produced both the events and their agents. 
The rejection of surface history however produced peculiarly motionless and abstract histories 
and there was a swing back to narrative in the late 20th century, accompanied by vigorous 
debates about its reliability in relation to the 'truth' of the event- as-narrated. 17 The event, for 
all the difficult issues it poses, is the bedrock of history. If nothing happens, there is nothing 
to tell. One elegant definition of daily life is precisely that there is nothing to say about it. It is 
uneventful because it has no storyable, tellable characteristics (Sacks 1995, volume 2: 215- 
221). 
History however is not simply the event. Events remain unhistorical unless or until they are 
narrated. History is the act of narrating the event. To narrate is not to chronicle. It is to find 
17 A useful review of history and narrative as discussed by historians, philosophers and literary 
theorists is provided by Roberts 2001. 
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and tell the story of the event. The investigate process of finding and telling the story is the 
task of the historian and the journalist: 
Yes (. ) This just in (. ) 
You are looking at obviously a very disturbing live shot there 
That is the World Trade Center and we have unconfirmed reports this morning 
that a plane has crashed into one of the towers of the World Trade Center 
CNN center right now is just beginning to work on this story 
obviously our sources and trying to figure out exactly what happened 
But clearly something relatively devastating happening this morning 
there at the south end of the island of Manhattan. (emphases added) 
This is the moment that the event breaks, live to air, into CNNN news at 8.50 am on 
September II th 200 1. It is the moment of first sight, for viewers and the news-desk, of a pall 
of smoke billowing from one of the towers of the World Trade Center, and these are the first 
words from the newsroom about what, coming out of the ad break, is now on screen with the 
strapline, BREAKING NEWS. It is immediately and naturally assumed, by the newscaster, 
that this-whatever it is-is a story. There is 'something. [ ... ] happening' as viewers can see. 
What exactly, is unclear beyond 'unconfirmed reports' of a plane crashing into the building. 
Though the situation presents itself as incomprehensible and inexplicable, it is spontaneously 
treated as self-evidently potentially meaningful and significant. The work of finding the story 
is the task of the CNN news center and it is now, off screen and invisibly, working flat out on 
it. In the interface between its backstage finding and its front-stage telling, the meaning and 
significance of the event-as-story will be uncovered. It was to be a long and terrible journey 
of discovery on that day (Scannell 2004b). 
Journalists are the historians of the present. To find and tell the story is to give structure, 
coherence and meaning to events-in-the-world and thereby historicise them. The world- 
historical character of life today shows up, like a bolt from the blue, in the world-historical 
event. Both are, in significant ways, an effect of television. To reiterate: it is not the event-in- 
itself that is historical. It becomes so only through the story-telling narratives of its 
historian(s). History is the sum of the relationship between event, story and narrative. The 
attack on the World Trade centre in New York instantly became a world-historical event 
through its immediate uptake on television news-programs round the world. Most news 
comes after the event. But on September II th event and narrative were both in the same 
forward-moving history-making real-time now. The significance of television-its essential 
meaning, power and impact-is encrypted in its most fundamental communicative affordance 
as live broadcasting. 
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Live television broadcasting 
'You are looking at obviously a very disturbing live shot there. ' To find and tell the story in 
the live, phenomenal now of television is to articulate a prospective, forward-looking 
narrative. This in contrast with written histories (including film and newspaper histories) 
which are backward-looking retrospective narratives. Innis and McLuhan drew attention to 
the fundamental communicative affordances of writing (inscribed in all its mediating 
technologies) and speech. But the force of this distinction was considerably vitiated by the 
terms in which it was made: the distinction between 'oral' and 'print' cultures has a curiously 
flattening and distancing effect (it is an academic distinction). We will have a more vivid 
grasp of its force if we think it in terms of the living and the dead. Historiography's subject 
matter (history) is in, as we say, the dead past. But history itself (the history-making process; 
the a priori of historiography) is in, as we also say, the living present. The past is dead 
because it is over and done with. 'It's history' (it's finished). The perishability of news 
('yesterday's news is dead news') reminds us of this each day. The present is alive because it 
is the now-becoming-future of the lives of the living. The liveness of television is not its 
technological effect but its existential basis, the condition of its existence in a double sense: 
its possibility and its manifest, expressed effect. It is because, and only because, television is 
live that it is inextricably implicated in the history-making process which today has long since 
been routinised by modem media (starting with the daily press) as news. Today's news is 
tomorrow's history. 
The meaning of live has been much misunderstood in the academic literature on television. 
In most discussions it is pointed out that television was broadcast live to begin with but was, 
from the 1960s onward, replaced for the most part by recorded programs. But 'recorded' is 
not the negation of 'live'. Jane Feuer's influential and much cited essay on 'The concept of 
live television' conflates liveness with immediacy. Of course in live broadcasting the 
moments of production, transmission and reception are all in the same real time now, but 
what Feuer neglects to consider is the temporal ontology of the immediate now and, crucially, 
what gives its possibility. As human beings we exist, at one and the same time, in many 
different and incommensurate orders of time. The immediate now, for instance, is radically 
different in digital and analogue time. In digital time reckoning we say: 'Now it is 8.50. Now 
it is 8.51 etc. Time is manifest as an ever-present punctual moment that cannot ever be 
anything other than 'now'. In analogue time reckoning we say: 'Now it is ten to eight. Now it 
is ten past eight'. Analogue time's immediate now is expressed (both on the clock-face and in 
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the way we say it) as being in a relationship with its before and after, neither of which exists 
in digital time. The now of analogue time is the phenomenal now of our concern. It is the 
matter to hand in the now that matters. It is an immediate present that exists only by virtue of 
the historic andfuture present which are the conditions of its possibility, of its coming-into- 
being. The possibility of live-to-air program transmissions, in which we experience liveness- 
as-immediacy, is given by the structure of the daily programme schedule which, in 
broadcasting, is attuned to the existential arc of days. 
The two ontologies of time expressed in analogue and digital time pieces are implicated in 
two temporal orders of the day. The day, in 24/7 news-time, exists in a continuous, never- 
ending succession of punctual moments that are always in the ever-present now. This strictly 
abstract, numbered and sequential time overrides the natural temporality of the day with its 
immanent structure, rhythm and tempo around which human life, even today, remains 
adjusted. 18 Light and darkness; waking and sleeping-the days of our lives have a natural arc 
of morning, noon and night which is the storyable arc of our own existence too. Life and days 
are inextricably folded into each other and show up in the schedules of the broadcast day in 
which the historic, immediate and future present show up in relation to each other. Good 
Morning America, which Feuer briefly discusses, is a start-of-day program whose live-to-air 
unfolding format performs the task of orienting its audience to the day ahead and all its 
upcoming business. It is not just at that time of day, butfor that time. For Feuer liveness and 
immediacy are essentially ideological. She never sees either as matters of time or as time-that- 
matters. 
Live broadcasting. The two terms must be thought together. We owe it to John Durham 
Peters for a corrective reminder of the communicative affordances of broadcasting, in his 
seminal discussion of Christ's parable of The Sower (Peters 1999: 51-62). To broadcast, 
before radio and television, meant to sow; to scatter seed abroad. In the parable the 
broadcaster is careless of where the seed falls. Some lands on stony ground and is pecked up 
by the birds of the air. Some falls among thorns and is choked as soon as it springs up. Some 
falls on shallow soil, springs up quickly and soon withers. And some falls on fertile soil and 
yields a good harvest; a hundredfold, sixtyfold, thirtyfold. This is inefficient communication 
that is indifferent to its success. It is inefficient because it is indiscriminate. It makes no effort 
18 The time-of-day, like the lunar month and solar year, is a natural (non-human) order of time and is 
both linear and cyclical in its movement. Digital time is motionless and is a perfect example of Zeno's 
paradox of the arrow in flight. In any indivisible instant of its flight is a flying arrow moving or at rest? 
If the former, how can it move in an instant; if the latter, it is never moving, and therefore is at rest 
(Honderich 1995: 922). The punctual moment of digital time, with no 'before' or 'after', appears 
trapped in the eternity of the ever-same now. Groundhog Day is a wonderful exploration of the 
paradoxes of digital and daily time. 
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to disseminate only to chosen, selected and responsive audiences. It allows for rejection and 
indifference. It has no measure of its own success. It is a strictly one-way, or non-reciprocal 
form of communication. But whereas this has usually been regarded as its deficiency, Peters 
sees it is a blessing. To give (to broadcast) without any expectation of return is an 
unconditional communicative act that comes with no strings attached. Any recipient can 
make of it what they will, and that is allowed for. It is unforced, non-coercive communication 
that offers involvement without commitment. In all these ways broadcasting is deeply 
democratic. It is intrinsically non-exclusive and non-binding. Anyone can watch or listen and 
anyone can, if they so choose, disagree with what they see and hear. The generosity of 
broadcasting is strictly impersonal, but allows for persons and their personal opinions. 
Television, history and the world 
The broadcast character of television indicates its spatiality. Its liveness is its particular 
temporality. Together they yield an unprecedented historical here-and-now. History is no 
longer 'then'. It is 'now'. The event is no longer 'there', but 'here'. The now-and-then, the 
here-and-there come together in the live immediacy of broadcast news and events which are 
structured in expectancy of what is to come. These real-time, real-world moments produce a 
spanned and gathered now in which, daily and routinely, countless individual lives and the 
historical life of societies intersect with each other the world over. In such moments each of 
us experiences the news-event as if it spoke to me-and-others now. 19 The world-event, 
through television, impinges directly and immediately, in each individual case, upon me and 
my life. Individuals the world over in live transmissions are not so much spectators as 
witnesses of events . 
20 As witnesses we become implicated in the events themselves. 
Witnesses have communicative entitlements and obligations by virtue of having been present 
at the event. As such we are not just entitled to our views and opinions but we may be called 
upon to bear witness, to testify to what we saw and how we saw it (Peters 200 1). 
19 For a ftiller discussion of the complexities of how 'we' are addressed by radio and television, see 
Scannell 2000. 
20 There is a very basic issue at stake here. The witness has experienced something by virtue of having 
been there. Can the viewer lay claim to an experience having watched something on television? The 
various communicative entitlements of a witness derive from the assumed authenticity of their 
witnessing. That is presumed to be validated by the fact of their presence and their immediate, first- 
hand experience. If television offers mediated, second-hand experience it is inauthentic. I have argued 
it is possible to have an authentic experience watching television and thus to be a witness (Scannell 
1996: 93-116), a claim which underpins the whole of this chapter. See Ellis 2002: 31-36 on television 
as 'live witness realized'. 
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BBC News, 11.09.01: 10.04 pm 
Eyewitness, New York: 
I wuz just standing here watching the World Trade Centre after the first after the first 
plane hit (-) I just saw a second plane come in from the south and hit the whuh south 
tower half way between the bottom and the top of the tower its gotta be a terrorist 
attack I can't tellya anything more th'n that () I saw the plane hit the building 
To re-live a moment such as this testifies to the pain of witnessing. The anguish in the face 
and voice, in the whole body of this anonymous 'man in the street' as he tells what he just 
saw is all caught in the recording. But what is our position, as viewers, in relation to what 
we witness on television? 
Luc Boltanski has eloquently argued that, as 'moral spectators of distant suffering' via 
television, we are unavoidably implicated in what he calls the politics ofpity. In France, if 
you are an immediate witness of suffering, you have a legal obligation to come to the aid of 
the sufferer (Boltanski 1999: 7-17). What, then, is our obligation (if any) as television 
viewers in relation to what we witness? As moral spectators we cannot assume the 
indifference of an objective stance ('that's how it is') and turn away. Wefeel for what we 
see. The politics of pity requires that we take a stand and confront the choice between 
detachment or commitment, a choice made reflexively visible by broadcasting. We may be 
roused (politicised) to act; to protest, to demonstrate or at least to make a donation to an aid 
agency. At the very least we may be roused to speak; to express our indignation, pity, or 
even our malicious pleasure, to discuss with others, to form an opinion on the matter of the 
suffering of others. Through the communicative affordances of today's television, their 
suffering achieves a visibility and publicness which 'presupposes an international public 
space' of discussion (Boltanski 1999: 184), a global public sphere. This is how we, as 
viewers anywhere, encounter the world-historical character of life today. This is how we are 
implicated in what Boltanski calls 'the politics of the present' which responds immediately 
to immediate events. 
Critics of the politics of the present accuse it of a naYve humanitarianism which merely 
responds to the victims of suffering without addressing its causes. Boltanski replies that 'to 
be concerned with the present is no small matter. For over the past, ever gone by, and over 
the future, still non-existent, the present has an overwhelming privilege: that of being real' 
(Boltanski 1999: 192). It is the reality of suffering brought to presence by television 
everywhere, that stirs us to present thought and action. Present actions have no guarantees of 
success. We cannot be wise before the event, though all of us can be wise in its aftermath. 
The CNN newsdesk and other broadcasters on the day had no such available wisdom as they 
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wrestled with the unbelievable events unfolding live and in real time on their screens; yet, by 
the end of that day, news-rooms the world over, had digested, framed and interpreted their 
momentous significance. They had named Osama bin Laden as the likeliest perpetrator of 
the attacks on the United States and correctly anticipated an American-led attack on 
Afghanistan as its likeliest political consequence. Journalists, as historians of the present, 
face and anticipate the future that present events will bring about. They do this on behalf of 
their publics everywhere today. 
Boltanski's meditation on the television news-viewer as moral spectator has a premise that 
this chapter shares-it is through television that we are implicated, day by day on a world- 
wide basis, in the history and politics of the present. The beginnings of that historical 
development was the theme of Jugen Habermas's hugely influential account of the 
emergence of public opinion as the foundation of modem mass, democratic politics 
(Habermas 1989). Habermas pinpointed the moment that the opinions of ordinary citizens 
became historically relevant as the moment that they became politically relevant. When the 
opinions of ordinary people began to impinge on the decisions and actions of those who 
exercised political power, the people themselves became, for the first time, involved in the 
process of making history. The role of media in making public the political-historical 
process was and remains crucial to the formation of critical public opinion as part of that 
process. In the last century the live and broadcast affordances of radio and television have 
drawn us all into the history-making politics of the present which all of us experience 
normally, and normatively, as members of the societies in which we live. Our own situation 
and its attendant circumstances are understood by each of us as embedded in the world- 
historical framework of life today as disclosed, daily and routinely, in television news and 
events wherever and whoever we may be. 
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Chapter Nine 
The meaning of broadcasting in the digital era 
Twenty years ago the Peacock Report on The Financing ofBroadcasting endorsed direct 
consumer choice, assumed that subscription would eventually replace the license fee and 
ended with the hope that Britain would soon 'reach a position where the mystique is taken out 
of broadcasting and it becomes no more special than publishing became once the world 
became used to living with the printing press' (HMSO 1986: para. 711, p. 15 1). It reluctantly 
concluded that public service broadcasting (PSB) was defensible as a corrective to market 
failure in commercial television services because it provided those special 'minority' 
programmes of cultural value that commercial TV failed to supply. Peacock was the first 
Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry into British broadcasting led by an economist (Sir Alan 
Peacock) and written in the language of economics. The vocabulary and concepts of Peacock 
define the terms in which the new regulatory authority, Mom, deals with broadcasting today. 
The enquiry into the funding of the BBC was partly driven by political animus because 
Margaret Thatcher disliked the BBC and the principle it represented. It was also driven by the 
genuine problem of justifying the license fee in a new television age of multi-channel 
services, just around the comer, that would vastly extend consumer choice beyond the four 
national services then available (BBC I and 2, ITV and Ch4). But what happened? Not a 
plethora of tv channels in a noisy marketplace of competition, but the emergence in the 1990s 
of a new 'big beast' in the British media landscape-BSkyB. Today the two key players, in 
the business of tv and radio provision, are the BBC and Sky. 
In this essay I want set aside the economic and policy issues concerning the regulation of 
broadcasting today-matters of immediate concern in the UK at this moment, with the BBC's 
charter under review-and try to think of what essentially broadcasting means today, and 
whether it matters any more. It is no longer a question of public service versus the market, I 
suggest, but of whether broadcasting is a relevant way of delivering services in today's 
world. Digital technologies, satellite and cable 
delivery systems and the new media (the 
extraordinary growth, in less than ten years, of the 
Internet and world wide web) pose the 
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challenge today: has broadcasting in any fonn a future in the so-called digital age of the 2 I't 
century? 
Broadcasting as dissemination 
We should remember that 'broadcasting' is an old, rural term that found a new technological 
application and meaning in the early 20th century. It was used to describe the transmission 
effect of wireless telephony, a technology that extended wired telephony by providing links 
between two transmission-reception points without the necessity of lines (above or below 
ground or water) to make the connection. In point-to-point communication-the original 
intentional application-the side-effect of transmission (that anyone else within range of 
reception and with adequate receiving equipment could also pick it up) was a minus rather 
than a plus. The general social application of the technology for informational and 
entertainment purposes was discovered in the 1920s when wireless broadcasting began. John 
Durham Peters has recently reminded us of the true force and significance of this word by 
reconnecting it to Christ's parable of The Sower which he takes as the paradigm for 
communication as dissemination in contrast with the other great communicative paradigm of 
dialogue, exemplified by the discourse and method of Socrates (Peters 1999). 
Historically it is clear that radio was conceived as a technology for extending dialogue, but 
discovered its true communicative role as broadcast dissemination. Dialogue is a personal 
two-way interaction between people. Dissemination is an impersonal one-to-many one-way 
system of communication. To broadcast, before radio, meant to scatter seed abroad. Christ 
stands before a large anonymous crowd, gathered on the shore of the Sea of Galilee and tells 
them a story. The sower goes out one day to scatter his seed: some falls on stony ground and 
is pecked up by the birds of the air; some falls among thorns and is choked as soon as it 
springs up; some falls on shallow soil, springs up quickly but soon withers and dies. And 
some falls on fertile soil and yields a good harvest; thirty fold, sixty fold, a hundredfold. The 
story is, of course, Christ's discourse on his own method as a teacher, on what he is doing 
even as he speaks to the assembled crowd. 
Socrates, Peters tells us, argued for insemination as more virtuous than dissemination. 
Insemination is to implant the seed in another where it will bear fruit. Dissemination is like 
the sin of Onan who spilled his seed upon the ground. It is a wasteful scatter for there is no 
guarantee that the seed will, in due course, bear fruit. Put like this, Christ's method of 
communication is scandalously inefficient. But that, Peters stunningly argues, is its 
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disinterested kindness and generosity. The parable of the sower makes manifest, in its form as 
much as its message, that the love of God (agape) is indiscriminately available for all, not just 
the few that are open and receptive to the Word. Broadcasting is a fundamentally democratic 
form of communication. But more than this, and crucially, it is like the love of God in that it 
is non-reciprocal. It gives without any expectation of a return. It neither expects nor requires 
acknowledgement and thanks. It is one-way and unconditional and for anyone and everyone 
anywhere anytime. It cannot be reciprocated. This is the blessing of broadcast communication 
and its indiscriminate scatter. 
Peters, then, offers two paradigms of communication; one, a dialogue of intimacy and 
reciprocity, the other of indiscriminate mass dissemination. It is a contrast between two kinds 
of love, eros and agape: human and divine, non-transcendent and transcendent, personal and 
impersonal, individual and social, present and absent, embodied and disembodied, immediate 
and mediated. In Britain the public service model of broadcasting was understood, from its 
beginning, in terms of Christ's parable. Broadcasting House, the home of the BBC from 1932, 
has a famous sculpture over the entrance of Prospero and Ariel. Inside, in the foyer, there is 
another less well known carving by the same Catholic sculptor, Eric Gill, of The Sower. The 
key feature of the British model from the start, its core commitment, was to the universal 
dissemination of its radio service as an inclusive public good. Public service has been, and 
remains to this day, the dominant and still valued means whereby truly broadcast services are 
delivered in Britain and other Northern European countries. Nor does it exist in isolation from 
other public services-health and education. The continuing political will of electorates to 
support such services, in spite of the neo-Conservative challenge of the 1980s, indicates the 
direction taken by Britain and other northern European countries since the 2d World War as 
one that favours social democracy. The USA of course has favoured a different version of 
democracy; one that is strongly libertarian, that favours individual endeavour, that rejects 
central government and is suspicious of any notion of the public good. The wholly marginal 
position of public service broadcasting in the USA (an audience share of 2% and largely 
dependent on voluntary donations) is indicative of this. 
Broadcasting, as the parable and Peters make quite clear, is wasteful, inefficient 
communication. But is that a blessing or a curse? From the start less wasteful and more 
efficient methods of distribution have been sought, by those who regard radio and television 
as a business like any other, that target only paying customers: pay-per-channel, ideally pay- 
per-view, narrowcasting, in short. The political demand, in the UK today, to justify public 
services in economic terms is, while understandable (value for tax-payers' money must be 
demonstrated), in the end paradoxical. The reasons and justifications for public services are, 
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ultimately ethical and political; they are concerned with what we think a good society should 
be like and the political form it should take. They are underpinned by a commitment to 
common goods. Economic rationality is normatively thought in ternis of individual goods- 
profit is private, and rational choice theory presupposes self-interest as its start and end point. 
It may help to rationalise the delivery of common goods, preventing waste and corruption, but 
it can never justify them. Americans are cynical about their radio and television services 
because they see them simply as businesses and, therefore, exploitative. They treat their 
media, to paraphrase de Tocqueville, as kings do their courtiers: they enrich and despise them. 
A viable public sector, of which broadcasting is a part, presupposes as the condition of its 
existence, trust in the political institutions of public life and those who serve them. 
Democracy does not depend on public trust for it has many forms, but the particular form of 
democracy that has developed in Northern Europe clearly does. 
Broadcasting and liveness 
Radio and television are time based media. It is 'empty' time that is filled by their schedules 
and time that is consumed in listening and watching. The very first weekly publication of the 
BBC in 1923 was Radio Times and it's still on sale on sale today. What are the times of 
radio? Sylviane Agacinski makes the point beautifully: 
We cannot speak of the time, as if it were homogeneous, unifiable by a single 
measure and a single history. There are different orders of temporality 
(corresponding to the tempos of various events) just as there are different orders 
of historicity. 
Today, the universal clocks are the audio-visual media, and the clock-radio is the 
object that best represents the takeover, the makeover, of the clock. Indeed, this 
object is not a simple means for being awoken by music or the morning news; it 
is the concrete sign that we live in the time of the radio, in the time of the media 
and their programs. 
[Agancinski 2003: 46-7. Original emphases] 
Agacisinski contrasts the time of the media with older historical temporalities-the rhythm of 
the sun, the seasons, the harvest. But really the time of the media stands in contrast to the time 
of the masses; industrial, factory time whose coercive, punitive and disciplinary character was 
fully explored by Edward Thompson (1963) long before Foucault wrote Discipline and 
Punish. The time of the media means, in the first place, timefor the media. Societies of which 
daily radio and television services are an integral part have of necessity risen above 
subsistence economies and the realm of necessity. They bespeak a world in which the 'silent 
majorities' have at the very least a marginal surplus of money and time to spend on the 
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purchase and use of radio and television sets as pastimes. The transition from the time of the 
masses to the time of the media depended on the decisive world-shattering, world- 
transforming event of the last century; the 1939-45 war, the historical hinge of the 20 th 
century. 
Let's say, to simplify greatly, that in the first half of the 20'hcentury it seemed as if human 
beings existed to serve the tremendous apparatuses (economic, political, technological, 
cultural) that dominated their lives, threatened the liquidation of their individuality and 
produced them as the silent, passive, manipulated masses. This was the world of mass 
production, mass politics and mass culture-the time of the masses. At the end of the 2& 
century this world has disappeared. That is the real meaning of post-modernity. The transition 
from Fordism to post-Fordism, as the British Left saw it in the 1980s, signalled 'The end of 
the masses' (Hall and Jacques 1989; Hebdige 1989). Raymond Williams had noted this much 
earlier, in the 1950s when the decisive, silent transformation began: 'There are no masses any 
more, there are only other people'. In the 1950s a new conception of culture began to appear 
at exactly the same time as a new politics' and an economy geared to the production of 
domestic appliances or consumer durables. The 1950s is the key decade of the second half of 
the last century: in it we see emerging a new historical phenomenon called 'everyday life'. 
This is the beginning of 'the age of television' and the time of the media, in which time no 
longer dominates and oppresses individuals but begins to be something that they manage and 
occasionally enjoy as part of their ordinary, everyday life. To understand this time is to 
grapple with the meaning of live broadcast radio and television which is intimately entwined 
in the historical emergence of everyday life as a particularising order of historical time. 
We experience the liveness of broadcasting in the immediate now of the particular 
programme; the soccer match, say, or the news. But that is an effect of something larger and 
more difficult to grasp; namely the times of the schedules and the temporality of every day 
life. The day is a natural order of time (it is not a human invention like hours and minutes). 
Each day has an immanent structure, rhythm and tempo around which human life, even today, 
remains adjusted. Light and darkness; waking and sleeping; morning, noon and night: a 
natural order of time that is both linear and irreversible and infinitely cyclical and repetitive. 
Each day goes through the same cycle as every other day. Human life is 'naturally' in the first 
place and historically and culturally in the second place adjusted to the rhythm and cycle of 
1 The women's movement and the civil rights movement. 
Both appear in 1950s America and give rise 
to what is later labelled 'Identity politics' or 
'the politics of recognition' (Taylor 1994). The refusal of 
Rosa Parkes to give up her seat to a white passenger in Montgomery, Alabama on I December 1955- 
the trigger of the civil rights movement-is exemplary of the new politics of everyday 
life. 
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days. Today we live in the order of days just as other cultures in other times lived in the order 
of the seasons: the time to sow and the time to reap. The days of our lives have a natural arc 
of morning, noon and night which is the storyable arc of our own existence too. Life and days 
are inextricably folded into each other and show up in the schedules of the broadcast day in 
which the historic andfuture present show up in relation to each other in the immediate 
present of live-to-air transmissions. 
The future present shows up as a set of expectations at the beginning of each day. Start-of-day 
news and indeed all early morning live-to-air programmes on radio and television are not just 
at that time butfor that time. In all sorts of ways a rolling three-hour news and discussion 
programme, such as the aptly named Today on BBC Radio 4 that starts at six am each 
weekday morning, is concerned with the day ahead and all the upcoming and ongoing issues 
that will mark Today as this day in particular. The routine, recurring time-checks, weather and 
traffic reports provide relevant data that allow listeners to orient themselves to and prepare for 
the day ahead. End-of-day news (BBC 1, News at Ten) looks back on what was anticipated in 
start-of-day news. It brings the events of the-day-now-past into the present in its live-to-air 
reports and interviews. This is the retrospective historic present, concerned with what has 
just-now happened and what it meant. It too exists in and for its own and particular time-of- 
day. It summarises, assesses and, where appropriate, brings closure to the now-ending day. 
The weather reports that immediately follow nightly news are oriented to tomorrow. News 
junkies, who switch to Newsnight (BBC 2: 10.30pm) after the news, know that they will get 
further discussion and comment on the events of the day. The programme always ends with a 
brief look at tomorrow's newspaper headline stories, thereby indicating closure and 
renewal-back to the future! 
Thus routinely, day by day, the broadcasting schedule articulates and expresses each day in 
its prospective and retrospective character-its ontology of expectations, its assessments of 
whether they were met-in the live momentum of the phenomenal now from morning 
through to night. If we can meaningfully speak of radio and television as part of our lives it is 
because (and only because) their services articulate the existential structure of the days of our 
lives while at the same time connecting each and all of us, day in day out, to the life of the 
world in its manifest, manifold diversity. This double articulation of life (my life linked to the 
life of the world) is endlessly reiterated in news and other programmes in the course of each 
and every day as we and broadcasting move through it from morning to night. This is the 
unobtrusive world-historical character of television and radio broadcasting today and it 
depends upon the fact that it is live. 
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Underpinning all this is a continuing interactive conversation between the broadcasters and 
their audiences. Broadcast radio and television services in fact combine Peters' two 
communicative paradigms of dialogue and dissemination. They talk continuously to their 
viewers and listeners; not just in news programmes and all studio based talk, quiz, game and 
people programmes but in the crucial in-between continuity segments that segue from one 
programme to another, that point to future programmes, that forecast the weather and so forth. 
The relationship through the day and from day to day, between broadcasters and audiences is 
essentially a real-time communicative relationship realised in talk-the universal 
communicative medium of everyday life. Each and every listener or viewer encounters this as 
an aspect of their own experience; as if broadcasting spoke to, in each case, me. At the same 
time, each one of knows that what we have seen and heard has also been seen and heard, at 
exactly the same time and in the same way, by countless others. Each and all of us has a 
communicative entitlement to speak of what we have witnessed in live broadcasting, which 
thereby creates the conditions of common experiences as the basis of the formation of public 
opinions and tastes. 
BSkyB as a media superstore 
Most work on audiences concentrates on their responses to this or that particular programme. 
Less attention has been given to the experience of listening and watching as such. I want to 
consider for a moment the experience of watching BSkyB's digital satellite service in order to 
compare it with that of broadcast television as I have just described it. At the heart of Sky's 
extraordinary success in the last ten years is the way in which it has brought order to chaos 
and tidied up the experience of access to the new world of multi-channel television and radio. 
The key to the Sky experience is the Electronic Program Guide (EPG). In the early days of 
satellite television you could access lots of different channels, but they came up randomly, 
you had no idea what you were looking at or what their schedule was. You would hit many 
channels that were either a snow-blizzard or encrypted so you hadn't a clue what they were 
(apart from the heavy breathing). Watching satellite television was a frustrating hit and miss 
experience to which the EPG was a brilliant technological solution. 
The EPG functions like a home-shopping catalogue. It provides clear, easy and fast access to 
any of the one thousand television and radio channels on the menu. When you turn on, the 
initial display screen offers 10 options: all channels, entertainment, movies, sport, news, kids, 
music and radio, specialist, A-Z and personal planner. With the buttons of the remote (a key 
part of the technology) you can quickly toggle through to the channel you want. A text-frame 
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at the bottom of the screen-it disappears after thirty seconds-tells you the date and time, 
the channel and the title of the programme as well as displaying various interactive options. 
At any time you can check what's coming up next and, indeed, the schedule for the rest of the 
day. Channel browsing is very easy and you always know where you are and what you're 
looking at. The many hundreds of channels have been sorted and stacked together: God? Sex? 
Sport? Music? Travel? Shopping? DIY? Gambling? All these and much more have been 
conveniently grouped together, the way goods are stacked and displayed in the supermarket: 
this aisle for dairy products, that for meat and so on. Once you get used to the EPG, just as 
once you know where things are in the supermarket, browsing through them is a comfortable 
and similar experience. 
But the EPG is a highly sophisticated piece of equipment that allows much more than easy 
channel browsing. It is essentially an interactive device for the customisation of viewing. You 
can identify and mark your own channel favourites so you can call them up directly. You can 
earmark a particular programme you want to see later and a get a reminder when it's time to 
watch it. And the live channels have a red button which brings up an interactive menu that 
offers a range of alternative choices to what's on screen; particularly useful for news and 
sports programmes. The latest refinement is Sky+ which adds a DVR (digital video recorder) 
and other technical goodies to the basic Sky package. The DVR needs no tape, for the hard 
drive of the digibox can hold up to 20 hours of recorded material (60 hours on Sky+ 160) that 
you can arrange as you wish into your own viewing schedule. You can record two other 
channels simultaneously. You can record a whole series-the Series Link feature will do this 
automatically and avoid recording repeats and omnibus editions. While watching live 
programmes-Sky News, say, or a live game on a premium sports channel (for which you 
pay extra)-you can pause them to answer the phone or whatever and you can if you wish, 
fast-forward when you return to catch up with the action in real time or carry on from where 
you stopped. You can also rewind whenever you want: instant replays on demand. Sky's core 
concept is personalised viewing; the perfection of individual consumer choice that the 
Peacock Report dreamt of. Sky+ adds the refinement of flexitime; viewing in your own time 
as well as the power to stop and reverse time in live programmes. Sky offers a supermarket 
conception of the meaning of choice, attuned to late 20thcentury post-modem post-industrial 
lifestyles that have become increasingly individualised. 
Sky is very clever and very successful. It makes television something you can customise to 
your convenience in much the same way that you can customise your own favourite music 
selections with MP3s. As such it is the antithesis of traditional broadcast services. It has the 
effect of privatising the experience of radio and television. First, and crucially, it destroys the 
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significance of the schedules which are rendered strictly meaningless: that is to say, the time 
at which any programme appears has no particular point, nor any meaning in relation to any 
other programme. Thereby the channels themselves become largely redundant. They are 
simply time-stores in which individual programmes of a certain kind (sport, music, sex) are 
held. What counts is the huge diversity of programmes on offer. From all the channels 
available you pick the programmes that you want, to watch at leisure. It is convenience 
television based on individual customer sovereignty and choice. It removes the experience of 
television from public time into the private times of private individuals. The Sky experience is 
typically in my time. The time of the world has disappeared. 
The defining characteristic of broadcasting is its worldliness, which is the hidden meaning of 
publicness. I have tried to show this as the effect live-to-air transmission which creates a 
spanned and gathered now that brings together into the public worldly time of the programme 
all who watch and listen. In this common, public time the common experience of a common 
world is created. We experience this with sometimes shattering intensity in great events or 
disasters, but such exceptional moments depend upon the routine structure of schedules 
attuned to the existential arc of days and a continuing communicative dialogue between 
broadcasters and their listeners and viewers-the two distinguishing characteristics of live 
broadcast public services. With Sky you create your own television time from a large and 
diverse supply of programmes available for you to pick and mix. With BBC services you 
attune your time to the times of broadcasting and the time of the world. Sky digital makes 
television a personal life-style accessory. Broadcasting makes it part of your daily life 
connected day by day to the life of the world. 
I have mainly been concerned with television but it's important not to forget radio which is 
arguably the more important broadcast medium of daily life. Radio listening in the last few 
years has increased a little, while viewing has correspondingly declined. More people listen to 
radio in Britain each day than they watch television. The unique communicative affordance 
of radio is that you don't have to stop doing other things and watch it as you must with 
television. Radio allows us all to do two at least things at once: to listen and get up and 
dressed, and drive to work, and work at the computer, and cook or do the housework or go to 
bed and read. The structure of daily listening (with its early morning and drive time peaks) 
compared with that of viewing confirms that radio is a through-the-day medium whereas 
television is what it has always been, essentially an evening leisure time activity-at least for 
the working population. Radio today is the primary communicative medium of daily life 
because it is more accessibly and intimately connected to the daily time-routines of the 
working week while television is more attuned to the pleasures of the weekend. And in the 
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UK there's no doubt that BBC radio services have a much more distinctively public service 
character than its television services. Thus, in thinking about PSB today it is important to 
unbundle radio and television, to recognise their differences and that people use them 
differently, at different times of day and for different purposes. One is not more important 
than the other. It is the combination of both that matters for us. 
The meaning of publicness 
Broadcasting then is the sum of radio and television and is greater than what each part offers 
individually. Yet public discussion today of the future of PSB as the BBC's charter is under 
review is focused exclusively in terms of television. What escapes recognition and 
acknowledgement is that both mediums are important in people's daily lives in different ways 
and at different times. But people are never discussed by the policy wonks. Their talk is 
always of citizen-consumers-a convenient ideological fiction that suits the politicians (with 
talk of citizens) and the economists in Ofcom (with talk of consumers). But real people do not 
conceive of themselves as either as they watch and listen. That has been my concern: the 
experience of radio and television today and what it means for people as an aspect of their 
lives. 
It is natural enough to think of the experience of radio and television in terms of the 
programmes that we listen to and watch. Public discussion of PSB today is very much in 
terrns of trying to identify (and then to protect) certain kinds of program that have some added 
'public value'; documentaries, religious, ethnic minority and children's programmes, 
'serious' drama. These are the terms in which Ofcorn sets the agenda for discussion. But it 
misses the essential point about the meaning of PSB. 
It is not just, or in the first place, about programme content. Obviously any television service 
must somehow supply a content. But the key question is: What determines the content 
supplied? And the answer very much depends on how the supplier conceives of those for 
whom the contents of the services are intended. To conceive of the recipient as a consumer 
(as Post-Peacock debate in the UK does unquestioningly) is to change fundamentally the 
meaning of PSB. In fact it renders meaningless its core commitment to publicness understood 
as the general public and its general public interest. It marks a regression to pre-20thcentury 
forms of public life and experience such as existed before the advent of radio broadcasting. 
What was public life and what were publics then? They were always particular publics that 
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gathered in a particular place at a particular time for a particular event. These typically 
consisted of political, religious, sporting or cultural occasions: the political rally or state 
occasion, the church service, the cricket or football match; the opera, concert or theatre. 
Which ever case you take it is clear that the public is always a minority interest public of 
some sort; a self-selecting, self-defining body of the faithful gathered together for a common 
purpose. Access to all such occasions was limited by a number of factors that depended not 
only on time and money but also, and crucially, on availability. The vast majority of people 
before broadcasting had never heard or seen the king, the prime minister or a full-scale 
symphony orchestra performing in concert, simply because they lived too far from the 
metropolitan centres where public life, people and events were situated. Even the reading 
publics of books, magazines and newspapers remained interest publics of some kind; 
particular political opinion publics, taste publics, gendered publics. 
We entirely fail to understand the significance of broadcasting if we do not recognise the 
structurally different public that it created: the general public, society at large, anyone and 
everyone within range of reception and in possession of a decent receiving apparatus. Now 
anyone anywhere could hear the voice of the monarch or political leaders of the day, had live 
and direct access to a football match or a symphony concert or a religious service from church 
and much more besides. Events that had hitherto been for particular publics, now became 
generally available and of general interest to the new general public. The general public is not 
an amalgam of particular publics writ large. Nor is the general interest that it creates the sum 
of particular interests. The general interest marks the broadening and deepening of the range 
of experiences of public life and events that are available to us as individuals. Through 
broadcasting many things of potential interest to all but hitherto inaccessible, now became 
available to all. I may like to watch, for instance, international soccer or rugby and be 
occasionally enthralled by it. That does not mean I am a fan. Fans constitute a particular 
community of interest who follow the game (more exactly, their club) week in week out. 
They are prepared to pay for access to Sky's premium sports channels to follow their passion. 
The general interest in international sport continues to be protected by the listed events in 
broadcasting acts that grant a right of access to them on behalf of the free-to-air terrestrial 
broadcasters and the general public whom they serve. It is designed to prevent the removal of 
such events from the common public domain and their privatisation for particular paying 
interest publics. 
The general public and its general interests are the unique effect of radio and television 
broadcasting which produced it as a matter of fact, almost as a by-product of their generous, 
indiscriminate scatter. The discovery of this new public and the working through of what it 
188 
meant took time but it is a process that, from the beginning through to the present, lies at the 
heart of the meaning of democracy. We should never forget what a recent thing mass 
representative democracy is, nor how fragile it seemed in the first half of the last century. 
The establishment of mass representative democracy in the UK (the Representation of the 
People Act, 1918) coincided with the beginning of broadcasting that supplied the 
unprecedented, unique and necessary conditions through which the meaning of democracy 
could be continuously and routinely worked through. It made the demos, the people, the 
whole population, into an audience with live access to a host of worldly events, public 
discussions, entertainment and cultural resources that were hitherto beyond the reach of the 
vast majority.. The general public is first and last a political public, the communicative 
realisation of the democratic process, the means by which a dialogue is maintained routinely, 
day in day out, between the public world of politics and the private worlds of individuals. 
When constituted as a public service, broadcasting is neither part of the state, nor of civil 
society. It is an independent public body, answerable to both and charged with the task of 
maintaining the necessary conditions of public life for all, independent of class, age, sex, 
religion or ethnicity. This huge task has been discharged, never without difficulty or tension, 
but on the whole successfully by national broadcasters such as the BBC. 
It is because the audience, in public service broadcasting is acknowledged as the general 
public that it has developed its characteristic method for the delivery of mixed program 
services in national channels that reach all parts of the country. Only in this way does it fulfil 
its representative remit which is at the heart of its democratic mandate. On the one hand the 
service is for each and all, irrespective of who they are or where they live. On the other hand, 
within the GBP (the Great British Public), there are of course a host of differences that 
depend on age, class, sex, beliefs, tastes, attitudes and where you happen to live. The historic 
task of PSB has been to cater for these differences within the general public through programs 
that acknowledge their particular preferences and circumstances, while preserving it as the 
general public in the first and last instance. If there is such a thing as the general interest it is 
expressed and maintained by mixed programme services for the general public. In the UK the 
national terrestrial tv channels, BBC Radio4 and the World Service still maintain a mix of 
programmes in their daily output, but under increasing market pressure. 
Audiences defined as consumers will naturally be considered in terms of their particular 
interests and for which they are willing to pay. Under market conditions the general interest 
and the general public collapses. The complete range of programmes available on Sky's EPG 
represents the total mix (and more) of the terrestrial PSB television channels. But what has 
disappeared is the appearance of the elements in the mix, side by side in a single programme 
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service or channel through the changing days, weeks and months of the year. Generic 
programming has replaced it. Instead of religious programmes on Sundays, or sport on 
Saturdays or children's programmes at tea-time each has been repackaged as an all-day 
everyday customised option for a particular public. Religious, sporting and children's 
programs now no longer appear in relation to each other, at particular times of the day and 
week, as part of a common public domain. Each has been withdrawn from the general public 
and the general interest. Each now represents only a self-selecting, self-defining minority. All 
have regressed to those 19thcentury publics made up of discrete, self-involved communities 
of interest that acknowledge nothing outside themselves (community broadcasting is not in 
principle democratic). 
Mass democracy grants formal political equality to all and is (like justice) blind to difference. 
Its fundamental principle is inclusion. On the other hand, and only as a result of their 
inclusion, there have been growing demands for rights on the part of hitherto excluded 
groups; the new social movements of the late 20th century and the politics of recognition. The 
politics of culture, since the 1980s, has emphasised difference, diversity and choice. It may 
look like the triumph of consumption as life-style, but it is more than that. Culture, for most 
of the 20thcentury, was supplied by the culture industries. The new communication 
technologies of the last twenty years or so increasingly allow individuals to customise their 
own taste preferences and to create their own cultures. A host of new lightweight portable 
audio/visual appliances have come onto the market recently that depend on digitisation, 
computers and the Internet; MP3s and iPods, digital cameras, video-cams and image scanners, 
CDs and DVDs, the latest generation of mobile phones. Individual and family home-pages, 
on-line text- and photo-blogging, text-messaging and the exchange of digital images (still and 
moving) on mobile phones are all indications of the ways in which individuals now create 
and disseminate statements about themselves, their beliefs, their tastes and their lives. 
Interactivity is the buzzword that partly captures what this transformed and enhanced 
presentation of self in everyday life is about. It is part of the long, complex, continuing 
process of working through the meaning of democratic ways of life. Sky is one contemporary 
response to this general process. 
Conclusion 
The scenario I have described is not an either-or. Sky and other contemporary instances of 
the digital revolution are all part of the personalisation of experience as something that 
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individuals can now manage and manipulate themselves through new everyday technologies 
of self-expression and communication. But these developments do not surpass older broadcast 
technologies of the earlier 20thcentury nor do they replace their function. That function I have 
tried to show is not to be thought of in terms of some notion of the 'value-added' content of 
certain kinds of program. It is much more to do with a communicative relationship between 
broadcasting and the new kind of general public and general interest that its indiscriminate 
scatter created. That relationship exists in an order of time-the living present-that is 
embedded in the natural, existential arc of days and seasons and depends for its possibility 
upon the liveness and immediacy of the technology. I have suggested that broadcasting 
uniquely spans several orders of time-my time, the time of day, the time of institutions, the 
time of the event-and brings them together into a gathered now that joins the lives of 
individuals with the life and times of the world. That is the incomparable communicative 
affordance of live broadcasting. It does this day by day and every day and it is irreplaceable. 
The difficult problem that social democracies face today lies in squaring the circle of 
contradiction between its fundamental inclusiveness that depends on the denial of difference, 
and the demands that inevitably and increasingly arise, once everyone is included, for the 
recognition of the right to be different. The economic, political and cultural developments of 
the late 20thcentury have all been in the direction of diversity, difference and choice. This 
places increasing strain on the unity of the political body, the nation-state, as the guarantor 
and defender both of democratic inclusiveness and the rights of difference. It puts national 
systems of broadcasting, through which these tensions are played out daily and routinely, 
under similar stress. It is in the interest of nation states committed to social democracy to 
preserve such systems for they preserve the principle and practice of a common public life 
against all those contemporary forces that fragment it. The enrichment of private life and 
experience is no bad thing. It is one side of the democratic coin that makes possible self- 
realisation and fulfilment. But if it takes place at the expense of public life and experience- 
the other side of the coin-it has catastrophic consequences for the meaning of democracy. 
Broadcasting, pace Peacock, is not a business like any other. Sky is-rightly and properly-a 
business geared to individual consumers. The BBC- equally rightly and properly-is not a 
business at all. It is at heart a political matter. That is why state-regulated public services 
developed in the 20th century as its rationalisation and justification. Public service, as is now 
abundantly clear, is the only means of guaranteeing broadcast radio and television services. 
And in our world, broadcasting remains an indispensable guarantor of open, common forms 
of democratic public life. It is a mark of how far we have lost sight of the essential meaning 
of broadcasting that it is discussed today in the language of economics and consumer choice 
and the political rhetoric of citizenship. 
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